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Preface 
 
 
When this author was eleven years old, France began a series of nuclear tests 
at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific – to worldwide protest and criticism. I vividly 
remember the opposition articulated within Australia, and this was my first 
introduction to the controversy generated by nuclear testing. The French tests between 
1995 and 1996 were the last that nation carried out before committing to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but they showcased how far the norm that governed 
nuclear weapons testing had shifted since the early Cold War. The conduct of nuclear 
tests for the purposes of weapons development was not considered an acceptable 
reason to risk environmental damage and diplomatic opprobrium. 
It is within this context that I have sought to construct a history of nuclear 
testing – albeit a history earlier in time and removed in location – and to reconcile 
testing with its modern controversy. The thesis that follows was, to borrow the words 
of Milovan Djilas, “the product of productive forces.” Foremost was an interest in 
nuclear doctrine and strategy that I explored in my undergraduate and Honours years. 
While reading Richard Rhodes’s account of the development of the hydrogen bomb, I 
became interested in nuclear testing, which Rhodes demonstrated was crucial to the 
evolution of that weapon. But the kind of operational history of testing that Rhodes 
touched upon was almost entirely missing from the literature. Nuclear testing is 
primarily discussed in terms of its radiological effect – upon the environment, and 
upon populations close to test sites. This otherwise excellent body of work fails to 
satisfactorily explain the acute importance of nuclear testing to the history of the Cold 
War. 
  iv 
Similarly, while searching for a topic for my doctoral dissertation, I read the 
work of Michael Quinlan, who argued that thinking about nuclear weapons and 
nuclear doctrine was largely speculative because the human experience of nuclear 
conflict was limited to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the merciful 
absence of greater experience with nuclear conflict does not, I argue, render nuclear 
thought speculative: much knowledge about the use and consequence of nuclear 
weapons was acquired through their detonation as weapons tests. 
This thesis, then, responds to a gap in a literature and refutes the idea that all 
nuclear thought is based on supposition. Its purpose is to rationalise nuclear testing 
and present testing as an important component of the wider history of the Cold War. 
Through testing, nuclear arsenals were refined and perfected, and, as a result of that 
process, humanity acquired, for the first time in its evolution, the awesome ability to 
destroy itself. 
This thesis adopts an intellectual history of discourse within the Harry S. 
Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy Administrations between 1945 
and 1963. By presenting a history of the written record of these administrations, I am 
able to identify the connections between nuclear weapons tests and nuclear thought, 
and trace the evolution of both. The early history of U.S. testing is valuable not just 
for its historical perspective on the world’s foremost nuclear power, but also for what 
it tells us about those states in the modern international community who are currently 
pursuing, or will in the future pursue, a nuclear test program. 
 
 
David M. Blades 
Melbourne, August 2013  
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Introduction 
This Awesome Field 
 
 
In March 1954, the United States conducted a series of thermonuclear tests in 
the Pacific known as Operation CASTLE. Included in this series was CASTLE 
BRAVO, the largest nuclear test ever carried out by the United States, and also the 
worst single incident of fallout exposure in the history of the U.S. testing program. 
Lewis L. Strauss, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was present and 
observed these tests; he returned to Washington at the end of the month and made a 
public statement in response to public fears generated by the BRAVO test. Among his 
less-than-reassuring comments on nuclear weapons and their testing, Strauss 
described nuclear testing as “this awesome field.”1 
The field of nuclear testing is indeed an awesome one, in the truest sense of 
the word. At the most basic level, nuclear tests involved overwhelmingly energetic 
reactions measured in thousands and millions of tons of conventional explosive 
equivalent, reactions powered by the same energies that fuel stars. Nuclear weapons 
tests represented the pinnacle of scientific knowledge, and humanity’s ability to 
manipulate the fundamental structures of the universe. Nuclear fission had been 
discovered in the year before the outbreak of the Second World War; fission weapons 
had been developed during the course of the war; and their use at its end seemed to 
successfully conclude the conflict. Nuclear weapons were thus closely connected to 
the conclusion of a thoroughly transformative conflict, and their development and 
                                                
1 Statement by Lewis L. Straus, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 31 March 
1954; Press Conferences Series, Box 2; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President 
of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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refinement, propelled by the competition of the Cold War, continued in the post-war 
years. Through nuclear tests, first the United States and then the Soviet Union created 
deadly arsenals of nuclear weapons and made plans for their use. The threat these 
arsenals posed was existential not just for the belligerents of a war fought with them, 
but, eventually, for the species as a whole. Nuclear tests were the most visible, 
spectacular and awesome demonstration of the power of nuclear weapons, and it is for 
this reason that nuclear testing was undeniably an “awesome field.” 
However, this it not to suggest that this thesis is devoted to that awesomeness. 
The testing of nuclear weapons was also an important aspect of the wider history of 
the Cold War. The two superpowers that remained standing at the end of the Second 
World War eyed each other suspiciously over their fallen adversaries, and through 
nuclear tests they refined their nuclear arsenals. The development of nuclear 
weaponry and comprehension of their effects was only possible through the test series 
conducted in the first two decades of the Cold War. Furthermore, test series on 
occasion assumed political and diplomatic significance wholly divorced from their 
technical and developmental importance. Nuclear tests were more than a thread of the 
fabric of the Cold War. They were intimately connected to the crises that punctuated 
its history, and, together with those crises, were a vivid expression of the contest that 
the term, Cold War, describes. 
Despite their significance, or because of it, nuclear tests have since CASTLE 
BRAVO in 1954 been associated with radiological contamination, fallout, and their 
environmental and health effects. Literature that relates specifically to nuclear testing 
frames it in just this manner, and tends to date from the end of the Cold War.2 Vital 
                                                
2 Wide-focus examples include "Radioactive Heaven and Earth: The Health and 
Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, On and Above the Earth,"  in 
International Commission to Investigate the Health and Environmental Effects of 
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work has been published on the effect of nuclear testing on indigenous populations 
and the environment in which tests are conducted: examples include Pieter De Vries’ 
Mururoa and Us (1997), Dean Kohlhoff’s Amchitka and the Bomb (2002) and Alan 
Parkinson’s Maralinga (2007).3 Where test series have been discussed from an 
operational perspective – such as Jonathan Weisgall’s excellent account of the 
Operation CROSSROADS tests, or Richard Miller’s history of testing in Nevada – 
the inevitable effect that nuclear testing has had upon displaced or exposed 
populations remains a foremost consideration.4 With respect and appreciation for this 
body of work, this thesis nonetheless seeks to discuss nuclear testing separate from 
these radiological concerns; indeed, it was this emphasis on fallout that helped frame 
one of this author’s basic research questions. 
Nuclear testing has more commonly been presented within the context of a 
more comprehensive examination of a related field. For example, Richard Rhodes’s 
superb The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986) and Dark Sun: The Making of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Nuclear Weapons Production and Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 
(New York: IPPNW, 1991); Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih, ed. 
Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and its Health 
and Environmental Effects (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Philip L. Fradkin, Fallout: 
An American Nuclear Tragedy  (Boulder: Big Earth Publishing, 2004); Steven L. 
Simon and Charles E. Land, "Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests and Cancer 
Risks," American Scientist 94, no. 1 (2006). 
3 Pieter De Vries, Mururoa and Us: Polynesians' Experiences During Thirty Years of 
Nuclear Testing in the French Pacific  (Lyon: Centre de Documentation et de 
Recherche sur la Paix et les Conflicts, 1997); Dean Kohlhoff, Amchitka and the 
Bomb: Nuclear Testing in Alaska  (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); 
Alan Parkinson, Maralinga: Australia's Nuclear Waste Cover-up  (Sydney: ABC 
Books, 2007). Another example of a narrowed focus on a test series and its 
radiological effect is E.P. Cronkite, R.A. Conard, and V.P. Bond, "Historical Events 
Associated with Fallout from Bravo Shot - Operation Castle and 25 Y of Medical 
Findings," Health Physics 73, no. 1 (1997). 
4  Jonathan Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll  
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994); Richard L. Miller, Under the Cloud: The 
Decades of Nuclear Testing  (New York: Free Press, 1986). 
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Hydrogen Bomb (1995) discuss nuclear test series within the wider history of the 
atomic and hydrogen bomb and their development.5 Similarly, David Alan Rosenberg 
makes fleeting mention of early U.S. test series within a study of the evolution of 
doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons; while both Robert A. Divine’s Blowing on 
the Wind (1978) and Benjamin P. Greene’s Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the 
Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1945-1963 (2007) investigate nuclear testing only within 
their wider discussion of the test ban debate.6 Missing from the historiography is a 
comprehensive and dedicated history of nuclear testing and an analysis of its 
profound consequences on nuclear thought and even the course of the Cold War. The 
closest example is the work of the late Chuck Hansen. His book U.S. Nuclear 
Weapons: The Secret History (1988) is an exceedingly rare work that, like Rhodes, 
focuses on testing as it relates to the technical development of nuclear weaponry.7 
The historiography related to nuclear testing, inadequate as it is, raises 
important questions about nuclear testing itself. That the notion of testing is typically 
approached from the perspective of its radiological perils, or a diplomatic agreement 
to ban tests themselves, speaks to their underlying threat and controversy. Despite 
this, over 1,900 nuclear tests were conducted by the five declared nuclear powers 
                                                
5 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1986); Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb  (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1995). Another example is David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: 
The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994). 
6 David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American 
Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7, no. 4 (1983); Robert A. Divine, 
Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); Benjamin P. Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the 
Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1945-1963  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
7  Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History  (Arlington, TX: 
Aerofax, 1988). Rhodes drew upon Hansen’s work in his own books, and dedicated 
Arsenals of Folly to Hansen. 
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between 1945 and 1992.8 Two questions are posed by this incongruity: firstly, why do 
states conduct nuclear tests, and, secondly, what can be learned from nuclear tests? As 
an investment of government authority, nuclear tests have presumably happened for a 
rational, explainable purpose. At its most basic level, this thesis seeks to reconcile 
nuclear testing with that rational purpose. 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis has adopted a particular focus. A 
comprehensive study of nuclear testing since 1945 would exceed the constraints of a 
doctoral dissertation, and such breadth would risk the deserved depth of its analysis. 
Instead, this examination of nuclear testing is confined to those tests carried out by the 
United States of America between 1945 and 1963. The United States is the natural 
focus for such a study because, as Nina Tannenwald writes in her own examination of 
U.S. non-use of nuclear weapons, the United States 
has seriously considered or threatened the use of nuclear weapons on more 
occasions than any other nuclear power, it has relied on nuclear weapons most 
heavily in its defense and alliance policies, it has steadily resisted any specific 
legal prohibition on first use, and, of course, it is the only country to have 
actually used nuclear weapons in war.9 
 
To these very appropriate reasons to focus on the U.S., this author would 
append that the United States was the first to test nuclear weapons; remained ahead of 
all other powers in significant testing milestones; and has conducted more nuclear 
tests than any other nuclear power. Correspondingly, the thesis is limited in timeframe 
to those tests conducted between July 1945 and November 1963, at which time the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty effectively ended atmospheric nuclear testing and drove 
these experiments underground. This timeframe permits a survey of U.S. atmospheric 
                                                
8 This figure averages out to approximately one test every week. "Radioactive Heaven 
and Earth: The Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing In, On 
and Above the Earth,"  159. 
9 Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis 
of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization, 53:3 (Summer 1999): 438. 
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testing and the shift to underground tests, while also offering the viewpoints of three 
different presidencies on the topic.  
In defining the term “nuclear test,” this author has adapted the definition used 
in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union, signed 
in 1974, a definition also used by the Department of Energy.10 Accordingly, a test is 
defined as a single nuclear explosion or detonation conducted at a test site for the 
ostensible function of advancing weapons design, proving theoretical concepts or 
stockpiled designs, determining weapons effects, and/or for experiments in weapon 
safety. Nuclear tests differ profoundly from tests of conventional weapons through 
their sheer scale: this was remarked as early as 1946, when Lee DuBridge, the 
president of the California Institute of Technology, wrote that “one can do target 
practice with a gun (even a 16 inch gun) in his own ‘backyard’ without foreign 
complications. But brandishing atomic weapons is in a different class.”11 The scale of 
nuclear tests were such that their effect could be measured beyond national borders. 
The history of nuclear testing is an important but sometimes undervalued one. 
Michael Quinlan argued in his book Thinking about Nuclear Weapons that, 
mercifully, the “evaluation of ideas” regarding nuclear weapons is problematic 
                                                
10 The Threshold Test Ban Treaty defines a test as “a single underground nuclear 
explosion conducted at a test site, or two or more underground nuclear explosions 
conducted at a test site within an area delineated by a circle having a diameter of two 
kilometers and conducted within a total period of time of 0.1 second.” "Treaty 
Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (and Protocol Thereto)," ed. 
U.S. Department of State (Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 
1974). Also, "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  (Las 
Vegas, Nevada: United States Department of Energy, December 2000), xv. The final 
U.S. test series discussed in this thesis, Operation STORAX, included experiments in 
simultaneous underground detonations such as those covered by this treaty. 
11 Quoted in Lloyd J. Graybar, "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or 
Bureaucratic Infighting?," The Journal of American History 72, no. 4 (1986): 891. 
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because of a lack of hard evidence; because literature about nuclear war remains 
speculative; and because historians and analysts must rely upon “concepts, hypotheses 
and inferences.”12 But Quinlan makes no mention of the evidence provided by nuclear 
tests, even as he remarks that the “uniquely appalling destructive power” of nuclear 
weapons is “manifest.”13 This thesis argues that much can be and was learned from 
nuclear testing, and that the lessons drawn from testing – be they scientific, doctrinal, 
or political – were rational and compelling reasons to undertake otherwise 
controversial and contentious test series.14 Moreover, nuclear testing is not an issue 
confined to the Cold War of decades past. States continue to test nuclear weapons, or 
consider that option: North Korea has tested nuclear devices in 2006, 2009 and most 
recently in 2013, while Iran, should it continue down what appears its current path, 
will need to test a device in the future to have confidence in its design. Nuclear testing 
remains an important political issue in the twenty-first century, and the study of its 
history is vital. 
In order to examine the history of U.S. nuclear testing, this thesis will be 
structured in two parallel dimensions. Firstly, it presents a narrative of U.S. nuclear 
test series conducted between 1945 and 1963. Secondly, it discusses the ideas 
                                                
12  Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, 
Prospects  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13-14. 
13 Ibid. 
14 The focus of this thesis on overt nuclear testing would seem to exclude Israel, a 
nuclear state with an ambiguous testing history. Yitzhak Rabin discussed the 
relationship between testing and introducing weapons when he met with Paul Warnke 
in 1968 as part of the Johnson Administration’s attempt to limit Israeli strategic 
weapons. Israel argued, playing to its strategy of an indistinct nuclear threat, that 
“throughout the world, experience indicated that the introduction of a weapon could 
only occur after testing. You could not introduce a weapon until after it actually 
became a weapon.” Rabin asked Warnke “Do you consider a nuclear weapon one that 
has not been tested, and has been done by a country without previous experience?” 
Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear And What 
That Means For The World  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 300, 310. 
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generated by these test series. Both dimensions, but particularly the latter, use an 
intellectual history to analyse the thoughts prevalent within the White House as U.S. 
nuclear testing evolved. This thesis uses the documents of three presidential 
administrations – that of Harry S. Truman (1945-1953), Dwight D. Eisenhower 
(1953-1961) and John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) – as the basis of this intellectual 
history, because this author argues that the ideas discussed within the White House 
offer a more comprehensive understanding of nuclear testing than those more focused 
discussions that undoubtedly occurred within the Atomic Energy Commission or the 
Department of Defense. It was the sheer scale and consequence of nuclear weapons 
and their testing that made those weapons more the purview of civilian government 
than any other weapons system. Chapters One, Three and Five provide the history of 
U.S. nuclear testing under the presidencies of Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, 
respectively. Chapters Two, Four and Six are thematic examinations of the evolution 
of nuclear thought as it was influenced by nuclear testing. Chapter Two considers the 
normalisation of nuclear testing, together with the paradigm of weapons design. 15 
Chapter Four discusses the expansion of nuclear testing under Eisenhower, along with 
the important elements of its suspension. Chapter Six considers the political 
dimensions to nuclear testing and the manner in which the test series held under 
Kennedy affected the negotiations for the Limited Test Ban Treaty. These chapters 
shall demonstrate that the testing of nuclear weapons was a rational state act, from 
which much of our knowledge about nuclear weapons and their consequence derives. 
 
  
                                                
15 It should be noted that, of the libraries accessed by the author, there was a 
comparative paucity of material within the Harry S. Truman Library related to nuclear 
testing. The second chapter of this thesis thus makes greater use of secondary sources 
than Chapters Four and Six. 
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Chapter One 
Truman, 1945-1952 
 
 
“We are fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what 
counts in the war with Japan.”  
Letter to Henry Stimson from General Leslie Groves following the Trinity 
test, 18 July 1945. 
 
“The Survey has estimated that the damage and casualties caused at Hiroshima by the 
one atomic bomb dropped from a single plane would have required 220 B-29s 
carrying 1,200 tons of incendiary bombs, 400 tons of high-explosive bombs, and 500 
tons of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs, if conventional weapons, rather than an 
atomic bomb, had been used.”  
United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War),  
1 July 1946. 
 
 
The greatest war in human history in both cost and consequence ended with 
the use of atomic weapons. These weapons represented a qualitative revolution in 
technology and firepower; they had been developed and produced through the years 
of the Second World War, and represented the forefront of scientific knowledge. But 
as the peace of the post-war world turned into Cold War, the weapons whose use had 
concluded the Second World War were refined and further developed through nuclear 
testing.  Under the presidency of Harry S. Truman, the goal of these tests was 
weapons development. Excluding the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a total of 
thirty nuclear tests were conducted by the United States between July 1945 and 
October 1952. These thirty tests were held as six test series, in addition to the wartime 
Truman, 1945-1952 
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TRINITY test. Of these thirty shots, the Department of Energy classifies twenty-four 
as “weapons related” tests, meaning that eighty per cent of the nuclear tests conducted 
by the United States during this period were done so for the purpose of furthering 
development of nuclear weapons design.1 
The nuclear tests conducted during these years took place in the context of 
worsening relations with the Soviet Union and the decline of post-war international 
relations into Cold War. These developments in turn saw, firstly, the end of the 
United States’ atomic monopoly and the victory of communist China over nationalist 
China in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and secondly, the United States’ involvement 
in the Korean War from 1950 onwards, fighting first against North Korea and then 
also China. The first Soviet atomic test in August 1949 and the war in Korea in June 
1950 would affect the United States’ test program; the former led to internal debate 
within the Truman Administration of the merits of developing thermonuclear 
weapons, culminating in Truman’s directive of 31 January 1950 to do just that, while 
the latter created operational and logistical challenges to testing in the Pacific. 
Almost from the outset of the atomic age, it was recognised that atomic 
weapons should be controlled and their testing limited. This recognition was best seen 
in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which in turn led to the Baruch Plan, submitted to 
the United Nations in 1946. It was with the Soviet rejection of this proposal that the 
United States nuclear test program began its generally upward trend, as seen in 
Appendix One, which shows a broad increase in number of shots per series and/or in 
the total yield of series. This graph does not show the expansion of testing facilities in 
the Pacific and the continental United States. 
                                                
1 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  2-5. 
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No single structural cause for this acceleration can be easily identified; it was 
likely a confluence of the expansion of the atomic stockpile (requiring testing of new 
designs and permitting quantitatively more weapons to be tested), the decision to 
develop the thermonuclear bomb, and the exigencies of the Korean War. These are 
issues discussed in more depth in Chapter Two. 
This chapter will explore the nuclear tests conducted by the United States 
between 1945 and 1952, during the period in which it tested fission weapons. It will 
examine the six test series – CROSSROADS, SANDSTONE, RANGER, 
GREENHOUSE, BUSTER-JANGLE and TUMBLER-SNAPPER – together with the 
wartime TRINITY and Hiroshima explosions. This history will provide greater 
context for the deeper analysis of Chapter Two. This chapter shows that, although 
each of the series was important, none was more so than SANDSTONE and 
GREENHOUSE, especially given the focus on weapons design prevalent during this 
period. 
 
TRINITY 
The first test of a nuclear device was conducted in New Mexico on 16 July 
1945. A press release relating to this test dramatically described the event in terms of 
“[m]ankind’s successful transition to a new age, the Atomic Age.”2 The TRINITY 
test was indeed a point of transition, but it also marked the successful culmination of 
many years of secret, scientific effort toward a speculative goal. This effort has been 
                                                
2 War Department Release as Background Information on the July 16 Test; Atomic 
Bomb: Alsop Article to Atomic Bomb: Press Releases [3 of 3]; Box 174; National 
Security Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject File 1940-1953; Truman Papers, 
Truman Library. 
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extensively documented in other works.3 It is sufficient to note, as did the press 
release of the War Department in July 1945, that the implosion of this “small amount 
of matter” was “the product of a chain of huge and specially constructed industrial 
plants,” and that, for the first time, the TRINITY test had released “the energy of the 
universe locked up within the atom from the beginning of time.”4 
The TRINITY shot was a test of a plutonium, implosion-type device. It was 
detonated in the desert south-east of Socorro, New Mexico, in the pre-dawn darkness 
at 0530 on 16 July 1945.5 Initial estimates of energy generated by the explosion were 
“in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT;”6 the U.S. Department 
of Energy now specifically reports the yield as 21 kilotons.7 The device was emplaced 
on a 100-foot (30-metre) steel tower. Interestingly, General Leslie R. Groves, director 
of the Manhattan Project, found it necessary to highlight in a memo to secretary of 
                                                
3 For an account of the Manhattan Project and the TRINITY test, see Richard Rhodes, 
The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986). See also 
Cynthia C. Kelly, ed., The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in the 
Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses, and Historians (New York: Black Dog & 
Leventhal Publishers, 2007), and Joseph M. Siracusa, Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short 
Introduction  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 10-27. 
4 War Department Release; Atomic Bomb: Alsop Article to Atomic Bomb: Press 
Releases [3 of 3]; Box 174; National Security Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject 
File 1940-1953; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
5 The TRINITY blast was preceded on 7 May 1945 by a conventional explosive test 
in which 100 tons of high explosive, seeded with tubes of radioactive material, was 
detonated from a test tower. This pre-shot experiment gave Manhattan Project 
personnel experience with the forthcoming atomic test, and calibrated instruments for 
the detection of yield and radiation. Carl Maag, et al., "Project TRINITY, 1945-
1946," in United States Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel 
Review (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 23-26. See also, K.T. 
Bainbridge, et al., "Trinity," (Los Alamos, New Mexico: Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory of the University of California, 1976), 7-14. 
6 Memorandum for the Secretary of War, 18 July 1945; The Decision to Drop the 
Atomic Bomb on Japan, #4; Box 1 of 1; Student Research File; Truman Library. 
7 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  2-3. 
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war Henry Stimson, dated two days after the test, that the device had been installed 
upon this tower and had not been dropped from an airplane.8 
The flash of the detonation was visible in the cities of New Mexico – 
Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City – and El Paso, in northern Texas, but generally to 
a distance of 180 miles (290 kilometres). At the instant of its detonation the flash of 
TRINITY was brighter than any light ever produced on Earth, and was visible from 
another planet.9 The sound of the explosion was heard within a 100-mile (160-
kilometre) radius. Within a radius of 20 miles (32 kilometres), “there was a lighting 
effect…equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire formed which lasted for 
several seconds.”10  From this fireball the mushroom cloud formed, which surged 
upward through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet (5.2 kilometres) that many 
scientists predicted would suppress the updraft, and reached the substratosphere at 
41,000 feet (12.5 kilometres) within five minutes. The mushroom cloud lifted 
thousands of tons of dust from the New Mexico desert, and fissionable material and 
other radioactive products mixed with this dust. Varying winds dispersed the column 
of radioactive dust, and radioactive fallout was for the first time deposited “over a 
wide area.”11 
In his memorandum to Stimson, General Groves made a number of interesting 
observations about the effects of the atomic bomb. These observations give to their 
reader a sense of the power of the TRINITY test more clearly than any recital of the 
size of the resulting crater, or the effect upon nearby structures. Firstly, Groves 
reported that he could “no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a 
                                                
8 Memorandum for the Secretary of War, 18 July 1945; The Decision to Drop the 
Atomic Bomb on Japan #4; Box 1 of 1; Student Research File; Truman Library. 
9 Siracusa, Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction: 20. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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bomb.”12 This consideration is particularly telling when one also considers that 
Groves directed the construction of the Pentagon prior to assuming responsibility for 
the Manhattan Project. Secondly, Groves noted that although he found “no reason to 
anticipate” the loss of the bomber that would deliver such a bomb to its target, he 
could neither assure nor guarantee the safety of the delivery plane “in an actual 
operation.”13 Groves was unable to do so because the thunderstorms that jeopardised 
the shot time and which feature in the recollections of many witnesses of TRINITY 
also prevented observation bombers from approaching the detonation at prescribed 
distances. 
TRINITY proved many things. To start with, it proved the implosion-type 
design, whereby the force of the detonation of high-explosive lenses would compress 
and concentrate a subcritical core of plutonium into a supercritical mass, a design that 
was used to effect above Nagasaki only weeks later. But it also proved the possibility 
of a notion that had remained until that point purely theoretical. In the words of the 
War Department’s press release: “[s]peculative theory, barely established in pre-war 
laboratories, had been projected into practicality.”14 This projection of speculative 
theory into practicality would prove as important a catalyst to the Soviet atomic 
program as its spectacular use against Japan in the coming weeks.15 
With some degree of foreboding, Groves concluded his memorandum to 
Stimson with the following: “[w]e are fully conscious that…the battle test is what 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 War Department Release; Atomic Bomb: Alsop Article to Atomic Bomb: Press 
Releases [3 of 3]; Box 174; National Security Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject 
File 1940-1953; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
15 For an account of the beginnings of the Soviet atomic program, see David 
Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
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counts in the war with Japan.”16 With the implosion-assembly device tested and 
proven by TRINITY, the gun-assembly device would be tested above Hiroshima. 
 
Little Boy 
The detonation of the gun-assembly Little Boy device above Hiroshima on 6 
August 1945 has not been considered by the historiography as a nuclear test.17 The 
Department of Energy explicitly rejected the notion that the two wartime uses of 
atomic bombs could be considered tests: “these detonations were not ‘tests’ in the 
sense that they were conducted to prove that the weapon would work as designed…or 
to determine weapons effects...”18 However, Little Boy was an untested design, and 
its successful detonation above Hiroshima proved that design in a manner not 
dissimilar to that by which TRINITY proved the Fat Man design; moreover, the 
United States derived much information regarding weapons effects from both 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as evidenced by the extensive Strategic Bombing Surveys.19 
The definition as articulated by the Department of Energy suggests an intent 
behind a nuclear event that determines whether an event is a nuclear test. This is 
                                                
16 Memorandum for the Secretary of War, 18 July 1945; The Decision to Drop the 
Atomic Bomb on Japan #4; Box 1 of 1; Student Research File; Truman Library. 
17 Much of the recent literature regarding Hiroshima is related instead to debate of the 
decision to drop the atomic bomb. For a good review of this discourse, see the 
beginning of chapter six of Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: 
Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge, 2007), 218-220. 
18 Department of Energy, "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 
1992,"  vii. 
19 For these weapons effects, see U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of the 
Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 19 June, 1946; President’s Secretary’s 
File; Truman Papers. For an account of the conventional bombing of Japan that 
preceded the atomic bombings, see United States Strategic Bombing Survey: 
Summary Report (Pacific War), 1 July 1946; President’s Secretary’s File; Truman 
Papers. Both documents have been digitised and are available among the Online 
Documents at the website of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
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certainly appropriate. This author does not wish to suggest that the significance of the 
deaths of 66,000 people at Hiroshima should be lessened by defining that event as a 
weapons test.20 The circumstances in which Little Boy was detonated, and the effect 
that detonation had upon human population, raise natural and moral objections to its 
classification as anything but a tragedy of war. But it should not be denied that, in 
many senses, including those rejected by the Department of Energy, the wartime use 
of the Little Boy device might qualify as a nuclear test. From a purely technical 
perspective, divorced entirely from the moral consideration of its use, Little Boy 
should be seen as a weapons design proof test.21 
The attack on Hiroshima was reported to Truman by Stimson in terms relative 
to TRINITY. In a cable to the president, Stimson wrote that “first reports indicate 
complete success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.” 22  The 
conspicuousness of Little Boy was related to the place of its detonation – above a city 
– rather than its yield: Little Boy yielded 14 kilotons, rather than the 21 kilotons of 
TRINITY. “Results clear cut successful in all respects,” read one subsequent report, 
“[v]isible effects greater than any test. Conditions normal in airplane following 
delivery.”23 
                                                
20 This figure from Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third 
Edition ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), xiii. Tens of thousands more died 
as a result of radiation sickness in the aftermath. 
21 Jozef Goldblat and David Cox argued that “the use of the bomb was in itself a test” 
when interrogating the necessity to test an atomic weapon before building a stockpile. 
Jozef Goldblat and David Cox (eds.), Nuclear Weapons Tests: Prohibition or 
Limitation? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 4. 
22 The Secretary of War to the President, 6 August 1945; Atomic Bomb: Alsop Article 
to Atomic Bomb: Press Releases [3 of 3]; Box 174; NSC – Atomic File; PSF: Subject 
File 1940-1953; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
23 Admiral Edwards to Admiral Leahy, 6 August 1945; Atomic Bomb: Alsop Article 
to Atomic Bomb: Press Releases [3 of 3]; Box 174; National Security Council – 
Atomic File; PSF: Subject File 1940-1953; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
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If the detonation of Little Boy proved the success of the uranium, gun-
assembly device – a design that would become prevalent in the atomic artillery of the 
1950s – then the conditions aboard the Enola Gay following delivery proved by 
example the method of delivery. This dimension of the bombing of Hiroshima is 
commonly accepted but should not be taken for granted; recall that after TRINITY 
General Groves expressed caution toward the survivability of the delivery bomber in 
the aftermath of an atomic explosion. The report “conditions normal in airplane 
following delivery” confirmed a pre-existing assumption that the United States’ 
strength in strategic bombing could be easily adapted to delivering atomic bombs. 
If one measurement simultaneously communicates both the scale of damage 
inflicted upon Hiroshima and the importance of this new weapon to U.S. strategic 
bombing, it might be that reported by the post-war Strategic Bombing Survey: 
The Survey has estimated that the damage and casualties caused at Hiroshima 
by the one atomic bomb dropped from a single plane would have required 220 
B-29s carrying 1,200 tons of incendiary bombs, 400 tons of high-explosive 
bombs, and 500 tons of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs, if conventional 
weapons, rather than an atomic bomb, had been used…This estimate pre-
supposed bombing under conditions similar to those existing when the atomic 
bombs were dropped and bombing accuracy equal to the average 
attained…during the last 3 months of the war.24 
 
This was, of course, an optimistic estimate – it would be irresponsible to 
assume the kind of total aerial supremacy that the United States enjoyed above Japan 
at the end of the war, just as it would be to expect the kind of experience and 
veterancy of its air crew that the bomb group responsible for Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
had developed in the strategic campaign against Japan. The above estimate is a useful 
one nonetheless, as it gives a rough conversion rate, for lack of a better term, between 
atomic and conventional bombing at the beginning of the atomic age. 
                                                
24 United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War), 1 July 
1946; President’s Secretary’s File; Truman Papers. 
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Little Boy poses a challenge to the argument that testing is crucial to the 
development of nuclear weapons, because Little Boy was itself an untested design 
when used against Hiroshima. The fact that the gun-assembly Little Boy device was 
not tested before its use, while the implosion-assembly Fat Man device was, might 
suggest that only the least-robust of designs or theories need be tested, or that there is 
a lesser need to confirm theoretical developments through full-scale testing. While 
there is some merit to this line of thought – here one thinks of Oppenheimer’s 
arguments against the 1946 tests series, which I shall soon explore – it cannot be 
applied to Little Boy. Little Boy used all sixty-four kilograms of uranium-235 that the 
United States had accumulated and enriched before July 1945; there was not enough 
of this superdense material left to test another device.25 As a result, Little Boy was an 
“extremely conservative design,” divested of safety features so as to increase its 
reliability.26 Little Boy was a product of the pressures of war in every sense. 
Nowhere was it written that nuclear testing would continue after the end of the 
Second World War, although in hindsight it seems a natural progression. The 
assumption that atomic bombs could be tested and improved in the same manner as 
conventional weapons relies upon the assumption that nuclear weapons are not 
qualitatively different from conventional weapons. The debate in this regard is 
extensive and largely beyond the scope of this thesis, but the debate itself emerged in 
the period leading up to the first peacetime nuclear test series, Operation 
CROSSROADS.27 
 
                                                
25 Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 17. 
26 Ibid. 
27 In addressing the CROSSROADS tests, Graybar connects this assumption with 
concerns about international relations. Graybar, "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: 
Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting?" 
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CROSSROADS 
The Operation CROSSROADS tests were conducted in 1946, when, as Lloyd 
Graybar eloquently framed it, “the contours of the Cold War were becoming sharply 
defined,” and were the first nuclear tests conducted during peacetime – and, thus, 
without the secrecy that surrounded TRINITY.28 CROSSROADS consisted of two 
shots (with a third shot planned but cancelled) and was conducted at Bikini Atoll in 
the Marshall Islands. These shots were the first detonations of atomic weapons since 
the wartime use against Japan, and the fourth and fifth nuclear events of history.29 
Brien McMahon, chairman of the Special Senate Committee on Atomic 
Energy, wrote to Truman regarding the tests and noted that the designation of 
“CROSSROADS” was “most appropriately chosen” by the Navy because it 
communicated the great importance of the tests to the American people.30 Of the goal 
of the tests, McMahon was “convinced that these tests were being planned and will be 
executed to demonstrate fairly and conclusively the value of present-type Naval 
vessels.”31But McMahon was writing tendentiously. The stated purpose of the 
CROSSROADS tests was indeed to determine the effect of the atomic bomb upon 
                                                
28 Ibid., 890. 
29 For an excellent account of CROSSROADS within the context of the Cold War, see 
the aforementioned article by Graybar. For an in-depth account of the entirety of 
Operation CROSSROADS, see Jonathan Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The 
Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994). 
30 Senator Brien McMahon to President Harry Truman, 6 February 1946; Atomic 
Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 
176; National Security Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Truman 
Papers, Truman Library. Brien McMahon served as Democratic Senator from 
Connecticut from 1945 through to his death from cancer in 1952. He authored the 
McMahon Act, which became the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, establishing civilian 
control of nuclear weapons through the Atomic Energy Commission. In addition to 
the Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, McMahon also chaired its 
successor, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in 1946 and again in 
1949-1952. 
31 Ibid. 
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naval vessels, but with the specific intent to identify the need for changes in ship 
design, formations at sea and anchoring distances in port, number and location of 
bases, and the strategic disposition of ships.32 Secondary purposes of the tests 
included the determination of weapons effects upon aircraft and military ground 
weapons and equipment; effects upon living beings; and to “gain information 
regarding the relative value of atomic bomb attack against naval vessels, as compared 
with other types of targets.”33 Not among those purposes was the intent to validate 
contemporary naval designs. 
CROSSROADS was, then, the first weapons effects test series, and the 
Department of Energy today classifies the shots that composed the series as such.34 
CROSSROADS permitted the first close study of weapons effects in a controlled 
environment, and, in the absence of the wartime secrecy of TRINITY, the 
CROSSROADS shots were much more accurately measured and observed. These 
tests were described in memoranda as “in the nature of a laboratory experiment,” and 
the close study of weapons effects was to furnish designers of weapons platforms and 
strategists important information about a “revolutionary new weapon.”35 Each of the 
three planned tests produced two or more types of weapons effects, studied according 
to the purposes outlined above.36 
                                                
32 Purposes of Atomic Bomb Tests and Reasons for Conducting Them at an Early 
Date, 2 April 1946; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to Atomic 
Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – Atomic File; 
PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
33 Ibid. 
34 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  2-3. 
35 Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy to the President, 6 April 1946; 692 
Misc. Civilian Control of Atomic Energy (x) – 692 A Misc. (1945), Box 1527; 
Official File; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
36 Purposes of Atomic Bomb Tests and Reasons for Conducting Them at an Early 
Date, 2 April 1946; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to Atomic 
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The relative absence of the secrecy that surrounded TRINITY, and the manner 
in which the world was forewarned about the CROSSROADS tests, permitted loud 
voices to be raised in objection to the series. This objection was manifested not only 
as an internal discourse within the Truman Administration: CROSSROADS was the 
first example of public opposition to atmospheric nuclear testing. Public opposition 
was strongest in March through to May, and, in April, Truman issued a statement in 
which he articulated his “complete agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretary of War and the Navy in their view that these tests are of vital importance in 
obtaining information for the national defense.”37 
J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, 
articulated many of the arguments against the CROSSROADS tests in his letter to 
Truman of May.38 In that letter, Oppenheimer argued for model tests and calculations, 
being less costly than full-scale nuclear tests and possibly more useful; he noted that 
there was a possibility of the devices giving an ineffective explosion, a fizzle, that 
would underwhelm observers and threaten the image of American atomic power; and 
he observed the dissonance between the conduct of “a purely military test of atomic 
weapons” at a time when the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the control of atomic 
                                                                                                                                      
Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – Atomic File; 
PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Truman Papers, Truman Library. 
37 Statement by the President, 12 April 1946; 692 Misc. Civilian Control of Atomic 
Energy (x) – 692 A Misc. (1945), Box 1527; Official File; Truman Papers, Truman 
Library. 
38 A comprehensive and recent biography of the fascinating life of Oppenheimer can 
be found in Ray Monk, Inside the Centre: The Life of J. Robert Oppenheimer 
(London: Random House, 2013).  For a compilation of primary material related to the 
hearing that revoked Oppenheimer’s security clearance in 1954, see Richard 
Polenberg (ed.), In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: The Security Clearance 
Hearing (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
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energy was to be submitted, as the Baruch Plan, to the United Nations.39 Moreover, 
Oppenheimer noted that naval applications of the atomic bomb were “not important 
ones to test,” and nor were the tests a “good measure of naval applications.”40 It was 
in forwarding Oppenheimer’s letter to Dean Acheson that Truman famously labelled 
Oppenheimer a “cry baby.”41 
A criticism not made by Oppenheimer but which featured in the internal 
discourse of the administration was that CROSSROADS was to be “conducted in a 
prejudiced way to further Navy interests.”42 This criticism was perhaps a natural 
result of the test series being run by the Navy – let us not forget that CROSSROADS 
predated the Atomic Energy Act and the formation of the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC). The reproach by the secretary of commerce that the test series 
was “prejudiced” was accompanied by the suggestion that the president appoint a 
civilian oversight board, which eventually manifested as the Evaluation Commission 
chaired by Senator Carl Hatch (D-NM). 
Public sentiment echoed at least one of Oppenheimer’s arguments – that there 
was a threatening gesture contained within the CROSSROADS tests. The proposed 
shots were described as “a vulgar display of fiendish strength…to encourage other 
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countries to work more militarily at the perfection of weapons”;43 likewise, one 
citizen suggested military tests were not in accord with the “expressed intention” of 
the Truman Administration that atomic weapons be controlled;44 while another citizen 
wrote that whatever information learned from the series would be meaningless if the 
atomic bomb came to be eliminated from national arsenals.45 
Much of the public opposition to the tests was related to a lack of 
understanding of atomic weapons, which of itself was probably a natural feature of 
the early years of the so-called “Atomic Age.”46 For example, concerns were raised 
that the shots would generate widespread tsunamis, or cause famine through the 
poisoning of “millions of tons of fish and other sea-food.”47 The State Department 
even received a request from a Cuban national to remain aboard the target ships so 
that he could “contribute detailed information on the exact behaviour of atomic 
explosions and their effects on the human body.”48 
                                                
43 Elizabeth T. Johnson to President Truman, 13 March 1946; 692 A Misc. (1946) – 
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Perhaps the most harrowing anecdote related to lack of understanding of 
atomic bombs comes from Bill, a sailor aboard USS PGM-32, a small motor gunboat 
that was assigned to support CROSSROADS. Bill wrote to his family a solemn letter 
in which he bid farewell, because, although noting that his gunboat was to be “30 
minutes from the explosion when the bomb goes off,” Bill was convinced that “there 
is not much chance for us” and that “we will not come back.”49 PGM-32 was to be 
stationed 21 miles (38 kilometres) upwind of the point of detonation.50 Bill concluded 
his letter by questioning “why they send us out there when they know we will all get 
killed, but they said they expected to lose six or seven hundred men.”51 Researchers 
have access to this letter because Bill’s family relayed it to their congressman, who in 
turn relayed it to the White House, where it was passed on to the commander of 
CROSSROADS, Vice Admiral Blandy. Congressman Clifford Davis (D-TN) noted 
that, although the “distressing” letter was likely “the writing of a homesick boy,” were 
its contents made public, “some fellow who doesn’t like us could make a lot of talk 
out of this.”52 Vice Admiral Blandy reassured all involved that “the fears expressed 
by the sailor on that ship are without foundation.”53 
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Shots ABLE and BAKER were each successful. Each was of the same design 
as those used at TRINITY and Nagasaki (that is, a plutonium, implosion-type device) 
and both yielded 21 kilotons.54 Concentrated in the lagoon were some ninety target 
warships – some captured from the defeated Japanese and German navies, together 
with many obsolete American ships – that were arranged so as to give technical 
information on the atomic explosions, rather than to simulate a battle formation.55 
CROSSROADS ABLE was an airburst, dropped by a B-29 bomber; Senator Hatch 
reported to Truman the dramatic sinking of destroyers, cruisers and transport ships.56 
Hatch was writing in the enthusiasm of the moment, for the destructive effect of 
ABLE was less than anticipated. Indeed, two Soviet observers (present for the shots 
because the United States had invited to observe the tests members of the U.N. 
Commission to which Baruch had presented his plan for international control of 
atomic weapons two weeks earlier) reported “general disappointment with the results 
of the explosion” and that, because the target ships had survived reasonably well, the 
“material results of the explosion proved to be insignificant compared with what had 
been expected here.”57 The underwhelming results were mainly due to inaccurate 
delivery of the ABLE device, which missed the target, USS Nevada, by 2,130 feet 
(650 metres).58 
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BAKER was by comparison much more effective. The second shot was 
reported to Truman as “in some respects…of even greater interest [than ABLE], for it 
will have no precedent.”59 BAKER detonated underwater, and the water transferred 
the effect of the bomb blast to target ships more effectively than the atmosphere. 
Images of the blast suggested that the USS Arkansas, a 26,000-ton battleship, was 
immediately upended by the blast and sunk thereafter.60 The BAKER shot sank two 
battleships and an aircraft carrier, and many other destroyers, submarines and 
auxiliaries.61 The underwater detonation lifted some ten million tons of irradiated 
seawater into a column that fell back down upon the target ships. The target ships 
were so irradiated that boarding parties could not approach them for at least four 
days.62 
Decontamination efforts in the wake of the underwater BAKER shot were 
focused upon the ships designated for use in CROSSROADS CHARLIE.63 On 30 
August, Robert P. Patterson, the secretary of war, and James Forrestal, the secretary 
of the navy, wrote to Truman to advise that neither they nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) any longer considered the third CHARLIE shot to be necessary. This 
memorandum couched their advice in terms that ABLE and BAKER had “retarded” 
the “research and development progress of the Manhattan Project” through the 
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absence of scientists from theoretical work, and that CHARLIE would exacerbate this 
effect.64 Furthermore, they wrote, the “additional information expected from Test ‘C’ 
does not warrant the expenditure in money, manpower, and effort involved.”65 
However, recent scholarship suggests that among the reasons for the cancellation of 
CHARLIE was the serious irradiation of the designated target ships by BAKER, and 
the inability of the Navy to successfully decontaminate these vessels.66 Truman 
replied to Forrestal with his decision to “indefinitely postpone” CHARLIE on 7 
September.67 The effects to be tested in shot CHARLIE, a deep underwater nuclear 
explosion, were not observed until Operation WIGWAM in 1955.68 
As the first atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons since their wartime use, the 
two shots of Operation CROSSROADS set a number of precedents for subsequent 
test series. Foremost was that atomic weapons could and should be tested in 
circumstances distinct from TRINITY (that is, without the sole intent to prove their 
function) – even while simultaneous efforts were being made in the international 
forum to control atomic energy. Another precedent was that the United States would 
test these weapons in the atmosphere, and, to do so far from its population centres, the 
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United States would test in its Trust Territory overseas. 69  Connected to this, 
CROSSROADS saw the earliest concern about the environmental and radiological 
consequences of nuclear testing. Finally, from the beginning of the test program – 
long before accidents like that which befell the Lucky Dragon during Operation 
CASTLE in 1954 – not-insignificant bureaucratic and public opposition was arrayed 
against nuclear testing. 
 
SANDSTONE 
Operation SANDSTONE was a three-shot test series conducted at the AEC’s 
Pacific Proving Ground in the spring of 1948.70 This series was conducted “to proof-
test new designs,” and was the first test series related to weapons design since 
TRINITY three years earlier.71 As a weapons design test series, SANDSTONE 
demonstrated important new techniques that had a profound effect upon the US 
nuclear stockpile. 
Shortly after coming into existence with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the 
AEC submitted a report to Truman outlining the state of the nuclear industry. The 
report began with the statement that “the present supply of atomic bombs is very 
small.”72  While the number of stockpiled devices stated in this report remains 
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redacted, the Defense Nuclear Agency report for Operation SANDSTONE states that, 
as of 27 June 1947 (when Truman gave preliminary approval for SANDSTONE and 
almost three months after the AEC report), the U.S. had only thirteen devices in its 
atomic stockpile. 73  Of just as much concern to Truman was another warning 
contained within the AEC report: that production of plutonium was far behind 
production of uranium-235. 74  This warning was particularly important, because 
implosion-assembly devices such as those tested in TRINITY and CROSSROADS 
and used at Nagasaki, which had become the so-called “standard type,” used 
plutonium rather than uranium for fissile material. These warnings from the AEC 
highlighted the need for technical and theoretical developments to expand bomb 
production to meet defense requirements. 
SANDSTONE responded to this need. Proof-tested in the three shots were 
weapons designs that more efficiently assembled a supercritical mass from fissile 
material, which, coupled with increased production rates of fissionable material, 
“allowed the great expansion in the U.S. stockpile evident by the end of 1949.”75  
The first two shots of SANDSTONE, X-RAY and YOKE, were of composite-
core, levitated, implosion devices. The composite core was designed in the last month 
of the Second World War, but issues with symmetrical implosion of the levitated core 
were only solved in the years afterward. A mixed core of plutonium surrounded by a 
shell of cheaper uranium increased the yield of the device while also decreasing the 
cost. Levitating the core in a space inside the uranium tamper “gave the imploding 
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shell time to acquire momentum before it hit the core,” as Richard Rhodes writes, 
who quotes an analogy from Theodore B. Taylor: “the way to get more energy into 
the middle was to hit the core harder. When you hammer a nail, what do you do? Do 
you put the hammer on the nail and push?”76 X-RAY and YOKE proved these design 
features: the X-RAY shot yielded 37 kilotons while YOKE yielded 49 kilotons, more 
than twice the yield of the Nagasaki “standard type.”77 More to the point, the levitated 
composite core design used half as much plutonium compared to that “standard type,” 
and ten times less uranium compared to Little Boy.78 
The third shot of SANDSTONE, shot ZEBRA, was of a levitated core, 
implosion design, but fuelled entirely by uranium. ZEBRA was first reported as 
yielding 15 kilotons but in fact yielded 18 kilotons, more than the previous all-
uranium device, the gun-assembly Little Boy bomb.79 The ZEBRA shot was also the 
first time that a supercritical mass of uranium had been assembled using the implosion 
method.80 
Operation SANDSTONE commenced six weeks after the Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia of February 1948 and concluded six weeks before the Berlin 
Blockade brought about the darkening of the Cold War; moreover, the X-RAY shot 
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was fired less than two weeks after the Marshall Plan was signed into law. The test 
series of 1948, then, should be seen as part of the fabric of the developing Cold War. 
The efficiency of new designs demonstrated in SANDSTONE made that series, 
arguably, more responsible than any other test series for the large nuclear arsenals that 
would come to define the Cold War. 
 
RANGER 
Operation RANGER was a five-shot atmospheric test series conducted early 
in 1951. No nuclear tests were held during 1949 and 1950, although why this should 
be the case is unclear: certainly, from available documents, there does not seem to 
have been the same pressure on Truman to recommence testing after the Soviet 
atomic test of 1949 that Kennedy was to endure in 1961. Some authors have 
suggested that the Truman Administration used a “war scare” in 1951 to “overcome 
congressional resistance to stupendous military build-up once the Korean War 
furnished a suitable pretext,” a build-up that could easily be connected to nuclear 
testing.81 A more convincing argument for this pause is related to those events in east 
Asia: the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, and the perceived threat 
that this conflict might expand “throughout the Far East,” diminished the accessibility 
of the Pacific Proving Ground.82  As a result, RANGER was the first series conducted 
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in the continental United States since TRINITY of 1945, although the development of 
the Nevada Test Site for this purpose was not immediate. 
RANGER was a weapons design test series as with TRINITY and 
SANDSTONE, but not in the manner of proving existing designs as with those earlier 
series. Rather, “the primary objective of the operation was to provide sufficient data 
to determine satisfactory design criteria for nuclear devices scheduled to be detonated 
at Operation GREENHOUSE.”83 (GREENHOUSE was to be held at the Pacific site 
several months after RANGER was held in Nevada.) RANGER was conducted to test 
variations in core compression that, Los Alamos scientists believed, would affect the 
yield of devices tested in GREENHOUSE.84 The connection between RANGER and 
GREENHOUSE was an intimate one. The choice of devices tested in 
GREENHOUSE depended “to a critical extent” on calculations tested during 
RANGER, and it was because “the GREENHOUSE stakes [were] so high” that great 
importance was attached to RANGER.85 
Sandwiched between SANDSTONE and GREENHOUSE, the RANGER tests 
were of comparatively small yield. Of the five shots, the largest was FOX, which 
yielded 22 kilotons. Shots ABLE and EASY each yielded one kiloton, and shots 
BAKER and BAKER-2 each yielded 8 kilotons. All shots were airdropped, the first 
time since CROSSROADS ABLE, although the delivery aircraft was a B-50 rather 
                                                
83 Ibid., 17. 
84 Ibid., 18. 
85 Memorandum for the Special Committee of the National Security Council for 
Atomic Energy Maters from Gordon Dean, 4 January 1951; Executive Secretary’s 
Subject File Series, Box 4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White 
House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. In addition to contributions to 
theoretical calculations for the GREENHOUSE shots, the tests of the RANGER series 
determined the applicability of a new central “pit” design for existing stockpile 
models of atomic weapons. 
Truman, 1945-1952 
  33 
than a B-29.86 FOX was airdropped from a higher altitude than the other shots, 
probably because of its much greater yield.  
While the primary purpose of the tests was to test designs for subsequent 
series, the Department of Defense also collected data relating to the effects of gamma 
and thermal radiation upon defensive structures. This involved the construction of 
shelters, fortifications and foxholes at varying distances from the hypocentre, many of 
which contained film packets to measure the penetration of gamma radiation and 
different fabrics to measure the effect of thermal radiation. These effects experiments 
were limited and certainly secondary to the primary objective of weapons design, and 
the Department of Energy defines all shots of RANGER as weapons design tests.87 
Interestingly – perhaps because of the small yield of shots but also because of 
the results of SANDSTONE – for the first time at RANGER, manned aircraft 
conducted cloud-sampling missions. During CROSSROADS and SANDSTONE, 
remote-controlled drone aircraft had flown through the mushroom clouds to sample 
the particulate and gaseous debris (these were usually obsolete designs like the B-17); 
however, during RANGER, manned B-29s sampled the clouds of each shot.88 
RANGER was an important test series less for the shots that composed it as 
for its place within U.S. atmospheric testing: the catalyst for the establishment of, and 
first series conducted within, the Nevada Test Site; the improvement of designs for 
the crucial GREENHOUSE tests; and for the beginning of manned cloud sampling 
missions, which would have lethal consequences during Operation CASTLE three 
years later (see Chapter Three). RANGER was also the first of the six test series 
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conducted during the Korean War, and the first series conducted after the Soviet 
Union had acquired a very modest atomic capability. 
 
GREENHOUSE 
Operation GREENHOUSE was a four-shot test series held at Eniwetok Atoll 
in the Pacific Proving Grounds in the spring of 1951. It was the fourth post-war test 
series, and, arguably, the most important held during the Truman Administration. All 
shots were conducted primarily for weapons design purposes, although, as with the 
preceding RANGER series, secondary objectives included defense-related weapons 
effects studies. 
The principal objectives of GREENHOUSE, as articulated to Truman while 
RANGER was being conducted in Nevada, were: the “proof-testing of nuclear 
components and associated weapons designs which may permit the attainment of 
much greater yields from a given amount of fissionable material, or, conversely, a 
given yield with the expenditure of less material”; the examination of blast effects on 
buildings, material, vehicles and animals; and, crucially, to gain “information 
concerning the feasibility of the thermonuclear weapon.”89 
GREENHOUSE was conceived upon the completion of SANDSTONE in 
1948.90 Effort toward GREENHOUSE was evident in late 1949, only days after the 
first Soviet test, and was spurred on by Truman’s decision to commence a crash 
program to develop a thermonuclear weapon in January 1950. In September, 
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preliminary costs of the series were estimated and a commander of the operation 
assigned.91 In November, the AEC announced: “a new series of tests of atomic 
weapons is planned at the Commission’s Proving Ground at Eniwetok Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands.”92 Further preparation was apparent in 1950 for what was at that 
time a three-shot series.93 The period of preparation for GREENHOUSE, which partly 
accounts for the two-year gap in U.S. testing noted in the preceding section, was 
exacerbated by the requirements of the Korean War. For example, the 79th Engineer 
Construction Battalion, which assisted the civilian contractor in construction of 
facilities at Eniwetok Atoll, was to be reassigned from Eniwetok to Korea, although 
this deployment was contingent upon GREENHOUSE being moved to a continental 
test site.94 Likewise, Rhodes relates a similar example, where the JCS were willing to 
delay GREENHOUSE, and thus the thermonuclear bomb, to free ships in the test task 
force for the blockade of North Korea.95 
GREENHOUSE might have been postponed and the Korean War prioritised if 
not for Truman’s directive to the AEC of 31 January 1950 to “continue its work on all 
forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb.”96 While 
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none of the devices tested during GREENHOUSE were thermonuclear devices, two 
involved important “thermonuclear experiments,” while the GEORGE shot was “an 
important way station on the path to development of thermonuclear devices.”97 While 
RANGER was the first series conducted after Truman’s 1950 directive, 
GREENHOUSE was the first to respond to it directly and meaningfully.98 
Shots DOG and EASY were fired in April 1951, while, in the two-week 
period between them, Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme 
Commander in Korea. Both shots were from towers, and both involved a mix of 
weapons design and effects experiments. Most important of these experiments was to 
prove and measure new fission designs – in the case of DOG, three-quarters the size 
and a third the weight of the models stockpiled at the time, but with much greater 
yield; and in the case of EASY, the same size and weight and similar yield as the 
stockpile model but using less fissionable material.99 These experiments included 
measurements of device performance and radiation output, biomedical studies of 
exposed mice, instrumentation evaluation and study of cloud physics.100 EASY 
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involved more extensive effects experiments upon exposed structures at varying 
distances from the hypocentre.101 DOG yielded 81 kilotons, EASY 47 kilotons.102 
Shots GEORGE and ITEM were fired in May 1950, and sometimes referred to 
as the first thermonuclear and first boosted fission tests respectively. The GEORGE 
test was described to Truman as “determining experimentally one aspect of the 
feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon,” specifically what came to be called the Teller-
Ulam design, “the most favored [sic] current idea for initiating a thermonuclear 
reaction.”103 GEORGE tested the principle of using radiation to ignite deuterium-
tritium (isotopes of hydrogen) by exposing a small amount of D-T to the energy of a 
fission bomb, and observing the effects of neutrons, temperature and density. 
Marshall Rosenbluth, a theoretical physicist involved in GREENHOUSE, later said 
that “everyone knew beforehand that it was pretty certain to work; using a huge 
atomic bomb to ignite the little vial of deuterium and tritium was like using a blast 
furnace to light a match.”104 GREENHOUSE GEORGE yielded 225 kilotons, more 
than every nuclear detonation before RANGER FOX combined.105 
GREENHOUSE ITEM tested the concept of boosting rather than radiation 
implosion, and was described to Truman as correspondingly “less ambitious” than 
GEORGE.106 The ITEM device was a uranium-235 implosion device similar to 
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SANDSTONE ZEBRA except that much of its yield was derived from the inclusion 
of D-T fusion fuel, the fusion of which increased the neutron count and the rate of 
fission reactions within the uranium, and thus boosted the yield. GREENHOUSE 
ITEM yielded 45.5 kilotons, more than twice that of SANDSTONE ZEBRA.107 
Observers of ITEM also noted that particles from its fallout were large enough to be 
felt on their hands and faces.108 
GREENHOUSE was likely the most significant of the test series conducted 
under Truman. It stands out in the table that appended to this thesis for a remarkable 
gulf between number of shots and total yield. This gulf, inverted as it was, was due to 
the relatively high yield of each of the shots, expressed most clearly in GEORGE. As 
SANDSTONE demonstrated the potential for increased stockpiles through more 
efficient fission reactions in limited fissile material, so too did GREENHOUSE 
demonstrate the ability to vastly improve yield through introduction of fusion 
material. In four test series since wartime use against Japan, the United States had 
achieved a tenfold increase in the yield of its nuclear weapons. More important still, 
GREENHOUSE proved the practicality of radiation implosion, the crucial step to the 
thermonuclear bomb. Indeed, the proof borne out in GREENHOUSE GEORGE “led 
directly to the first successful thermonuclear test, [IVY MIKE], some 16 months 
later.”109 
 
BUSTER-JANGLE 
Operation BUSTER-JANGLE was a combined Atomic Energy Commission 
and Department of Defense test series conducted in late 1951 at the Nevada Test Site. 
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It was a seven-shot series that combined weapons design and weapons effects 
experiments and involved the first of the DESERT ROCK military exercises. 
BUSTER-JANGLE was born as a very different test series to what was 
eventually conducted: it was first known as Operation WINDSTORM and was to 
determine the effects of underground explosions in the same manner that previous 
tests had determined the effects of atmospheric and underwater explosions. 110 
WINDSTORM was to be held on Amchitka Island, at the far end of the Aleutian 
Islands, between Alaska and the Soviet Union. Internal opposition within the Truman 
Administration to the use of Amchitka for nuclear testing was registered from at least 
the Department of State and the Department of the Interior.111 The use of Amchitka 
for WINDSTORM was eventually abandoned not because of concerns about the 
provocative character of tests so close to the borders of the Soviet Union or about the 
native population of sea otters, but rather because a “detailed exploration of the site 
has revealed geological conditions less favourable [to the conduct of an underground 
nuclear test] than preliminary surveys had indicated.”112 
After casting about for a more appropriate test site – a process during which 
potential sites in Canada, Australia and the Caribbean were rejected – the substance of 
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the WINDSTORM series was designated for the Nevada site used for Operation 
RANGER earlier in 1951, and the entire test series renamed Operation JANGLE.113 
The AEC submitted to Truman in October 1951 that JANGLE be merged with a 
weapons design test series named BUSTER, and Operation BUSTER-JANGLE was 
approved by Truman on 9 October.114 The two halves of this combined test series 
were distinguishable by their sponsor (the Department of Defense was involved only 
in JANGLE shots, while Los Alamos sponsored both BUSTER and JANGLE) and by 
their purpose (all shots of BUSTER were weapons-related tests, while the JANGLE 
shots were weapons effects tests).115 
Interestingly, there was discussion between the White House and the AEC 
regarding the possibility that Truman himself would attend at least one of the 
BUSTER-JANGLE tests. Gordon Dean, chairman of the AEC, wrote to Truman less 
than a week after the president’s approval of the series to remind him of an earlier 
                                                
113 Regarding the search for an appropriate test location: Memorandum for the 
President from James S. Lay, Jr., 27 October 1950; Executive Secretary’s Subject File 
Series, Box 4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House 
Office; Dwight S. Eisenhower Library. Regarding the change in designation from 
WINDSTORM to JANGLE: Memorandum for James S. Lay from Gordon Dean, 2 
October 1951; Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 4; National Security 
Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Library. 
114 Regarding the merging of BUSTER and JANGLE: Memorandum for James S. Lay 
from Gordon Dean, 2 October 1951; Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 4; 
National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. Regarding Presidential approval for BUSTER-JANGLE: 
Request for Presidential Approval for BUSTER-JANGLE, 9 October 1951; Atomic 
Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 
176; National Security Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Truman 
Papers, Truman Library. 
115 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  2-3. 
Truman, 1945-1952 
  41 
discussion and to suggest a number of shots the president might witness.116 Truman 
responded the next day with an implicit rejection, stating that, “as conditions look 
now, I doubt very much whether I will be able to be present at any of them [test 
shots].”117 
The five shots of BUSTER were focused on weapons development, but 
information about those developments remains redacted. Dean related to Truman the 
general objective – similar to preceding fission weapons development tests – to “find 
more efficient ways of using fissionable material.”118 We also know that BUSTER 
EASY, the fifth shot, was of an untested design intended for stockpile and much 
smaller than previous designs.119 The BUSTER shots were of relatively low yield, 
compared to GREENHOUSE: ABLE yielded 0.1 kilotons; BAKER yielded 3.5 
kilotons; CHARLIE yielded 14 kilotons; DOG yielded 21 kilotons; while EASY 
yielded the highest energy of the series at 31 kilotons.120 It seems likely from its yield 
and the comparative yields of the other shots in the series that ABLE was a fizzle – an 
unsuccessful test in which the device fails to achieve its designed yield. 
The two shots of JANGLE were conducted to determine the effects of 
underground nuclear explosions, specifically, to evaluate “types and numbers of 
                                                
116 Gordon Dean to President Truman, 15 October 1951; Atomic Energy: President’s 
Directive [1 of 3] to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security 
Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Truman Papers, Truman 
Library. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. It was this shot that Dean most recommended Truman witness. 
120 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  2-3. It is 
interesting to note that BUSTER CHARLIE had the same yield as Little Boy and 
BUSTER DOG the same as Fat Man. 
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[ground] penetrating weapons required for stockpile.”121 Two low-yield shots were 
conducted, one on the surface and one underground, so as to compare the effects of 
surface and penetrating atomic detonations.122 The JANGLE shots responded to 
observations from earlier test series, which suggested that certain structures, such as 
airfields, roads and underground installations, were “relatively immune” to airburst 
detonations, and the JCS identified a need for a ground-penetrating weapon to destroy 
these targets.123 Because of the comparative delicacy of the implosion-assembly 
device, the gun-assembly device was tested for ground-penetrating warheads – for the 
first time since Hiroshima. SUGAR, the surface shot, and UNCLE, the underground 
shot, each yielded 1.2 kilotons.124 
Most significant for BUSTER-JANGLE was the participation of Defense 
personnel in the first nuclear military exercises, known as DESERT ROCK I, II and 
III.125 These troop training and military exercises were held because of the “increasing 
dependence” of U.S. military upon its atomic capability, and were conducted to “test 
tactics and protective measures for use during a nuclear conflict.”126 The three 
DESERT ROCK exercises involved approximately 6,500 personnel. They included 
observations of nuclear detonations and post-shot inspection of equipment affected by 
                                                
121 Memorandum for James S. Lay from Gordon Dean, 2 October 1951; Executive 
Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-
1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
122 Ibid. The measurement of the underground detonation, presumably, required 
certain geological conditions that Amchitka Island could not provide. 
123  Memorandum for the President from James S. Lay, Jr., 27 October 1950; 
Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 4; National Security Council Staff: 
Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight S. Eisenhower Library. 
124 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  2-3. 
125 DESRT ROCK I was held as part of BUSTER DOG, while DESERT ROCK II 
was held at JANGLE SUGAR and DESERT ROCK III at JANGLE UNCLE. 
126 Jean Ponton, et al., "Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, 1951," in United States 
Atmospheric Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, D.C.: 
Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 46. 
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the blast.  DESERT ROCK I involved a troop manoeuvre, in which a reinforced 
battalion of airborne troops, having observed BUSTER DOG from a safe distance, 
advanced toward ground zero in attack formation.127 At their closest approach, the 
soldiers of this battalion were less than five hundred meters from the hypocentre.128 
BUSTER-JANGLE continued the emphasis upon weapons design tests carried 
out during the Truman Administration. As with preceding series, the goal of these 
weapons design tests was more efficient use of fissionable material, including more 
efficient methods to assemble supercritical masses of that material. The cratering 
shots of JANGLE were also the first underground tests conducted by the United 
States, but these were carried out for weapons design purposes rather than for seismic 
detection purposes as was the case late in the Eisenhower Administration when 
underground testing received greater attention.129 
 
TUMBLER-SNAPPER 
Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER was an eight-shot test series held in the 
spring of 1952. It was the sixth post-war test series and the third held at the Nevada 
Test Site. As with the preceding BUSTER-JANGLE series, TUMBLER-SNAPPER 
was conceived as two separate series that were conducted together by the AEC and 
the Department of Defense. Likewise, TUMBLER-SNAPPER involved weapons 
designs and effects experiments, and further military exercises as part of the DESERT 
ROCK program. 
The two distinct series that became two phases of the same series, TUMBLER 
and SNAPPER, were amalgamated due to the results of the BUSTER-JANGLE 
                                                
127 Ibid., 54-55. 
128 Ibid. 
129 See Chapters Three and Four. 
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series. Indeterminate plans were made in 1951 for a test series in 1952 to be called 
Operation SNAPPER; to this planned series additional shots were added following the 
results of BUSTER-JANGLE. The additional shots, Operation TUMBLER, included 
some experiments already covered by SNAPPER, and, because of this overlap, the 
two series were combined into one operation.130 As carried out, TUMBLER involved 
weapons effects tests that sought to confirm data observed from BUSTER-JANGLE, 
while SNAPPER involved tests of weapons designs for inclusion in the nuclear 
arsenal and techniques for measuring thermal radiation for the forthcoming IVY 
series.131 
Results of the preceding test series determined many of the experiments held 
at TUMBLER-SNAPPER. Weapons effects measurements from the BUSTER shots 
of 1951 had suggested a significant miscalculation of the air blast pressures – as much 
as a third to half – then being used “for planning purposes by the Armed Services.”132 
This miscalculation was significant. It affected calculations for the optimum heights 
of airburst detonations and blast overpressure, consequently decreasing the damage 
and area of damage to which a target might be subjected.133 With some degree of 
urgency, Robert A. Lovett, the secretary of defense, wrote a memorandum for the 
National Security Council (NSC) suggesting that, should the BUSTER data be 
confirmed, “the resultant effectiveness of the atomic weapons stockpile [would be 
                                                
130 Jean Ponton, et al., "Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER 1952," in United States 
Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, 
D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 26-28. 
131 Ibid., 28. 
132 Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 16 January 
1952; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to Atomic Weapons: Procedure 
for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-
1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library. 
133 Ibid. Height is used to measure vertical distances from the surface, as in an airburst 
detonation, while altitude is used to measure vertical distance from mean sea level. 
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decreased] by a factor of 4 or more.”134 Lovett recommended that three shots be fired 
“as soon as is practicable”;135 Gordon Dean, in his own letter dated two weeks later, 
stated that while the AEC was “in complete sympathy” with Lovett’s request, the 
NSC should rather seek presidential approval in principle only for the merging of 
TUMBLER and SNAPPER.136 Truman approved TUMBLER on 20 February, and 
TUMBLER-SNAPPER one month later.137 
Four of the shots of TUMBLER-SNAPPER were airdropped and the 
remaining four shots were fired from towers; only two shots were for the explicit 
purpose of weapons effects testing. Shots ABLE through DOG were airdropped, and 
varied in yield from the 1 kiloton of ABLE and BAKER, through 19 kilotons and 31 
kilotons for DOG and CHARLIE respectively.138 The four tower shots varied in yield 
between the 11 kilotons of FOX to the 15 kilotons of GEORGE.139 ABLE and 
BAKER were the weapons effects tests of the series, although CHARLIE, DOG, 
EASY and HOW also involved weapons effects programs of secondary importance to 
                                                
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Gordon Dean to James S. Lay, Jr., 30 January 1952; Executive Secretary’s Subject 
File, Box 4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
137 Regarding the approval of TUMBLER: Memorandum for the President from 
James S. Lay, Jr., 20 February 1952; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to 
Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – Atomic 
File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library. 
Regarding the approval of TUMBLER-SNAPPER: Memorandum for the President 
from James S. Lay, Jr., 21 March 1952; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] 
to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – 
Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman 
Library. 
138 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. As with 
previous series, the larger yield shots were detonated at a greater height than those of 
smaller yield, presumably to prevent interaction between the fireball and the surface 
and the resulting fallout. Ponton, "Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER 1952," 35. 
139 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
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weapons related purposes.140 As with BUSTER-JANGLE, the specific purposes of 
weapons effects studies are more readily available in the archival sources than the 
specific purposes of weapons designs studies; nonetheless, it would appear from 
statements made by Gordon Dean and by the yield of the weapons design shots that 
efforts were made through TUMBLER-SNAPPER to miniaturise and diversify the 
range of tactical nuclear weapons available in the atomic arsenal.141 
Exercise DESERT ROCK IV was held as part of the TUMBLER-SNAPPER 
series. All shots except HOW were observed by members of the armed forces so as to 
familiarise these soldiers with “the characteristic effects of nuclear detonations.”142 
Shots CHARLIE, DOG and FOX featured troop manoeuvres involving all three 
branches of the armed forces that were “to determine whether standard ground tactical 
movements could be employed under the radiological conditions resulting from the 
use of nuclear weapons.” 143  Troops observed the shots from trenches and 
fortifications as close as 6,400 meters from the hypocentre and then, following the 
detonation, advanced toward the exercise objective. The largest of the manoeuvres 
was conducted by the Marine Corps at shot DOG, and involved almost two thousand 
participants.144 
TUMBLER-SNAPPER was the last of the test series conducted before the 
first test of a thermonuclear weapon as part of Operation IVY four months later. In 
that respect, this series can be seen as the last of the fission age. Both the weapons 
design and weapons effects tests speak to a developing understanding of nuclear 
                                                
140 Ponton, "Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER 1952," 80, 85, 90, 94, 97, 101. 
141 Ibid., 25. Efforts, likely, spurred by the ongoing war in Korea. 
142 Ibid., 64-65. 
143 Ibid., 65, 67. 
144 Ibid., 65, 70. The marines halted their exercise 820 meters from ground zero due to 
intense radiation. Ibid, 5. 
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weapons in a tactical role on behalf of the United States, an understanding that 
presaged the defense policies of the Eisenhower Administration – which would take 
office barely six months after the conclusion of TUMBLER-SNAPPER. 
 
Conclusion 
The nuclear test series conducted during the Truman Administration were 
foremost weapons design tests. Improvements in weapons design and theoretical 
understanding permitted a doubling of yield over the weapons used against Japan in 
two test series, and a tenfold increase in yield in four test series. Moreover, these 
improvements permitted a far larger and more varied atomic arsenal through more 
efficient use of the limited stockpile of fissile material. In this regard, Operations 
SANDSTONE and GREENHOUSE were the most crucial test series – SANDSTONE 
for making possible for the first time the large nuclear arsenals that came to define the 
Cold War, and GREENHOUSE for taking a definitive and meaningful step toward the 
thermonuclear bomb and the dramatic expansion in yield associated with that step. 
These test series were not exclusively for the purpose of weapons design, 
however. Weapons effects studies, whether the primary rationale for a shot like those 
of CROSSROADS or a secondary objective like the shots of RANGER, affected a 
more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of both the strategic and, eventually, 
battlefield applications of nuclear weapons, culminating in the tactical exercises of 
BUSTER-JANGLE and TUMBLER-SNAPPER. Knowledge of the effects of nuclear 
weapons shaped plans for their use as much as their availability and their yield. This 
relationship was seen in the TUMBLER-SNAPPER series, where tests were 
conducted based on information that would profoundly affect war plans for the use of 
nuclear weapons. 
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Very few if any of these developments would have been possible without 
testing. An argument might be made that nuclear testing merely confirmed theoretical 
calculations, as was the case with the test of radiation burn of deuterium-tritium of 
GREENHOUSE GEORGE. But that argument ignores the very real value of proof 
testing – the demonstration and measurement of a theoretical or technical 
development being of crucial importance at TRINITY, SANDSTONE and 
GREENHOUSE, for example. Moreover, testing not infrequently presented entirely 
unexpected data that might not have been learned otherwise; this was more so the 
case during the Eisenhower Administration, but, during the Truman Administration, 
we find an example in the unexpected results of the BUSTER series, which prompted 
the subsequent TUMBLER shots. 
The emphasis upon weapons design tests that characterised the years 1945-
1952 is perhaps a natural result of the infancy of nuclear weapons technology. But it 
was likely also the result of the glimpsed view of the thermonuclear bomb on the 
theoretical horizon – and Truman’s decision of 1950 to pursue that avenue of 
weapons technology. During these years, the rivalry between Moscow and 
Washington deepened, while the United States fought a war in Korea and developed 
its nuclear weapons technology to the point that, one week before the 1952 
Presidential election, it tested its first thermonuclear weapon with the IVY MIKE 
shot. I return to Operation IVY in Chapter Three; in the next chapter, I further discuss 
the paradigm of weapons design and development so prevalent between 1945-1952. 
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Chapter Two 
The Normalisation of Nuclear Testing 
 
 
“The profundity of the atomic crisis which has now overtaken us cannot, in my 
judgment, be exaggerated.”  
Brien McMahon, 21 November 1949. 
 
“If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and 
stockpile such weapons…will be greatly increased.”  
Terms of Reference to NSC-68, 14 April 1950. 
 
 
Although in hindsight it appears a natural, even inevitable, progression from 
the Manhattan Project, that the United States should conduct nuclear weapons tests 
was not a foregone conclusion. Many structural forces certainly operated to affect this 
conclusion, including the investment of scientific, technical and military progress in 
nuclear weapons, and the perception that nuclear weapons were both war-winning 
and peace-ensuring weapons that deserved further development. But in the aftermath 
of their wartime use against Japan, it was not assured that testing of nuclear weapons 
would assume the pervasive and threatening character that was the case over the next 
two decades. 
The nuclear test series conducted under Truman offer an opportunity to 
explore the normalisation of weapons testing. It was these series that established the 
precedent for the U.S. to test, while also determining the form and character of 
subsequent tests. These series were also the earliest opportunity to avert the 
normalisation of nuclear testing. The best example of normalisation was Operation 
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CROSSROADS, against which loud voices citing rational arguments were raised, and 
which was conducted simultaneously with diplomatic efforts that ostensibly sought to 
arrest nuclear weapons development. Through an examination of the Truman test 
series it is possible to identify the establishment of that norm and investigate also the 
interaction of various events – such as the first Soviet nuclear test in August 1949, the 
publication of NSC-68 in April 1950, and the start of the Korean War in June 1950 – 
that together crystallised the norm of nuclear testing. 
The idea of norms and normative behaviour is important to the study of 
nuclear weapons and strategy for their use (or non-use). Most helpful for this thesis is 
the excellent work of Scott D. Sagan and Nina Tannenwald. Neither discuss norms in 
relation to nuclear testing, but both have written useful works that are applicable to 
testing. Sagan’s multicausal analysis of why states build nuclear weapons identifies 
one potential reason: the “norms model,” through which “state behaviour is 
determined…by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate 
and appropriate in international relations.”1 This point is important because the shared 
beliefs regarding nuclear testing were constructed during the Truman years and 
changed during the Eisenhower years, such that testing was no longer “legitimate and 
appropriate.” Tannenwald’s constructivist account has examined the taboo on the use 
of nuclear weapons and discusses norms in terms of nuclear non-use; she identifies 
the crucial, larger issue of how norms affect a state’s capabilities and behaviour.2 In 
                                                
1 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search 
of a Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-1997): 73. As part of this model, 
Sagan also discusses nuclear weapons as a normative symbol of state identity, in a 
manner not dissimilar to the way battleships partly defined the identity of great 
powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
2 Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis 
of Nuclear Non-Use," International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 434. Tannenwald 
further developed this article into a book. See Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The 
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both cases, these authors have outlined a conception of norms similar to that used in 
this chapter: a pattern of state behaviour that is legitimised and as such comes to be 
accepted as convention. This chapter shall explore how the nuclear test series held 
while Truman was president came to establish this convention and normalise the act 
of nuclear testing until at least 1958 and, to a lesser degree, until 1963. 
In Chapter One, I briefly described seven nuclear test series conducted by the 
United States during the Truman years. This chapter shall specifically explore these 
test series through the lens of norms and normative testing. This lens is important 
because it helps to explain how nuclear testing came to be accepted as a legitimate 
state act, and because it helps to contextualise the expansion, limitation and then 
abandonment of atmospheric testing during the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations. Moreover, this chapter will illustrate the importance of U.S. nuclear 
testing within the early Cold War period. 
 
The Hiroshima Decision 
Analysis of the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan, specifically the 
use of the Little Boy device above Hiroshima, is extensive and important to 
discussion of nuclear strategy. Much of this literature is related to the twin problems 
of the morality of the atomic bombing of Japan and the extent of its effect upon 
Japanese surrender – both issues raised in Gar Alperovitz’s historiographically 
significant Atomic Diplomacy. 3  Although shown by authors like Robert James 
                                                                                                                                      
United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
3 Alperovitz’s work is significant mostly for introducing a contentious theory and its 
divisive effect on subsequent literature. It was also among the first works to revise the 
orthodoxy regarding the use of atomic weapons against Japan. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic 
Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam  (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965). 
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Maddox to be less useful for the history of the Hiroshima bombing, Alperovitz’s 
notion of atomic diplomacy – in which atomic weapons serve as political tools to 
affect diplomatic results – is nonetheless useful for study of nuclear weapons testing. 
Analysis of what Wilson Miscamble simply calls “the Hiroshima decision” is also 
useful for understanding nuclear testing.4 The exploration of practical alternatives to 
the sobering use of atomic weapons above Hiroshima is central to any debate of the 
morality of the decision – and, so too, to a fuller understanding of nuclear testing.5 
Beginning in 1944 and intensifying in 1945 was a discussion within the 
United States military and the scientists of the Manhattan Project regarding the target 
of the atomic bomb.6 This discussion concluded with the selection of Hiroshima, but 
the path to this decision is almost as important for understanding nuclear testing as the 
TRINITY test. Discarded along the way to this conclusion were non-strategic and 
                                                                                                                                      
Regarding the Japanese surrender, most convincing to this author are the words of 
Lawrence Freedman: “If the bomb did have a role it was in accelerating and 
intensifying the process of political change [toward Tokyo’s surrender]. But even here 
caution is due. The dropping of the bomb was not the only shock the Japanese 
received in the four days beginning on 6 August 1945. Combined with the atom bomb 
was the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan.” Freedman, The Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy: 18-19. 
4  See chapter six of Wilson Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, 
Hiroshima, and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge, 2007). Literature regarding 
Hiroshima can be crudely labelled as orthodox or revisionist, with Alperovitz’s work 
marking the rise of revisionism. Early defense of the decision came from Stimson 
himself. Henry Lewis Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's 
Magazine (February 1947). A good example of the orthodox position can be found in 
Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 
5 Recent scholarship that covers both morality and effect can be found in Sean L.  
Malloy, "'A Very Pleasant Way to Die': Radiation Effects and the Decision to Use the 
Atomic Bomb Against Japan," Diplomatic History 36, no. 3 (June 2012). 
6 The decisions of the Target Committee have been extensively explored in the 
literature and their every decision will not be covered in this thesis. For a good and 
recent account of the Committee’s discussions, see chapter eight of Paul Ham, 
Hiroshima Nagasaki  (Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, 2011). 
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even non-combat uses for the first atomic bomb. Los Alamos scientists proposed the 
first of these potential uses in 1944 when they suggested that the atomic bomb should 
be used against Japanese “fleet concentrations,” specifically the naval base of Truk.7 
This proposal was rejected not by committee but by the course of the war in the 
Pacific: by mid-1945, when the atomic bombs became available, most of the Japanese 
fleet had been sunk through naval and air action, and Truk had been overcome 
through conventional air attack. Had the course of the war progressed differently it 
would still have been unlikely that concentrations of the Japanese navy would have 
been targeted for the same reasons – deliverability and effect – that determined that 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be bombed. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile if 
ahistorical to appreciate that the first use of an atomic bomb might have been tactical 
rather than strategic, with all the implications for the established precedent that would 
entail. 
It was also suggested by Manhattan Project scientists and members of the 
Targeting Committee that the first atomic bomb be detonated as a demonstration 
rather than as a weapon. At a meeting on 31 May 1945 of the Interim Committee – 
the effective, wartime predecessor of the AEC – physicist Ernest Lawrence suggested 
a demonstration of the atomic bomb, rather than combat use, to “show off its power 
and intimidate the Japanese” – a notion that the Targeting Committee, including J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, had rejected less than a fortnight before.8 Here again the idea 
                                                
7  William A. Shurcliffe, Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation 
Crossroads  (New York: W. H. Wise & Co., Inc., 1947), 9; James P. Delgado, et al., 
"The Archaeology of the Atomic Bomb: A Submerged Cultural Resources 
Assessment of the Sunken Fleet of Operation Crossroads at Bikini and Kwajalein 
Atoll Lagoons," (Sante Fe, New Mexico: United States Department of the Interior, 
1991), 14; Graybar, "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or 
Bureaucratic Infighting?," 892. 
8 Ham, Hiroshima Nagasaki: 157. 
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was rejected, this time by James Byrnes (who would one month later become 
secretary of state), with Henry Stimson and Oppenheimer concurring that, as Stimson 
later wrote, “nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain 
surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud.”9 Oppenheimer added 
that it was unlikely that a demonstration, such as an airburst in the skies off Japan, 
would have impressed the Japanese.10 The idea did not go away, however. In June, a 
committee of Manhattan Project scientists from the University of Chicago, chaired by 
Nobel laureate James Franck, penned the Franck Report, which argued against the 
military use of the bomb.11 Citing the effect on the United States’ moral authority and 
the possibility of international control of atomic energy, the Franck Report concluded 
that “much more favourable conditions for the achievement of such an agreement [an 
international agreement on the control of atomic weapons] could be created if nuclear 
bombs were first revealed to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately 
selected uninhabited area.”12 The Science Panel’s Report to the Interim Committee, 
signed by Oppenheimer and submitted in the same week as the Franck Report, 
commented upon the recommendation of the scientists of the University of Chicago 
but again rejected their suggestion. The panel noted “those who advocate a purely 
                                                
9 P. R. Baker (ed.), The Atomic Bomb: The Great Decision  (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 19; Ham, Hiroshima Nagasaki: 157.  
10 Max Hastings, Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45  (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2007), 455. 
11 Other members of the committee included Leo Szilard, who first conceived the idea 
of a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction and who oversaw the assembly of the 
world’s first nuclear reactor at the University of Chicago; Eugene Rabinowitch, who 
later lobbied against the hydrogen bomb; and Glenn Seaborg, who would become 
chairman of the AEC under presidents Kennedy and Johnson. 
12 Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems, 11 June 1945, quoted in 
Cynthia C. Kelly (ed.), The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in the 
Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses and Historians  (New York: Black Dog & 
Levanthal Publishers, 2007), 289. 
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technical demonstration” but stated that “we can propose no technical demonstration 
likely to bring an end to the war” and, importantly, “we see no acceptable alternative 
to direct military use.”13 In his memoirs, Truman attributed to this recommendation 
from Oppenheimer and the Science Panel, in the words of Paul Ham, “a critical role 
in influencing his decision of how and where to use the bomb.”14 
It is convenient to consider the kind of demonstrative test for which Lawrence 
and Franck argued, even if it remained a rejected suggestion. While the demonstrative 
use of a nuclear detonation would not likely advance nuclear weapons design or 
determine weapons effects, it would in both a technical and a political sense prove 
that the weapon worked as designed. This reason fulfils one of the criteria by which 
the Department of Energy defines a nuclear weapons test, as outlined in Chapter 
One.15 Had such a non-combat shot been conducted, history may have accepted 
another purpose to nuclear weapons and, specifically, another purpose to nuclear tests 
to go with weapons design, weapons effects and weapons proof tests. Moreover, the 
very discussion of a noncombat demonstration of an atomic weapon in May and June 
1945 speaks to early thinking that a nuclear test alone could affect political results, at 
least among some Manhattan Project scientists, and, however vaguely, conveys 
Alperovitzian notions of atomic diplomacy. This thinking lends the discussions over 
these two months in 1945 a historical significance far greater than an abandoned idea 
on the path to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Indeed, similar arguments regarding 
the political consequences of nuclear testing would emerge again in the following 
year during preparations for the CROSSROADS tests at Bikini Atoll. 
                                                
13  Science Panel’s Report to the Interim Committee, Recommendations on the 
Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, 16 June 1945; quoted in ibid., 290-91. 
14 Ham, Hiroshima Nagasaki: 162. 
15 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  vii. See also 
Chapter One. 
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CROSSROADS and the Emergence of a Norm 
The first nuclear test series conducted by the United States was Operation 
CROSSROADS, which was conducted in July 1946 at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific 
Ocean. In Chapter One I explored the historical narrative of CROSSROADS, 
including the opposition that emerged to the tests in early- and mid-1946. While it is 
notable that nuclear testing was from its very beginning opposed by scientists, 
sections of the government and the citizenry, it is of greater interest that the 
arguments militated against CROSSROADS outlined important characteristics of the 
series itself. Here I am thinking of CROSSROADS as an early, if not the earliest, 
candidate for that Alperovitzian term “atomic diplomacy,” while also recognising this 
test series as “one of the central events of the immediate postwar years.” 16 
CROSSROADS was a particularly significant test series for three reasons: the implied 
rejection of concurrent negotiations for international control of atomic weapons, the 
competition that characterised the U.S. military in 1946, and the relationship between 
that rivalry and the limited atomic stockpile of that year. 
Opposition to the CROSSROADS tests was widespread, and was noted in 
Chapter One. One of the arguments raised in opposition to the tests was that 
CROSSROADS would adversely affect diplomatic efforts toward the international 
                                                
16 Lloyd J. Graybar’s excellent article was one of the first to shift the focus of analysis 
regarding “atomic diplomacy” from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the 1946 Bikini tests. 
He notes that “while historians have engaged in heated exchanges over the issue of 
whether Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented atomic diplomacy, they have, with few 
exceptions, failed to discuss whether the Bikini tests had political goals of the sort 
attributed to the nuclear attacks on those Japanese cities.” Graybar ultimately 
concludes that CROSSROADS was not an example of “atomic diplomacy.” Graybar, 
"The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting?," 889, 
91. 
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control of atomic energy.17 What was understood by this argument was that the 
CROSSROADS tests were an implicit rejection of the international negotiations. The 
Baruch Plan was submitted by the United States to the United Nations two weeks 
before the ABLE shot was fired, and there was an undeniable dissonance to 
Washington negotiating for international control of nuclear weapons while 
simultaneously testing those same weapons on a fleet of warships.18 This dissonance 
was noted in the U.S. Senate during a debate regarding the Navy’s use of target 
warships in CROSSROADS, on the same day that the Baruch Plan was presented to 
the United Nations. Senator Scott Lucas (D-IL) noted that “if the United States wishes 
to strengthen Mr. Baruch’s hand…if the United States wishes to show the world that 
we mean business in the renunciation of the atom bomb as an instrument of warfare, 
we should now call off this test.”19 The Soviet Union, through Pravda, also made 
much of this point by saying that “the tests are not preparations to destroy the weapon 
but to work towards its perfection.”20  Lloyd Graybar however concludes that while 
the timing of CROSSROADS relative to the international negotiations was 
“regrettable,” such was the succession of international events and climate of 
solidifying tensions that at no other point in 1946 could the Bikini tests have been 
                                                
17 Graybar cites a sample of letters from the public opposing CROSSROADS to show 
that 45 per cent of these letters opposed the tests based on the use of live animals, 
while only 17 per cent opposed the tests based on concerns for international relations. 
Ibid., 896-97. 
18 For a good and recent overview of the negotiations for the international control of 
atomic weapons, including the Baruch Plan, see chapter three of Richard Dean Burns, 
and Siracusa, Joseph M., A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, 
Strategy, and Politics, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2013). 
19 Quoted in Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll: 101. 
Senator Ralph Brewster (R-ME) defended CROSSROADS with the rejoinder “speak 
softly and carry a big stick.”  
20 Ibid., 254. 
 The Normalisation of Nuclear Testing 
 58 
held without “risking the appearance of atomic diplomacy.”21 In a similar vein, 
Samuel Williamson, Jr. and Steven Rearden portray a Truman defensive of the 
Baruch Plan, and who desired “to avoid doing anything that might torpedo” that 
proposal.22 More to the point, the Baruch Plan was so inherently flawed that its 
acceptance by the Soviet Union is almost unimaginable even without the concurrent 
CROSSROADS tests.23 
CROSSROADS was more the result of rivalry between the branches of the 
United States military and the dynamics of the forthcoming unification of those 
branches than it was a particular example of atomic diplomacy. The process leading 
to the unification of the War and Navy Departments – characterised as “one of the 
most bitter and divisive bureaucratic quarrels in American history” – was taking place 
while the CROSSROADS tests were being planned and prepared.24 Nonetheless, the 
first test series conducted by the United States – indeed, in history – had diplomatic 
implications even if they were unintentional. CROSSROADS should be seen 
alongside George F. Kennan’s “long telegram,” Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech 
describing an “iron curtain,” the failure of the Soviet Union to promptly withdraw 
                                                
21 Graybar, "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic 
Infighting?," 902-3. 
22 Samuel Williamson Jr. and Steven L. Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear 
Strategy, 1945-1953  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
23 Dean Acheson, coauthor or the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on which Baruch based 
his plan and later secretary of state under Truman, described the Baruch Plan as 
“unrealistic, silly…mischievous in the extreme.” Quoted in Weisgall, Operation 
Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll: 100. 
24 Indeed, on 15 June 1946, just one day after the Baruch Plan was submitted to the 
U.N. and two weeks before CROSSROADS ABLE, Truman compromised on the 
issue of unification: he favoured a single military department with three branches, but 
“endorsed in principle” the Navy retaining land-based aviation and a separate Marine 
Corps. Williamson Jr., The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953: 55. 
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from Iran, and Moscow’s demand for control of the Dardanelles, as crucial and early 
events that came to define the Cold War – or at least make its contours known.  
As the first of the U.S. nuclear test series, it is worth also pausing to reflect on 
the investment that the United States made in CROSSROADS. David Alan 
Rosenberg has shown the limitations to the U.S. stockpile in the years of atomic 
monopoly.25 As of July 1946, when CROSSROADS was held, there were only nine 
atomic bombs in the U.S. stockpile; it was planned to expend a third of this arsenal 
during the Bikini tests. 26  With the cancellation of the third CHARLIE shot, 
CROSSROADS expended as many warheads as the sum of the U.S. arsenal at the end 
of 1945.27 This was a remarkable investment, one described as almost ostentatious by 
James Delgado et. al., who characterised CROSSROADS as: 
…a demonstration that the United States was now the world leader; it alone 
possessed the secret of nuclear power, it had a stockpile of atomic bombs 
capable of being used again, and it was sufficiently wealthy to expend 
three…of these bombs and nearly a hundred ships in the most costly and 
elaborate weapons tests performed on earth up to that time.28 
 
Such a proportionately large expenditure of the nuclear arsenal was only 
imaginable while that arsenal remained small and tensions with the Soviet Union 
relatively low – both circumstances unique to the immediate post-war years. But one 
should not forget that CROSSROADS was held a year before the Atomic Energy Act 
                                                
25 See particularly David Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950," 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38 May 1982); Rosenberg, "The Origins of 
Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960." 
26 Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll: 9. 
27 Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 
1945-1960," 14. For details of the cancellation of CHARLIE see Chapter One of this 
thesis. 
28  Delgado, "The Archaeology of the Atomic Bomb: A Submerged Cultural 
Resources Assessment of the Sunken Fleet of Operation Crossroads at Bikini and 
Kwajalein Atoll Lagoons," 15. It would seem from these comments alone that 
Delgado perceives CROSSROADS to have served diplomatic ends. 
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and the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission; the U.S. military, divided as it 
then was, controlled the stockpile and organised the tests. That military presumably 
expected something to justify the expenditure of a third of the stockpile. Here it is 
easy to turn to “atomic diplomacy” as the solution, but more likely was that 
CROSSROADS was the first weapons effects test series – a form of nuclear testing 
the produced important data relating to the use and effectiveness of nuclear weapons, 
and which until 1963 remained the purview of the Department of Defense. 29 
CROSSROADS was the first opportunity for the U.S. military to acquire this 
information (as its measurement was lacking entirely from TRINITY, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki), and was likely invaluable for military plans for the use of atomic 
weapons.30 
If the establishment of precedents goes some way to the emergence of a norm, 
then Operation CROSSROADS was the most crucial test series for the normalisation 
of nuclear weapons testing. With CROSSROADS, it became acceptable behaviour for 
the United States to detonate nuclear weapons during peacetime for the purposes of 
studying their military effects rather than exclusively proving their function; use the 
remote Pacific islands and atolls to protect its population from radiation; conduct 
                                                
29 The New York Times, citing the Federation of American Scientists, reported on 26 
May 1946 that the “tests were purely military, not scientific…Scientists expect 
nothing of scientific value and little of technical value to peacetime uses of atomic 
energy.” Quoted in Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll: 
97. The focus on weapons effects rather than weapons development “disappointed” 
many Los Alamos scientists. Ibid., 135. 
30 Rosenberg also notes that the final report of the JCS Evaluation Board of the 
CROSSROADS series, completed in 1947, “recommended that Congress…redefine 
‘acts of aggression’ to include ‘the readying of atomic weapons against us,’ and to 
authorize the President, ‘after consultation with the Cabinet, to order atomic bomb 
retaliation’ to prevent attack on the U.S.” Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: 
Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," 17. The results of the Bikini 
tests together with this recommendation from the JCS may have given military 
planners greater flexibility in drafting war plans. 
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these tests against a background of international and domestic opposition, and while 
negotiating on the international stage for control of nuclear weapons and eventual 
disarmament. With the implicit though likely unintentional rejection of the Baruch 
Plan, CROSSROADS helped normalise the possession of nuclear weapons and 
normalise their testing. CROSSROADS also established the form and character of 
subsequent test series, such as the creation of an overseeing task force and the 
detonation of multiple devices in compressed time and space. Indeed, the JCS 
Evaluation Board of the Bikini tests recommended that the United States “conduct 
periodic weapons tests” as part of the development, manufacture and stockpile of 
nuclear weapons.31 Although some aspects of CROSSROADS were unique to 1946 – 
such as the backdrop of the Baruch Plan, the rivalry between the service branches in 
the lead-up to unification, and the military as the controlling agency – much of what 
was established at Bikini Atoll in 1946 came to be repeated in the eighteen 
succeeding series held between 1946 and 1963.  
When Brien McMahon (D-CT), chairman of the Senate Special Committee on 
Atomic Energy, wrote to Truman in February 1946 and commented that the name 
CROSSROADS had been “most appropriately chosen,” he was touching upon 
something quite important although he was probably not fully aware of it.32 Not only 
was the form of the U.S. military at a crossroads, but so too was the international 
forum, at least in terms of the international control of atomic energy. Moreover, 
Operation CROSSROADS marked the intersection between a time when the testing 
of nuclear weapons was a wartime necessity and a different time when testing nuclear 
                                                
31 Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll: 293. 
32 Senator Brien McMahon to President Harry Truman, 6 February 1946; Atomic 
Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 
176; National Security Council – Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Truman 
Papers, Truman Library. 
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weapons during peace was normalised as acceptable state behaviour, and acquired a 
momentum of its own. The Bikini tests were an acutely transformative experience for 
the U.S.; indeed, the three dimensions of CROSSROADS examined above – the 
negotiations for international control of atomic energy, infighting between the 
branches of the U.S. military, and the limitation to the nuclear stockpile – would all 
change before, or as a result of, the next test series: Operation SANDSTONE in 
1948.33  
 
Weapons Development 
Eighty per cent of the nuclear tests conducted by the United States between 
1945 and 1952 were fired for “weapons related” purposes – meaning scientific 
development and technical refinement of nuclear weapons.34 This feature of testing 
was a natural and expected result of the technological infancy of nuclear weapons and 
the potential improvements visible on the theoretical horizon. Indeed, the results of 
these test series led to a dramatic improvement in the yield of U.S. nuclear weapons 
that cannot be understated: following CROSSROADS, which was conducted with 
unimproved devices identical to the Fat Man bomb used against Nagasaki, it took five 
                                                
33  “International control [of atomic energy] remained the only official policy 
enunciated by the U.S. government relative to atomic weapons through the summer of 
1948.” Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American 
Strategy, 1945-1960," 12. This change had less to do with SANDSTONE as it did the 
events of that year, described by Williamson and Rearden as a “year of crisis.” See 
chapter four of Williamson Jr., The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953: 77-
100. Service rivalry (at least, as described above) and military control of nuclear tests 
ended with the National Security Act and Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and 1947, 
which combined the Navy and War Departments into the Department of Defense and 
established the civilian control of nuclear weapons and their testing through the 
formation of the AEC. 
34 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  2-5. See 
Chapter One. 
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test series to lead to the first hydrogen bomb. This development represented an 
increase in yield of four hundred and ninety five times. With the notable exception of 
CROSSROADS, weapons development tests defined nuclear testing under Truman. 
The first test series held after CROSSROADS was Operation SANDSTONE. 
SANDSTONE was carried out in April and May 1948 – the final shot of the series, 
SANDSTONE ZEBRA, was fired less than six weeks before the Soviets revoked land 
access to West Berlin, precipitating the 1948 Berlin Crisis. SANDSTONE 
demonstrated crucial technical developments in nuclear weapons design that in turn 
had profound effects upon U.S. strategy for nuclear weapons. 35  Two weapons 
developments deserve to be singled out: the design of a composite core – which used 
a mixture of plutonium and enriched uranium (uranium-235), thereby reducing the 
amount of scarce and expensive plutonium required in bomb design – and the design 
of the levitated core – which suspended the fissile core in an airspace between it and 
the high-explosive lens, thereby allowing the shock wave from the lens to gather 
momentum before imploding the fissile core. Together, these improvements greatly 
increased the efficiency of the nuclear chain-reaction and in turn more cost-effectively 
consumed the fissile material. Weapons developments resulting from SANDSTONE 
permitted more bombs of higher yield to be produced more cheaply – with important 
consequences for nuclear strategy. As Rosenberg writes, SANDSTONE promised that 
“the ‘doctrine of scarcity’ which had governed all previous planning for nuclear war 
might no longer apply.”36 
The SANDSTONE series demonstrated more than technical and theoretical 
developments. The 1948 test series showed the intimate connection between plans for 
                                                
35 See Chapter One. 
36 Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 
1945-1960," 19. 
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the use of nuclear weapons and the size of the stockpile, and the size of the stockpile 
was related to developments from testing. If the United States was prepared to expend 
a third of its nuclear arsenal in the CROSSROADS series that was partly because in 
1946 plans for the use of that arsenal were ill defined; hardened tensions had by 1948 
generated detailed war plans that “expanded along with the nuclear stockpile.”37 
Indeed, by the end of 1948, the war plan TROJAN envisaged the use of 133 atomic 
bombs against the Soviet Union – almost four times the number of weapons to be 
used in the BROILER war plan of the preceding year.38 
While the weapons developments of SANDSTONE affected fission weapons 
– making them cheaper, more plentiful, and more effective – subsequent test series 
produced data relevant to the development of fusion weapons. The RANGER and 
GREENHOUSE series were held in 1951, following the test of the first Soviet atomic 
weapon in August 1949 and Truman’s subsequent directive of January 1950 to begin 
work on the hydrogen bomb. The GEORGE shot of Operation GREENHOUSE, 
probably the single most important nuclear test between TRINITY and IVY MIKE, 
demonstrated a design that would come to be known as a boosted fission weapon. 
This design included a small amount of fusion fuel that imploded along with the 
fissile core, greatly increasing the efficiency of the reaction, and thus the yield of the 
device. More to the point, GREENHOUSE was a crucial step toward the hydrogen 
bomb, as it proved that the pressure and temperature generated by an atomic 
explosion were sufficient to initiate nuclear fusion. 
                                                
37 Ibid., 15. 
38 Ibid., 15-16. Rosenberg’s article identifies technological change as the foremost 
“external dynamic” to the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War. 
Ibid., 10. 
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Operation GREENHOUSE, along with the previous RANGER series and all 
subsequent series through IVY, were wartime test series. On 25 June 1950, the North 
Korean army commenced the invasion of South Korea that began the Korean War. 
There would not be peace until after Truman left office. The effect that the Korean 
War had upon weapons development tests was not of the same profundity as that the 
Second World War had upon TRINITY. For example, the total secrecy of TRINITY 
was absent from the test series of the Korean War, which continued to be publicly 
announced beforehand. Nonetheless, as noted in Chapter One, the need to blockade 
Korea threatened to draw warships away from the task forces assigned to Pacific tests, 
and military personnel assigned to construct test facilities on the Pacific islands were 
instead to be deployed to Korea.39 This moderated effect was likely because Korea 
was a far more limited conflict in scope and space than that which had preceded it.  
Quite apart from revelations regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in 
the Korean War – for example, General Douglas MacArthur saw the potential to 
interdict routes into North Korea from Manchuria and Vladivostok40 – the weapons 
development tests conducted during the war are typically seen as entirely separate 
from that conflict. Like the Korean War itself, nuclear testing should be seen as part 
of the meta-conflict that was the Cold War. The weapons developed in these tests – 
demanded by the AEC and Department of Defense, directed by Truman, and expected 
by NSC-68 – were to form an arsenal to fight the Cold War and not the concurrent 
Korean War. This is not a novel observation. Rather, when contrasted with the 
previous wartime weapons development test, TRINITY, the test series held during the 
                                                
39 Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 442. The relationship 
between the logistics of nuclear testing and the logistics of fighting the war in Korea 
was explored in Chapter One. 
40 Ibid., 444. 
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Korean War illustrate the shifting of norms. Immediately after the success of 
TRINITY, atomic weapons were moved to the front and used against Japan, but no 
such immediate use came from the successes of GREENHOUSE in 1951 or IVY in 
1952. The norm governing the use of atomic weapons had changed: no longer was it 
acceptable behaviour for the United States to use these weapons in war, or at least a 
comparatively limited war.41 There were many reasons for this shift – the emergence 
of a global competitor to Washington, which possessed its own limited nuclear 
arsenal; the dissimilar character and scale of the Korean War compared to the Second 
World War; the inability to deliver in a combat setting the prototype devices tested 
(like IVY MIKE); and even widespread public awareness of the horrors of atomic 
bombing. But one of the reasons for this changed norm came from nuclear testing 
itself, which provided more data and developed more powerful weapons than had 
been available in 1945. 
While the use of nuclear weapons was constrained by the perception of their 
increasing destructiveness and the international political context, weapons 
development tests from Operation SANDSTONE onward did establish the norm of 
continued and deliberate improvement of nuclear weapons.42 This may appear a 
                                                
41 Tannenwald argues that the Korean War established the normative basis of the 
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. See Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The 
United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." 
42 Relatedly, and to risk a generalisation, for at least a hundred years wars had been 
fought with the weapons that emerged at the end of the previous war, improved, but 
only marginally. Weapons were bettered in the space between wars only in a technical 
and doctrinal sense – qualitative improvement, such as the leap from piston-engine to 
jet-engine aircraft, or from combustion-engine vehicles to tanks, came mostly through 
the developmental pressures of conflict. This trend vanished after the Second World 
War. Atomic weapons represented the forefront of many fields of science, foremost 
physics, and their development promised application beyond the battlefield. But most 
importantly these weapons represented such a tremendous growth in firepower and 
destructiveness that no longer could it be assured that a war fought with them would 
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fundamentally obvious statement to make but one must remember that for the first 
three years during which the United States possessed atomic weapons it made little 
effort to improve those weapons. From TRINITY in 1945, through CROSSROADS in 
1946 and through to SANDSTONE in 1948, the U.S. possessed unimproved devices 
of the same type used above Nagasaki – scarce, expensive and comparable in yield.43 
This characteristic changed after 1948 and the change dramatically accelerated in 
1951, following the end of the U.S. atomic monopoly, Truman’s decision to pursue 
the hydrogen bomb, the start of the Korean War, and the appearance of NSC-68. All 
of these events and decisions in confluence created pressure for weapons development 
tests, and these tests normalised the idea that nuclear weapons could be improved just 
like any other weapons system. 
 
The DESERT ROCK Exercises 
While weapons development tests led to technical developments that in turn 
diversified and increased the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, the war in Korea 
demonstrated how ill-prepared the United States military was to engage in tactical 
nuclear war. This is an observation made by Tannenwald and supported by 
Rosenberg.44 In the debate regarding the use of atomic weapons in Korea, at least 
some of those who supported such use identified the problem as not that there were 
too few suitable targets but rather that the United States military was itself unprepared 
                                                                                                                                      
last long enough, or a society survive sufficiently intact while fighting it, for the kind 
of organic development of weapons technology that had characterised previous wars. 
43 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1959), 150-51. 
44 Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of 
Nuclear Non-Use," 443-51; Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons 
and American Strategy, 1945-1960," 11-27. 
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for tactical nuclear combat.45 Specifically, “virtually no U.S. troops had been trained 
in using nuclear weapons on the battlefield.” 46  This observation was made to 
MacArthur in March 1951 and the Department of Defense responded quickly: the 
BUSTER-JANGLE test series of October-November 1951 included the first DESERT 
ROCK tactical nuclear exercises. 
The DESERT ROCK exercises were a series of troop training and military 
exercises conducted to “test tactics and protective measures” that might be used in a 
tactical nuclear conflict.47 Three exercises were held at the BUSTER-JANGLE series 
while a fourth was held at the succeeding TUMBLER-SNAPPER series. They 
involved thousands of defense personnel who attended briefings and orientation, 
observed nuclear tests, conducted military manoeuvres in the aftermath of the shots, 
inspected damage caused by the shot, and undertook post-shot surveys. The results of 
one such survey noted that “an important goal of the Desert Rock [sic] training 
maneuvers was to eliminate the exaggerated fear of atomic weapons by giving troops 
first-hand experience with atomic explosions.”48 
As a method of preparing the military for the realities of tactical nuclear 
warfare the DESERT ROCK Exercises I through IV were successful. Troops gained 
an understanding of atomic explosions and their effects and were trained in 
radiological and blast safety measures. Moreover, the military personnel involved in 
the exercises showed increased confidence as the exercises progressed. Airborne 
personnel in DESERT ROCK I had demonstrated measurable signs of tension and 
                                                
45 Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of 
Nuclear Non-Use," 446. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ponton, "Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, 1951," 46. See Chapter One of this thesis. 
48 Suzanne G. Billingsley, et. al., "Reactions of Troops in Atomic Maneuvers: 
Exercise DESERT ROCK IV," (Chevy Chase, Maryland: The John Hopkins 
University, 1953), 22. 
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stress, while mechanised infantry tested in DESERT ROCK IV presented fewer signs 
of apprehension.49 The report on the exercises notes that this discrepancy may have 
resulted from the fact that DESERT ROCK I was “the first use of troops in an atomic 
maneuver and participation was perhaps a more stressful experience than in 
subsequent exercises.” 50  Nonetheless, using a nuclear test to expose military 
personnel to the atomic bomb within a tactical context appears to have gone some 
way toward preparing the U.S. military doctrinally and the U.S. soldier 
psychologically for tactical nuclear warfare. 
It is of particular note that these exercises commenced in 1951. This thesis 
accepts that the DESERT ROCK exercises were a deliberate response to the Korean 
experience, but it also worth considering another approach. Frank Kofsky and 
Dominic Cerri have argued that the Truman Administration used “well-worn methods 
of artifice” to generate a “war scare” in the spring of 1951.51 These authors suggest 
that the Truman Administration used misleading statements and inflated threats in an 
attempt to “overcome congressional resistance to the stupendous military buildup it 
began once the Korean War furnished a suitable pretext,” just as it had in 1948.52 
Much of the planning for Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, at which Exercises DESERT 
ROCK I through III were held, took place in spring of 1951 during the height of this 
manufactured war scare. These exercises received “considerable publicity” and were 
perceived to have “significant propaganda effect upon our potential enemies” while 
                                                
49 Ibid., 20. These physiological signs were measured by taking the blood pressure of 
participants and subjecting them to polygraph surveys. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Kofsky, "Truman and the 1951 War Scare." 
52 Ibid. 
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the “psychological effect upon our own civilian population may also be important.”53 
It is curious timing indeed that so demonstrative a test series should be planned during 
a period when the administration had deliberately escalated its rhetoric, although this 
connection remains an entirely speculative one. The DESERT ROCK exercises began 
about as early as they could: the Nevada test site was opened with the RANGER 
series in early 1951, and the islands that bore the Pacific tests before then lacked the 
geography for military exercises. It is nonetheless worthwhile to consider that 
DESERT ROCK responded to domestic pressures beyond those coming from a 
military fighting in Korea. 
If nothing else, the DESERT ROCK exercises offer a very visible indication 
of when the United States began to consider tactical nuclear warfare possible. While 
the nuclear stockpile was small, those scarce weapons would not be used against 
tactical targets. But that stockpile had changed by 1951: Truman had approved a 
substantial increase in nuclear production in 1949 and another increase in 1950.54 
These increases combined with the technical improvement in weapons design 
accomplished in the SANDSTONE tests of 1948 led to an expansion of the stockpile 
sufficient to seriously entertain concepts of tactical use. At the same time, the 
experiences of the Korean War stressed a need for further thought, experimentation 
and training in the tactical use of nuclear weapons. The DESERT ROCK exercises of 
                                                
53 Billingsley, "Reactions of Troops in Atomic Maneuvers: Exercise DESERT ROCK 
IV," 23. 
54 The increase of 1949 coincided with Truman’s opinion that “we’ll never obtain 
international control.” Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and 
American Strategy, 1945-1960," 21-22. 
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the BUSTER-JANGLE and TUMBLER-SNAPPER tests series both responded to and 
exemplified this need.55 
 
The Hydrogen Bomb Decision 
The debate within the Truman Administration that took place in the winter of 
1949-1950 regarding the hydrogen bomb was probably one of the most important in 
modern history. Brien McMahon, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
(JCAE), wrote to Truman as part of this debate and supposed that “the profundity of 
the atomic crisis which has now overtaken us cannot…be exaggerated.”56 Joseph M. 
Siracusa has described the decision that resulted from this debate as “a watershed 
moment.”57 Analysis of the decision to pursue thermonuclear weapons is extensive.58 
Missing from this discourse is an appreciation of the hydrogen bomb decision as a 
                                                
55 Impressive though the DESERT ROCK exercises were, they paled in comparison to 
the scale of later Soviet tactical nuclear exercises. David Holloway describes an 
exercise near Totskoe in the winter of 1953-54 in which an astonishing 44,000 troops 
took part. A “medium-yield” atomic bomb was dropped on a target surrounded by 
equipment, instruments and animals; the troops then fought a mock-battle over the 
area. Veterans of the battle of Berlin in 1945 said that “they had not seen anything 
like [the Totskoe exercise].” Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and 
Atomic Energy 1939-1956: 326-27. 
56 Letter from Brien McMahon to President Truman, 21 November 1949; Subject 
File, Arabian Relations [December 10, 1947] to Council of Foreign Ministers – 
November-December 1947, Box 10; Subject File; SMOF: Naval Aide to the President 
Files, 1945-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library. 
57 Siracusa, Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction: 53. 
58 For the connection between NSC-68 and the hydrogen bomb decision, see Siracusa, 
"NSC 68 and the H-Bomb Decision." For the role of the U.S. military in the decision, 
see Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision." For 
efforts to halt the first test of the hydrogen bomb and domestic pressures to test, see 
Bernstein, "Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-Bomb?" For 
the technical development of the hydrogen bomb, see Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making 
of the Hydrogen Bomb. 
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normative construct, one that further normalised – indeed, hinted at the future 
expansion of – possession and testing of nuclear weapons. 
The debate regarding the hydrogen bomb was sparked by the Soviet nuclear 
test of 29 August 1949, which broke the United States’ atomic monopoly. Supporting 
the development of “supers” were the AEC and Department of Defense, along with 
McMahon and the JCAE. Opposing them were a handful of nuclear scientists, mostly 
in the General Advisory Committee of the AEC and the State Department’s Panel of 
Consultants on Disarmament. Foremost among these were Oppenheimer, Enrico 
Fermi, I.I. Rabi – who called the hydrogen bomb “evil” – and Vannevar Bush, who 
had been Roosevelt’s chief science advisor during the war. 59 As with CROSSROADS 
in 1946, here again a minority of scientists were opposed to nuclear testing; this panel 
of scientists was without political allies, and public opposition was this time 
precluded by the secrecy of the debate. 
Without actually knowing it, the advocates of a crash program for the “super” 
were generating normative paradigms. Here I mean both the normalisation of 
possession and testing, this time of thermonuclear weapons, but also the broadening 
of an emergent concept that nuclear weapons were normative symbols of a state’s 
identity. The hydrogen bomb represented the hopes of its supporters that the United 
States could recapture that technological supremacy it had lost once the atomic 
monopoly was broken. 
Lewis Strauss, who would become chairman of the AEC under Eisenhower 
but who wrote to Truman in 1949 as a commissioner of that body, identified a number 
                                                
59 Bernstein, "Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-Bomb?" 
135. Bush was the driving force behind a proposal to ban tests of hydrogen bombs, or 
to at least delay the first test until Eisenhower took office. His efforts in this respect 
are detailed in Chapter Three. 
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of arguments that must have been striking to the president. Some of these arguments 
were particularly weak – for example, that “a government of atheists is not likely to 
be dissuaded from producing the weapon on ‘moral’ grounds” – but at least one 
suggested that the hydrogen bomb might be used tactically.60 “Unlike the atomic 
bomb,” Strauss wrote, “which has certain limitations, the proposed weapons may be 
tactically employed against a mobilized army over an area of the size ordinarily 
occupied by such a force.”61 This must have been appealing to Truman and the JCS, 
as the atomic stockpile was in 1949 still too small and the individual weapons too 
bulky and limited in power for use against mobile targets, such as an army, to be 
“seriously considered.”62 Here Strauss was normalising the idea that the hydrogen 
bomb could serve a purpose that the atomic bomb had yet to fulfil. Indeed, in his 
letter to Truman, Strauss even suggests that the hydrogen bomb could be used by the 
United States on its own territory: “the weapon may be critically useful against a large 
enemy force both as a weapon of offense and as a defensive measure to prevent 
landings on our own shores.”63 This last was a particularly hazardous notion to 
normalise, and one that clearly predates the CASTLE BRAVO test of 1954 and 
awareness of the immense radiological dangers of thermonuclear weapons. 
The contest over those radiological dangers – fallout – represented another 
dimension to the theme of normalisation employed by advocates of the “super.” 
Strauss’s letter to Truman rejects a letter from the AEC dated just two weeks earlier 
that detailed serious concerns about the radioactivity and pollution caused by testing 
                                                
60 Letter from Lewis Strauss to President Truman, 25 November 1949; Subject File, 
Arabian Relations [December 10, 1947] to Council of Foreign Ministers – November-
December 1947, Box 10; Subject File; SMOF: Naval Aide to the President Files, 
1945-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," 74. 
63 Ibid. 
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of hydrogen weapons. Strauss wrote that new calculations had shown that it would 
instead require “many hundreds” of detonations to “pollute the earth’s atmosphere.”64 
Strauss was presumably referring to data that was sent to Truman by Sumner Pike, at 
that time the acting chairman of the AEC, almost two weeks later.65 Pike concluded 
that if all the devices were set off “in a period of a few weeks,” about 500 hydrogen 
bombs would pollute the atmosphere with radioactive carbon, but if the devices were 
detonated at a pace similar to previous nuclear tests “about 50,000 super bombs 
would be necessary to build up dangerous effects.”66 The image that Pike’s words 
convey – the relatively safe testing of tens of thousands of hydrogen bombs – is a 
stupefying one and one that goes some way to normalising the act of testing a handful 
of such devices. By contrast, Pike’s words imply that the modest number of tests 
necessary to develop thermonuclear weapons were a completely rational and even 
safe action, and thus constituted acceptable behaviour for the United States. 
Arguments such as these from advocates of the “super” went a long way to 
normalising the act of nuclear testing. 
While it appears to have been assumed during the debate of 1949-1950 that 
the United States would stockpile and thus possess the hydrogen bomb once it had 
been developed – many of the arguments for development used by Strauss, for 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 Richard Rhodes describes Pike as “a tough-minded self-made millionaire from 
Maine.” Rhodes, Dark Sun, 379. 
66 The Effect of Radioactive Carbon from Thermonuclear Bombs, Letter from Sumner 
Pike to President Truman, 7 December 1949; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 
of 3] to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – 
Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman 
Library. These calculations took no account of local fallout – dramatically observed at 
the CASTLE BRAVO test in 1954 – or of the use of a uranium tamper to surround the 
thermonuclear device – which would become an issue with the Soviet test of 30 
October 1961. See Chapters Three and Six. 
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example, outline the benefits of possession to the United States – that particular 
question was itself poorly articulated. The recommendation that Truman signed on 31 
January 1950, which represented the final decision, was also noteworthy for posing 
just this problem: 
It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed 
toward determining feasibility [of the hydrogen bomb] prejudges the more 
fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a 
thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, 
or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war.67 
 
Both questions were addressed by one of the most important documents of the 
Cold War: NSC-68, which resulted from Truman’s directive to secretary of state Dean 
Acheson and secretary of defense Louis Johnson to reassess the threat from the Soviet 
Union.68 NSC-68 reiterated these two questions as its terms of reference.69 This 
preamble included the cogent recognition that “if a test of a thermonuclear weapon 
proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons…will be 
greatly increased.”70 Such technological determinism was plainly seen after TRINITY 
in 1945 and SANDSTONE in 1948. But NSC-68 went further – it recommended 
production and stockpiling of thermonuclear weapons “in the event they prove 
feasible” and noted also that such weapons would “add significantly to our net 
                                                
67 Terms of Reference, 29 March 1950; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] 
to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – 
Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman 
Library. 
68 This directive to Acheson and Johnson was made on the same day as Truman’s 
decision to begin a crash program to develop thermonuclear weapons. 
69 For a complete copy of this document, see Appendix 4: NSC-68: United States 
Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950) in Joseph M. 
Siracusa, Into the Dark House: American Diplomacy and the Ideological Origins of 
the Cold War  (Claremont: Regina Books, 1998), 211-63. 
70 Terms of Reference, 29 March 1950; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] 
to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – 
Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman 
Library. 
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capability.”71 But while speculating on the spectrum of Soviet aggressive actions, 
NSC-68 did not answer the second question, instead hedging with the comment “not 
enough is known of their [thermonuclear weapons’] potentialities to warrant a 
judgement at this time regarding their use in war.”72 
The hydrogen bomb decision and NSC-68 were deeply connected to the 
phenomenon of nuclear testing. Both were driven by the Soviet test of August 1949, 
and both drove U.S. policy toward tests of hydrogen bombs. The first Soviet nuclear 
test propelled the United States’ nuclear program and thus further U.S. testing, just as 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had propelled the Soviet nuclear program.73 These were the 
earliest examples of the political implications of nuclear weapons tests that would be 
seen again in the case of China, India and Pakistan – where a nuclear test 
demonstrates proof of possession as much as proof of concept, requiring a response 
from threatened neighbours.74 In the case of the decision by the United States to 
pursue and develop the hydrogen bomb, this threat was an inflated one but one that 
struck at a normative sense of its state identity. Moreover, both the hydrogen bomb 
decision and NSC-68 normalised, in the early months of 1950 and over two years 
before Operation IVY, the idea that thermonuclear weapons could be tested and 
afterwards stockpiled by the United States. 
 
 
                                                
71 Siracusa, Into the Dark House: American Diplomacy and the Ideological Origins of 
the Cold War: 241. 
72 Ibid. 
73 For the best account of the Soviet nuclear weapons program, see Holloway, Stalin 
and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956. 
74 An exception to this idea is the example of Israel, which has thus far avoided the 
proof of possession that might inspire its neighbours to develop nuclear weapons. See 
Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear And What 
That Means For The World  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
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Conclusion 
The six nuclear test series conducted between June 1946 and June 1952 by the 
Truman Administration were deeply important aspects of the early Cold War. 
Foremost, they led through a series of important technological and theoretical 
developments to the hydrogen bomb – which was first tested in November 1952 
during the week of the presidential election that brought Dwight D. Eisenhower to 
office. These series also multiplied the potential uses of the United States’ nuclear 
stockpile, first, through the expansion of that stockpile which affected plans for its 
use, and, second, through the experience and training the DESERT ROCK exercises 
provided in tactical nuclear warfare. Additionally, these test series were by 
themselves important events of the early Cold War that shaped its character, none 
more so that Operation CROSSROADS. Finally, it was through these six series that 
the act of nuclear testing was normalised under Truman. 
There were two, related dimensions to the process of normalisation: the first, 
far clearer and more observable, was the setting of precedents, whereby atmospheric 
nuclear tests became an established policy; the second was less distinct, and involved 
the gradual alignment of nuclear weapons and their testing with a normative 
perception of American identity. Together, these two dimensions had the effect of 
generating acceptance of nuclear testing as rational state behaviour. 
Why does normalisation matter? The process – if it can be called that – of 
normalisation is historically significant, because it created the circumstances for the 
testing of more and larger devices during the general expansion of nuclear testing 
under Eisenhower. Through that process, nuclear tests became an accepted part of 
contemporary society. While nuclear testing was novel, it was opposed, as was the 
case with Operation CROSSROADS. But that series was held in spite of widespread 
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opposition, much of it from the public, and this fact helped to normalise subsequent 
testing, because it demonstrated that nuclear tests would be conducted even without 
universal support. The test series held after 1946 did not again endure the kind of 
grassroots opposition that CROSSROADS had faced – it would take something 
profoundly outside the norm to mobilise that domestic opposition again. That change 
came in 1954 with CASTLE BRAVO, after which the norm began to change.  
Furthermore, that Washington carried out CROSSROADS against the background of 
the Baruch Plan and negotiations for the international control of atomic energy 
implied that the possession and testing of nuclear weapons was more important to the 
United States than an international agreement. These implied priorities further 
crystallised the norm of nuclear testing. 
Nuclear testing noticeably accelerated as the Cold War grew more tense. Only 
three individual tests had been conducted between July 1945 and April 1948. In 1948, 
the year described by Williamson and Rearden as the “year of crisis” that included the 
blockade of Berlin, a further three tests were held. In 1951, the year that Kofsky and 
Cerri argue saw a theatrical war scare from the Truman Administration, a total of 
sixteen nuclear tests were conducted. In 1952, ten nuclear tests were carried out, 
including the first hydrogen bomb. Although this acceleration was connected to 
domestic and technical factors, such as evolving strategy and weapons design, it was 
also connected to a less-tangible factor. As the United States had demobilised and 
relations with the Soviet Union became slowly embittered, an awareness emerged that 
because of its conventional inferiority the United States had to quite rationally play to 
its strengths and include nuclear weapons more and more comprehensively into its 
sense of identity. This is an idea closely related to one of the reasons Scott Sagan uses 
to explain why states develop nuclear weapons: the norms model, where nuclear 
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weapons are symbols that reflect state identity. As nuclear testing continued to 
establish the precedent for and normalise the possession of nuclear weapons, so too 
did the United States increasingly perceive their possession as a guarantor of peace, as 
a means of victory should peace fail, and as “normal.” Following this line of 
reasoning, the very act of nuclear testing – separated from its results and 
accomplishments – had a normative effect upon U.S. nuclear strategy, because it 
helped establish possession and testing as acceptable state actions. 
Almost all of the dimensions of testing under Truman explored in this chapter 
were borne out in the IVY MIKE shot of 1 November 1952. Testing had by then been 
normalised to such an extent that the character of that activity could be massively 
expanded to include atmospheric tests of multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons. The 
most effective and broad resistance since Operation CROSSROADS was brought to 
bear against the IVY series, including efforts by Vannevar Bush toward a ban of 
thermonuclear tests, but the series nonetheless went ahead.75 Finally, IVY MIKE was 
the expected result both of the hydrogen bomb decision of January 1950 and of all the 
weapons developments achieved through testing that led to that decision. Chapter 
Three will explore the expansion of nuclear testing under Eisenhower, and I begin 
with the Operation IVY series. 
  
                                                
75 Bush’s efforts are detailed in Chapter Three. 
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Chapter Three 
Eisenhower, 1952-1958 
 
 
“The sun rises in the west.”  
Crewmember of the Lucky Dragon 5 regarding the CASTLE BRAVO shot,  
1 March 1954. 
 
“Why is it necessary to have so many shots? Could the series not be limited to not 
over twelve or so? The danger is that these tests will continue for a longer and longer 
period of time.”  
President Eisenhower regarding Operation HARDTACK Phase I,  
9 August 1957. 
 
 
Ten test series containing some 150 test shots were held by the United States 
between November 1952 and October 1958. Included among this number were the 
largest nuclear tests ever conducted by the United States. These years were something 
of a high-water mark for U.S. nuclear testing, involving extensive series in numerous 
environments. Thermonuclear weapons were successfully developed because of these 
test series and important effects of underground, underwater and high-altitude nuclear 
explosions were examined. Despite the success of these test series – perhaps even 
because of it – nuclear testing during the Eisenhower years ended with a voluntary 
moratorium. 
Compared to testing under Truman, the test series conducted under 
Eisenhower were far more varied in yield and number. Certainly, these latter series 
were driven by more complex goals, requiring more diverse testing environments and 
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objectives – but this variety might also speak to the concurrent efforts toward a test 
ban. While the trend of testing under Truman was generally upward in both yield and 
number of shots, this tendency was repudiated almost entirely after Operation 
CASTLE. Indeed, under Truman nuclear testing was normalised; under Eisenhower, 
it was abandoned. 
The test series held under Eisenhower were part of the structure of an 
established Cold War. Rivalry with the Soviet Union was the fundamental aspect of 
nuclear testing, and the development of weapons and their delivery systems were 
important objectives. Early test series of the Eisenhower years took place in context 
of Moscow’s potential lead in dry thermonuclear weapons; latter series took place in 
context of the Soviet lead in the space race and development of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles demonstrated by Sputnik in October 1957. 
More than was the case under Truman, individuals stand out in the shaping of 
U.S. test series between 1952 and 1958. Foremost among these is Lewis L. Strauss, 
who replaced Gordon Dean as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission but was 
also the president’s advisor on matters of atomic energy.  Strauss, as both Robert 
Divine and Benjamin Greene note, dominated Eisenhower’s perspective on nuclear 
testing by filtering the information the president received and thus sheltering him 
from viewpoints opposed to Strauss’s own enthusiasm for testing.1 Strauss’s influence 
                                                
1 Lewis L. Strauss enjoyed a close relationship with Eisenhower. Many of his 
memoranda to the president also shared their interest in livestock, and their letters 
continued after both left office. He was also awarded the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom by Eisenhower. But Strauss was most responsible for the Oppenheimer 
security clearance hearings, which contrasted dramatically with Gordon Dean’s 
defense of Oppenheimer. Strauss was not above using the FBI to investigate scientists 
with whom he disagreed, as he did with Hans Bethe. Divine described him as 
“pompous, shrewd, patriotic but often mean, petty and unpredictable.” Greene 
ascribed to Strauss “excessive secrecy, deviousness, and self-righteousness.” Strauss 
became Chairman of the AEC on 2 July 1953. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The 
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waned in 1957 when the controversy surrounding Sputnik and the evident Soviet lead 
in rocketry led to the creation of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, headed 
by the special advisor for science and technology, James Killian. Strauss eventually 
resigned as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in June 1958. 
This chapter will examine the nuclear tests series conducted by the United 
States between 1952 and 1958. Ten test series will be explored: IVY, UPSHOT-
KNOTHOLE, CASTLE, TEAPOT, WIGWAM, REDWING, PLUMBBOB, 
HARDTACK I, ARGUS and HARDTACK II. These series began with the first 
thermonuclear test and ended with urgency before the test moratorium took effect at 
the end of October 1958. Analysis of these series offers momentary but recurring 
glimpses of Eisenhower’s reluctance to test that was borne out in test ban negotiation 
and culminated in the test moratorium. This history of important shots and critical 
dimensions of each series will also contextualise the analysis within Chapter Four. 
 
IVY 
On 1 November 1952, the United States tested its first thermonuclear device 
as the MIKE shot of Operation IVY.  IVY was a two-shot series held at Eniwetok 
Atoll in the Pacific Proving Ground. The timing of IVY was awkward because, on 4 
November, Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election in a landslide, 
becoming president-elect of the United States of America between the MIKE and 
KING shots.2 
                                                                                                                                      
Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 11; Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and 
the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1945-1963: 28. For a biography of Strauss, see Richard 
Pfau, No Sacrifice Too Great: The Life of Lewis L. Strauss (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1984). 
2 IVY has been included in the chapter dedicated to testing under Eisenhower for two 
reasons: first, although the result of directives and decisions of the Truman 
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The significance of conducting so important a test series at the cusp of 
transition between administrations was not lost upon Truman or the National Security 
Council (NSC). Almost two months before IVY, Truman, via the acting executive 
secretary of the NSC, S. Everett Gleason, communicated his wish to Robert A. Lovett 
and Gordon Dean that the first shot of IVY be fired no earlier than 5 November.3 
Although he did not state it explicitly, Truman was saying that he did not want the 
thermonuclear test conducted until after the election of 4 November.4 Both the 
secretary of defense and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
reminded the president of the considerations of weather in the choice of the test date 
(although Gordon Dean “gave less weight to the weather factor than had Secretary 
Lovett”); despite this, Truman and Lovett decided to postpone the test until after the 
election.5 It is unclear from the archival sources why, following this decision, the IVY 
series commenced before the election, although it seems likely that weather at the test 
site was the deciding factor. Truman, Lovett and Dean decided to resubmit the request 
for presidential approval for Operation IVY without any reference to date, and this 
appears to have been done – Gordon Dean’s request of 15 August mentioned “early 
                                                                                                                                      
Administration, the results and consequences of IVY were experienced by the 
Eisenhower Administration; and, secondly, the technical division between fission and 
fusion tests marked by IVY closely matches the discursive division between Truman 
and Eisenhower Administrations marked by the election. 
3 Memorandum for the Executive Secretary from S. Everett Gleason, 10 September 
1952; Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 4; National Security Council 
Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
4 Barton Bernstein ventures that “Truman himself wanted to delay the detonation until 
after election day to keep the thermonuclear issue out of partisan politics.” Bernstein, 
"Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-Bomb?" 149. 
5 Ibid. 
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November” as the proposed date for IVY, while the approval signed by Truman on 10 
September entirely omitted mention of proposed dates.6 
Vannevar Bush, that wartime luminary of science administration, clearly 
stated his unease with the proposed date to Dean Acheson: 
I felt that it was totally improper…for that [test] to be [conducted] just before 
[the] election, to confront an incoming President with an accomplished test 
for which he would carry the full responsibility thereafter. For that test 
marked our entry into a very disagreeable type of world. 7 
 
One wonders, then, at the motivation behind Truman’s unease with the target 
date. Barton Bernstein argues that Truman wished to keep the test away from the 
partisan politics of the election. It is likely that he had also hoped with some futility 
that the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, would win the election. Yet, Bush’s 
criticism would still have been valid even had Stevenson won. Added to the discourse 
were the opinions of Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, of which Bush was a 
member, who argued that IVY be postponed for two reasons: to allow a new 
Administration to consider a test ban, and to prevent the Soviet Union from analysing 
– and benefitting from that analysis – the global fallout that MIKE would produce.8  
                                                
6 Regarding the resubmission of request for approval: ibid. Regarding the original 
request for approval for Operation IVY: Memorandum for the Special Committee of 
the National Security Council for Atomic Energy Matters from Gordon Dean, 15 
August 1952; Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 4; National Security 
Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Library. Regarding the revised approval: Memorandum for the President from James 
S. Lay, Jr., 10 September 1952; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to 
Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – Atomic 
File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library. 
7 Quoted in Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 497. Bush also 
suggested that IVY be postponed so as to pursue a test ban with the Soviet Union, 
presumably as a member of the Panel on Disarmament. 
8 The Panel on Disarmament was formed by Dean Acheson and included, alongside 
Vannevar Bush, J. Robert Oppenheimer and Allen Dulles, deputy director of the CIA. 
The Panel’s executive secretary was a young McGeorge Bundy. Bernstein, "Crossing 
the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-Bomb?," 140-43. 
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The debate about the timing of IVY illustrates an awkward but curious 
paradox: if anything, Truman, Lovett and Dean needed to advance the date of IVY 
rather than postpone it, because the pressures of the Cold War and the fear that the 
Soviet Union might soon test a hydrogen bomb meant that IVY could not be 
postponed until the spring of 1953 (allowing time for an incoming president to 
consider the test series); but, as reliant as IVY was upon preceding test series, it could 
not be realistically advanced for technical and theoretical reasons. Bush later 
lamented in 1954 that “the entire program for building an H-bomb was so vigorously 
under way that any suggestion of delay received practically no consideration 
whatsoever.”9 
MIKE was detonated on 1 November 1952 on Eluklab Island at Eniwetok 
Atoll.10 The test was of an experimental thermonuclear device and a substantial 
portion of its yield was derived by the fusion of hydrogen atoms.11 Because of the 
novelty of the test, it was difficult for designers to estimate a yield for the MIKE 
device, and estimates ranged from four to ten megatons.12 In fact, IVY MIKE yielded 
10.4 megatons of TNT equivalent, or 10,400 kilotons, almost 750 times the yield of 
the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.13 Over three quarters of its yield, probably eight 
megatons, resulted from the fission of the uranium pusher that surrounded the liquid 
                                                
9 Ibid., 158. 
10 Because the test was held in the Marshall Islands, it was still 31 October in the 
continental United States, and the Department of Energy thus records the test date as 
such. "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4. 
11  Rhodes’ work contains an entire chapter dedicated to the IVY MIKE shot, 
including a fascinating millisecond-by-millisecond description of the detonation. See 
Chapter 24 of Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 482-512. 
12 F.R. Gladeck, et al., "Operation IVY: 1952," in United States Atmospheric Nuclear 
Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear 
Agency, 1982), 18. 
13 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
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deuterium fusion fuel; MIKE was thus, in the words of Rhodes, “less a thermonuclear 
than a big, dirty fission bomb.”14 At the last moment before the test, the proportion of 
enriched uranium to plutonium in the MIKE device was increased “to secure 
substantially less probability of failure.”15 
MIKE produced a tremendous fireball, three miles (4.8 kilometres) across. A 
heat wave was felt on task force ships positioned thirty to thirty-five miles (48 to 56 
kilometres) out to sea. The fireball “appeared on the horizon like a half-risen sun, 
quickly expanded after a momentary hover time”; a conventional but enormous 
mushroom cloud soon appeared, “balanced on a wide, dirty stem.”16 That stem was 
darkened by debris, coral particles and water, vaporised and sucked by convection 
high into the air. Around the base of that stem a curtain of water appeared, and slowly 
dropped back to the atoll surface. 
As the mushroom cloud rolled upwards, it darkened from a white to a red-
brown colour. Thirty minutes after the detonation, the upper cloud was sixty miles (96 
kilometres) in diameter, and the stem twenty miles (32 kilometres) in diameter. The 
upward motion of the mushroom cloud soon, in the words of an observer, “splashed 
against the tropopause,” and stabilised at an altitude of over 120,000 feet (36.3 
                                                
14 Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 510. 
15 Memorandum for James S. Lay, Executive Secretary National Security Council 
from Gordon Dean, 30 October 1952; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] 
to Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – 
Atomic File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman 
Library. Astoundingly, this memorandum has been annotated, presumably by a 
censor, with the comment “this word should have been deleted, it’s more significant 
than the %” and an arrow drawn to the word “increase” in the sentence “an increase 
of oralloy (93.5% enriched) is now considered required.” Oralloy was a codename 
given to enriched uranium during the Manhattan Project. 
16 Gladeck, "Operation IVY: 1952," 187. 
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kilometres).17 By comparison, modern, commercial passenger aircraft cruise at an 
altitude of 37,000 feet (11.2 kilometres). 
At it farthest extent, the MIKE mushroom cloud formed a canopy a hundred 
miles (160 kilometres) wide that shrouded the atoll; radioactive mud and heavy rain 
fell from this canopy, irradiating at least one of the post-detonation helicopter 
surveys. A photo aircraft was contaminated an hour and a half after the detonation 
when it flew through a cloud of fallout with some radioactive particles as large as split 
peas.18 
After MIKE’s detonation, the island of Eluklab vanished. The fireball 
vaporised the island, lifting into the air tens of millions of tons of solid matter, the 
lightest of which would drift down as fallout across the planet. In the place of Eluklab 
was a crater two hundred feet (60 metres) deep and about 6,300 feet (1.9 kilometres) 
across – deep enough to contain fourteen buildings the size of the Pentagon.19 The 
bodies of birds were infrequently found, others found alive but sick and with singed 
feathers and unable to fly; more often, birds scattered by the flash were burned to 
cinders in mid air. Fish were found on the island of Engebi, three miles (4.8 
kilometres) from ground zero, with skin missing or charred on one side as though they 
“had been dropped in a hot pan.”20 They had presumably been washed up by the 
three-foot (1 meter) wave that had rushed across the atoll in the thirty minutes after 
the detonation.21 
In the shadow of that vast and – in the truest sense of the word – awesome 
mushroom cloud, MIKE was marred by what appears to have been the first direct 
                                                
17 Ibid., 188. These figures were later questioned but revised figures are not available. 
18 Ibid., 191. 
19 Ibid., 188. 
20 Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 509-10. 
21 Gladeck, "Operation IVY: 1952," 188. 
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fatality associated with U.S. nuclear testing. 22  The height of the bomb cloud 
necessitated the use of jet sampler aircraft (rather than propeller-driven types like the 
B-17 and B-50 used at earlier series), and F-84G fighter-bombers were used at IVY. 
Two of these sampler aircraft, Pebble Red 3 and 4, were unable to refuel from an 
aerial tanker, and were diverted to Eniwetok airstrip for emergency landing. Red 3 
successfully landed, but Pebble Red 4 splashed down in the water 3.4 miles (6.3 
kilometres) from the airstrip. A search-and-rescue helicopter arrived over the crashed 
aircraft: it had flipped over on impact and begun to sink, and the pilot was never 
found.23 
The second shot of IVY, KING, was detonated two weeks later. The KING 
shot was an airdrop test of “a stockpile weapon modified to produce a large yield.”24 
It remains unclear what modifications were involved, although, given the results of 
GREENHOUSE and the yield of KING, it seems likely that this device was boosted 
through the inclusion of some amount of fusion fuel. KING yielded 500 kilotons, 
more than twice the yield of GREENHOUSE GEORGE and thirty-five times the 
yield of the Hiroshima bomb.25 The significance of KING is often lost in the shadow 
of the preceding MIKE; that single shot was by itself of greater yield than the 
combined yield of any test series that preceded it. But KING was the largest fission 
                                                
22 Experimental physicist Raemer Schriber described the mushroom cloud: “it was 
awesome. It just went on and on.” Quoted in Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the 
Hydrogen Bomb: 509. 
23  Gladeck, "Operation IVY: 1952," 190-91. Furthermore, at least one aircraft 
diverted to assist the rescue was heavily irradiated when, taking a direct path to the 
crash site, it flew through the worst of the fallout from the MIKE shot. The aircraft 
received 20-25 roentgens and its crew up to 17.8 roentgens, the highest exposure of 
test personnel for Operation IVY and a dosage four to five times greater than that 
received by the pilots who flew sampler missions through the bomb cloud. 
24 Ibid., 199. 
25 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
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device tested by the United States.26 It was important in two dimensions: first, 
because it represented a contingency in the event that the thermonuclear experiment 
of MIKE was unsuccessful, and, second, because it was a test of the kind of high-
yield fission devices for which opponents of the thermonuclear bomb had argued.27 
IVY was a weapons design series, and both shots tested new weapons 
developments. 28  The objective of the series, as articulated to Truman, was to 
“produce, if possible, and study a full-scale thermonuclear reaction.”29 This objective 
was achieved with IVY MIKE, the culmination of debate regarding the thermonuclear 
bomb and Truman’s decision to develop it, and culmination too of the tests, 
experiments and measurements of many preceding series. It was not, however, 
Truman but rather Eisenhower who contended with the consequences of IVY’s 
success. 
 
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE 
The eleven-shot Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was a combined 
Department of Defense and AEC test series not dissimilar from those other 
hyphenated test series of the Truman era, BUSTER-JANGLE and TUMBLER-
SNAPPER.30 As with those two series, UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was an amalgamation 
of two separately planned series. It was held in the spring of 1953, and was the first 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Gladeck, "Operation IVY: 1952," 18. 
28  Ibid, 26. Both shots are defined by the Department of Energy as “weapons related” 
tests. "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
29 This was the first of two objectives; the second remains redacted. Memorandum for 
the Special Committee of the National Security Council for Atomic Energy Matters 
from Gordon Dean, 15 August 1952; Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 
4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library. 
30 See Chapter One. 
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series conducted under Eisenhower. Indeed, the AEC announced UPSHOT-
KNOTHOLE less than a week after Eisenhower took office.31 
As the first series conducted during the Eisenhower Administration, 
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE offers an interesting if early glimpse at Eisenhower’s opinion 
of nuclear testing. Most interesting is an undated (most likely from around the end of 
May) and handwritten note from S. Everett Gleason, deputy executive secretary of the 
NSC, which documented that “the President has given a reluctant approval to the 
Upshot-Knothole [sic] case presented by [Lewis] Strauss.”32 This reluctance extended 
also to witnessing the tests themselves. Val Peterson, the acting administrator of the 
Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), offered a “cordial invitation” to 
Eisenhower to observe the ANNIE shot of UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE; however, unlike 
the invitation for Truman to observe BUSTER-JANGLE, researchers do not have 
access to Eisenhower’s response, if he responded at all. 33  Oddly, however, 
Eisenhower many years later and with some degree of mirth noted in a press 
conference that he had not been allowed to witness a nuclear test.34 
                                                
31 AEC Announces New Series of Tests to be Conducted at Nevada, 26 January 1953; 
Subject Series, Box 7; White House Central Files (Confidential File); Eisenhower, 
Dwight D.: Records as President; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
32 Admiral Strauss’ Office Informs Me, undated; Executive Secretary’s Subject File 
Series, Box 4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House 
Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Emphasis my own. Lewis Strauss would 
replace Gordon Dean as Chairman of the AEC in July 1953 – one wonders what 
“case” Strauss had presented to Eisenhower at a time when Dean was Chairman. It 
was almost certainly that regarding the CLIMAX shot, which we shall soon explore. 
33 Val Peterson to President Eisenhower, 26 February 1953; OF108 Atomic Energy – 
Atomic Power, 1957, Box 450; Official File; White House Central Files; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. Peterson also offered an invitation on behalf of himself and 
Gordon Dean to James Lay, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the National Security 
Council, to witness ANNIE. Val Peterson to Mr. James Lay, Jr., 26 February 1953; 
Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 5; National Security Council Staff: 
Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
34 A reporter for the New York Herald Tribune asked “I have often wondered, have 
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Planning for UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE began at the end of 1951 when the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff considered a weapons-effects test series in 1953; the Department of 
Defense advised the NSC of the need to test “not more than three atomic devices” at 
the Nevada Test Site. 35 These tests became Operation KNOTHOLE, and were 
conducted “to obtain additional data on the military effects of atomic explosions and 
to test the projectile now being stockpiled for the 280-mm gun.”36 KNOTHOLE was 
combined with Operation UPSHOT, a series of weapon development tests conducted 
by the AEC.37 UPSHOT was composed of “not more than eight” tests and, together 
with the two shots of KNOTHOLE, was approved by Eisenhower on 21 February.38 
To these ten tests an eleventh was added while the series was underway. In 
April, and again in May, requests for additional expenditure of fissionable materials 
were submitted to Eisenhower because of the decision of the AEC to test an 
                                                                                                                                      
you ever seen a hydrogen bomb?” to which Eisenhower replied “They won’t allow 
me (laughter)…I have seen the bomb, I haven’t seen the test…I just haven’t been 
allowed to go to the tests.” Official White House Transcript, President Eisenhower’s 
Press and Radio Conference #161, 17 June 1959; Press Conference Series, Box 8; 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann 
Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. These comments shall be further 
discussed later in this chapter. 
35 Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council from William 
C. Foster, 22 December 1951; Atomic Energy: President’s Directive [1 of 3] to 
Atomic Weapons: Procedure for Use, Box 176; National Security Council – Atomic 
File; PSF: Subject File, 1940-1953; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library. 
36 Memorandum for James S. Lay, Executive Secretary National Security Council 
from Gordon Dean, 16 February 1953; Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 
4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White House Office; Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid and Memorandum for James S. Lay, Executive Secretary National Security 
Council from Gordon Dean, 19 May 1953; NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; 
Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; 
White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. The original request of the JCS 
in December 1951 for three tests was astonishingly accurate, as the Department of 
Defense series comprised only two shots. 
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additional device; this request was presented to the president in terms that “successful 
testing of this device will probably obviate the necessity for the AEC conducting 
Operation DOMINO in the fall of 1953.”39 Charles E. Wilson, the secretary of 
defense, supported Gordon Dean’s request, but did so primarily because it would 
preclude the conduct of DOMINO.40 Eisenhower’s approval of this additional shot 
was not without rebuke: Dean was advised that “the President…stated that he thought 
that the responsible officials should have brought this query up for consideration at a 
much earlier date.”41 
ANNIE, the first shot of the series, was an “open” shot, and was conducted on 
17 March. ANNIE was “open” in so far as “representatives of press, radio and motion 
pictures” were invited to attend the test along with civil defense personnel.42 It was 
the opinion of the AEC and the FCDA that those invited would be given “a better 
understanding of atomic weapons development and its impact” through observation of 
the ANNIE shot, and that “the results generally were advantageous to the public.”43 It 
was to this shot that Eisenhower was invited. ANNIE included effects tests on civilian 
structures, materials and vehicles that substantively assisted the FCDA and civil 
defense programs and gave “graphic information on atomic bomb effects to citizens 
                                                
39 Memorandum for James S. Lay, Executive Secretary National Security Council 
from Gordon Dean, 19 May 1953; NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of 
the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House 
Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
40 Memorandum for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from James S. Lay, 
Jr., 27 May 1953; NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Gordon Dean to Mr. Robert Cutler, 3 February 1953; Special Assistant Series, 
Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
43 Ibid. 
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generally.”44 ANNIE yielded 16 kilotons of TNT equivalent.45 If the relatively low 
yield of this “open” shot was intended to assuage public concern it was successful – 
members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy after witnessing ANNIE said to 
the press: “we were impressed by the finite…nature of a single atomic blast. The 
explosion…could not by itself have performed miracles.”46 
The remaining tests of UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE were conducted largely for 
weapons design purposes, with the exception of ENCORE, which was a Department 
of Defense effects test.47 These tests varied widely in yield: RUTH and RAY yielded 
just 200 tons; DIXIE yielded 11 kilotons; BADGER, NANCY and ENCORE yielded 
23, 24 and 27 kilotons, respectively; while HARRY and SIMON yielded 32 and 43 
kilotons.48 The major purposes of these tests were to “continue experimental study of 
the yield of implosion bombs”; “obtain more detailed and varied information on the 
behaviour of radiation implosion”; “test the boosting effect of [d]euterium in an 
implosion weapon”; and assist the design of the two thermonuclear devices planned 
for the upcoming CASTLE tests series.49 For example, NANCY and SIMON were 
small devices that tested fuel assembly of the fission primary (the initial fission bomb 
that set off a thermonuclear reaction in a hydrogen bomb); NANCY gave a smaller 
                                                
44 Ibid and Val Peterson to President Eisenhower, 26 February 1953; OF108 Atomic 
Energy – Atomic Power, 1957, Box 450; Official File; White House Central Files; 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
45 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
46 Quoted in Jean Ponton, et al., "Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, 1953," in United 
States Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review 
(Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 31. 
47 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Memorandum for Mr. James S. Lay, Executive Secretary National Security Council 
from Gordon Dean, 16 February 1953; NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office 
of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White 
House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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than expected yield while SIMON a higher.50 UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was intimately 
connected with the thermonuclear tests of the preceding IVY and subsequent 
CASTLE series. 
The tenth shot of the series, GRABLE, was unique among U.S. nuclear tests in 
that it was an operational test of the atomic projectile stockpiled for the 280-mm 
artillery piece.51 This projectile was a gun-assembly device, a design whose shape and 
ruggedness (demonstrated by JANGLE UNCLE) inclined it to use in an artillery shell. 
GRABLE had a slightly higher yield than Little Boy at 15 kilotons.52 Battalions of 
atomic-capable 280-mm artillery batteries were attached to U.S. divisions in Europe 
following this successful test.53 
As with the two preceding test series held at the Nevada site, UPSHOT-
KNOTHOLE included the fifth and largest of the DESERT ROCK exercises. 
DESERT ROCK V involved 18,000 troops of all three branches of the Armed 
                                                
50 There were very specific requirements for a fission primary – it must be less than 
27 inches (68.5 centimetres) in diameter and posses both a high and precise yield. 
One can presume from their results that these two shots tested the precision of yield. 
Memorandum for Mr. Robert Cutler from Gordon Dean, 1 June 1953; Special 
Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
51 Ibid and Ponton, "Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, 1953," 39-40. 
52 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
53 By 1954, five battalions of 280-mm atomic artillery had been deployed in Europe, 
one battalion for each U.S. division on the continent. By 1956, these battalions had 
been supplemented by Honest John atomic rocket batteries while another 280-mm 
battalion had been deployed in Okinawa. Department of Defense Report to National 
Security Council on Status of United States Military Programs as of 31 December 
1954; NSC Series, Status of Projects Subseries, Box 5; Office of the Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. Michael Gordon Jackson traces the discussions within the 
Eisenhower Administration regarding the deployment of these battalions, especially 
in Korea. Michael Gordon Jackson, "Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear 
War Fighting, and Korea 1953-1968," Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 
(2005): 63-65. 
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Services in observation, training exercises, and manoeuvres.54 Observers were trained 
to calculate safe distances for observation of nuclear detonations, use of protective 
equipment, measurement of battlefield radiation, and were themselves tested for 
psychological reactions to the use of nuclear weapons.55 Tactical troop manoeuvres 
were held at shots ANNIE, NANCY, BADGER, SIMON, ENCORE and GRABLE, 
including a novel helicopter-borne assault to determine the capability of helicopters to 
attack an objective following a nuclear detonation.56 
The final shot of the series was, appropriately, named CLIMAX, and is 
remarkable both for its planning and for what its testing said about atmospheric 
experiments in the continental United States. CLIMAX was the aforementioned shot 
that was added to UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE after the series had commenced. Gordon 
Dean articulated the reasons for this additional shot in a memorandum that responded 
to Eisenhower’s admonishment mentioned above. The divergent results of NANCY 
and SIMON had jeopardised the fission primary to be used in the upcoming CASTLE 
series; from this experience, a new design for a primary was produced, requiring its 
testing before CASTLE commenced.57 UPSHOT CLIMAX was tested only four days 
after this explanation from Dean, and yielded 61 kilotons.58 Here again entered Lewis 
Strauss, who in May had been offered the chairmanship of the AEC but who did not 
                                                
54 AEC Announces New Series of Tests to be Conducted at Nevada, 26 January 1953; 
Subject Series, Box 7; White House Central Files (Confidential File), 1953-1961; 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
55 Ponton, "Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, 1953," 60-78. 
56 Ibid., 77. The helicopter manoeuvres were not held at GRABLE. 
57 Memorandum for Mr. Robert Cutler from Gordon Dean, 1 June 1953; Special 
Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
58 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
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take that position until UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE had ended. 59  Strauss wrote to 
Eisenhower in May (as a member of the AEC and not its chairman) regarding 
CLIMAX and expressed his ongoing concern about testing in the continental United 
States. Most importantly, Strauss wrote that “I have the feeling that [the yield of 61 
kilotons] is uncomfortably near or beyond the limit of size that should be tested on the 
continent and I recommend against it at this time.”60 Here Strauss, a month before 
assuming the chairmanship of the AEC, enunciated a limit in yield for testing in the 
continental United States. Indeed, CLIMAX was the second-highest yield shot ever 
conducted at Nevada; only one shot held on the continent after UPSHOT-
KNOTHOLE exceeded 61 kilotons.61 
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, then, is important partly because it demonstrated an 
underlying awareness of the limits of the Nevada Test Site. Recall that the Nevada 
site was opened for BUSTER-JANGLE because it provided the necessary conditions 
for the underground and cratering shots of that series (that were originally to be held 
at Amchitka), but had evolved into a site of “greater convenience” than the Marshall 
Islands.62 Moreover, the desert of Nevada provided better terrain for the kind of 
tactical manoeuvres performed in the many DESERT ROCK military exercises than 
                                                
59 Strauss became Chairman of the AEC on 2 July 1953. 
60 Memorandum for the President from Lewis L. Strauss, 25 May 1953; Special 
Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. Emphasis my own. While recommending against CLIMAX, 
Strauss noted that to conduct the test at Eniwetok rather than Nevada involved a delay 
of three months, which might consequently delay CASTLE. 
61 This was PLUMBBOB HOOD in 1957. "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 
through September 1992,"  8-9. 
62 Strauss wrote that “there is no question of the greater convenience of the Nevada 
testing ground.” Memorandum for the President from Lewis L. Strauss, 25 May 1953; 
Special Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
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the islands of the Pacific atolls. Both the convenience and the limit to yield of the 
Nevada site became important in the resumption of U.S. testing after the Soviet 
abrogation of the test moratorium in 1961.63 
As with RANGER, Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was a test series 
largely obscured by the two series that bracketed it, despite its close developmental 
connection to both. It saw important progress in both tactical – see the atomic artillery 
of GRABLE – and strategic nuclear weapons – see the design of fission primaries for 
the thermonuclear devices of CASTLE. As the first test series held after Eisenhower’s 
inauguration, UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE occupied an important and interesting place in 
the narrative of U.S. nuclear testing. Eisenhower’s reluctance to test nuclear weapons 
was made immediately clear to the NSC, while the incoming chairman of the AEC, 
Lewis Strauss, confidentially expressed the limits that he as chairman would impose 
upon testing at Nevada.64 While the Eisenhower Administration was taking a very 
modest and undisclosed step backward from the escalation of testing evident after 
1950 (at least, from testing in the continental United States), another message was 
sent to the American public with the “open” ANNIE shot, which appeared to rein in 
speculation and fear about the atomic bomb. That speculation and fear would however 
be reignited with the first shot of Operation CASTLE. 
 
 
 
                                                
63 See Chapter Six. 
64  Eisenhower’s lukewarm enthusiasm for nuclear testing, expressed through 
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, preceded his famous “Atoms for Peace” speech before the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in December of 1953. For an excellent 
examination of this speech, see Ira Chernus, Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University, 2002). 
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CASTLE 
Operation CASTLE was a test series composed of six high-yield shots held at 
Eniwetok and Bikini atolls in the Marshall Islands in the spring of 1954. The first shot 
of the series, CASTLE BRAVO, dominates the discourse surrounding the test ban and 
the radiological dangers of atmospheric nuclear testing. It is difficult to write about 
the CASTLE series without discussing the vast fallout associated with BRAVO, 
because “BRAVO was without question the worst single incident of fallout exposure 
in all the U.S. atmospheric testing program.”65 
Although the device tested at IVY MIKE had demonstrated (and provided 
important information regarding) a thermonuclear reaction, the device itself was 
fuelled by liquid deuterium that required refrigeration, and as a result the device was 
large, unwieldy, and could not be delivered to a target using a bomber or missile.66 
CASTLE BRAVO tested a thermonuclear device fuelled by lithium deuteride, a dry 
fusion fuel that was more easily weaponised than that used in the IVY MIKE device. 
The deliverability of the hydrogen bomb became more important in the months 
following UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE when the Soviet Union tested a 400-kiloton device 
that derived much of its yield from thermonuclear fusion and was fuelled by dry 
hydrogen isotopes and so was deliverable.67 In terms of strategy and doctrine, it was 
only after the CASTLE series that the United States possessed a deliverable hydrogen 
                                                
65 Edward J. Martin and Richard H. Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," in United 
States Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review 
(Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 235. 
66 IVY MIKE was “larger than a two-storey house and weighed some 65 tons.” 
Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 16. 
67 The Soviet test of August 1953 was more akin to a boosted-fission device than a 
true thermonuclear, as it was a single-stage device and not infinitely scalable. It was a 
closer relative of IVY KING than IVY MIKE. Yet the August 1953 test used lithium 
deuteride, which the U.S. would not use until CASTLE BRAVO. Holloway, Stalin 
and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956: 305-9. 
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bomb, and as such CASTLE should be seen as “the culmination of the development 
of the super, or hydrogen, bomb that began in 1950.”68 
The six shots of CASTLE were weapons design tests that experimented with 
different fusion fuels and assemblies. These shots also included secondary effects 
experiments that focused upon “urgently needed military data” relating to blast 
overpressure and optimum airburst height for high-yield weapons.69 The measurement 
of these effects was made difficult by the shortage of land at the Pacific atolls, 
“offering little dry space to place shot towers, instrumentation shelters, test structures 
or places to live.”70 The shortage of dry land was made particularly acute by the high 
yield of each of the CASTLE shots and the larger blast and fallout footprint of these 
tests. It was because of the small total land area of Eniwetok that the CASTLE shots 
were distributed between Eniwetok and Bikini (the first tests at Bikini since 
CROSSROADS in 1946), and the problem was also partly solved through the use of 
barge-mounted test devices and floating data-collection stations.71 
Eisenhower had been again invited to witness a test of the CASTLE series. 
Lewis Strauss wrote to the president and suggested either the UNION or ROMEO 
shots, asking “will you have any interest in witnessing either of the shots?” Unlike the 
invitation to UPSHOT ANNIE, however, Eisenhower’s response is available: 
“Thanks. Don’t believe I can do it.”72 
                                                
68 Martin and Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 26. 
69 Specifically, from devices that yielded greater than 540 kilotons. This information 
“could not be obtained from the smaller yield tests at…Nevada.” Col. K.D. Coleman, 
et al., "Operation CASTLE: Summary Report of the Commander," (Albuquerque, 
New Mexico: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 1959), 22; Martin and 
Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 35. 
70 Martin and Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 51. 
71 Ibid., 51-52. 
72 Lewis L. Strauss to the President, 26 January 1954; Administration Series, Box 4; 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann 
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At 0645 on 1 March 1954, CASTLE BRAVO exploded above Bikini Atoll 
with a yield of 15 megatons of TNT equivalent, or over one thousand times the yield 
of Little Boy.73 Test personnel must have almost immediately realised that something 
was wrong with BRAVO. The device was expected to yield about five megatons, but 
instead ran away to triple that estimate.74 The BRAVO device was fuelled by lithium 
that was enriched to roughly forty per cent lithium-6 and the remaining sixty per cent 
lithium-7; the temperatures and pressures of the fission primary released tritium (an 
isotope of hydrogen) from lithium-6.75 Physicists had, however, underestimated the 
reaction of lithium-7, which was assumed to be largely inert – instead, lithium-7 
underwent a reaction whereby one neutron entering the nucleus knocked two neutrons 
out, meaning that lithium-7 acted like enriched lithium-6 and created even more 
tritium for the thermonuclear reaction.76 
A fireball almost three miles (4.8 kilometres) in diameter had formed in 
seconds, and gouged a crater one mile (1.6 kilometres) across and 200 feet (60 
metres) in depth from the coral atoll.77 This vaporised coral was lifted with the fireball 
into a cloud that after one minute was 45,000 feet (13.7 kilometres) in height.78 The 
glow of the detonation was visible for a minute on Rongerik Atoll, 135 miles (250 
                                                                                                                                      
Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. A wider invitation was also sent to 
Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which 
was similarly rebuffed. Lewis L. Strauss to Robert Cutler, 10 February 1954; Special 
Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
73 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-5. 
74 Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 541. 
75 Ibid. and Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 
17. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Martin and Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 205. 
78 Ibid. 
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kilometres) east of Bikini.79 The shock wave shook windows on Rongerik eleven 
minutes after the detonation. 
The task force fleet assembled around Bikini began to receive fallout just over 
an hour after the detonation. The fallout “resembled pinhead-sized white and gritty 
snow,” and forced the cancellation of helicopter surveys of the atoll.80 This gritty 
snow was irradiated coral falling from the bomb cloud. Marshall Rosenbluth 
described the fallout: “I was on a ship that was thirty miles [forty-eight kilometres] 
away, and we had this horrible white stuff raining out on us…it was pretty 
frightening.”81 Radiation levels on the task force ships rose quickly and after five 
minutes these ships were ordered south at best speed.82 The image of the test fleet 
rapidly retreating from the expanding mushroom cloud of BRAVO is a powerful one. 
Irradiated along with the task force fleet was a Japanese fishing boat, the 
Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon 5), trawling eighty-five miles (136 kilometres) 
east of Bikini. A crewmember who witnessed the BRAVO detonation reported to his 
colleagues that “the sun rises in the west.”83 Calcined coral rained out over the trawler 
and coated it and its crew with a “sandy white ash.”84 Despite aerial patrols to secure 
the test area and track the bomb cloud and fallout, the task force was unaware of the 
                                                
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 210. 
81 Recall Rosenbluth was the physicist who described the GREENHOUSE GEORGE 
shot as like using a blast furnace to light a match. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of 
the Hydrogen Bomb: 541. 
82 Martin and Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 210. Elements of the fleet received 
a second dusting of fallout from the early afternoon through to the evening 
“composed of much smaller particles that had taken considerably longer to fall from 
the great heights of the bomb cloud than the large particles of the morning fallout.” 
Ibid., 217. 
83 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 4. 
84  Ibid.; Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb: 542; Martin, 
"CASTLE Series, 1954." 212. 
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trawler until it returned to port in Japan.85 The crew was hospitalised for weeks with 
acute radiation sickness, and the radioman – Aikichi Kuboyama – died on 24 
September.86 
At Rongerik Atoll, fallout gathered to a depth of half an inch (1.2 centimetres) 
and left “a visible layer on tables in the mess hall and barracks.”87 Personnel were 
evacuated from Rongerik the day after the BRAVO shot, along with indigenous 
Marshallese from the surrounding atolls. Many of these evacuees suffered radiation 
burns as a result of their exposure, and some of the Marshallese developed severe 
blood disorders. 88  At about the same time that these evacuations were being 
undertaken, a fuel tanker en route from Eniwetok to Pearl Harbour received fallout at 
                                                
85 There was some confusion regarding the aerial patrol that should have detected the 
Fukuryu Maru. A P2V aircraft swept the area after the shot but was forced to cancel 
its mission when it became “heavily contaminated” by fallout. Accounts differ on 
how far east this aircraft had travelled before it broke off its search: one account 
suggests that it turned back to Kwajalein just before the Fukuryu Maru would have 
been detected, while another suggests that it should have easily detected the trawler. 
Martin and Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 213. The former scenario seems more 
likely to this author. 
86 The exposure of the Fukuryu Maru to fallout became a tense diplomatic issue long 
before Kuboyama’s death. The U.S. ambassador to Japan, John M. Allison, wrote a 
long cable articulating “unpleasant…even ominous” conclusions regarding the 
incident. Eisenhower was “concerned about the Japanese situation as reported by 
Allison” and requested more information from the State Department. The State 
Department recommended at the end of May (four months before Kuboyama’s death) 
that $150,000 be paid as compensation; the U.S. eventually paid two million dollars 
in compensation to Japan. Telegram to the Secretary of State from Tokyo, 20 May 
1954; Dulles-Herter Series, Box 3; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the 
United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the President, 26 May 1954; Dulles-
Herter Series, Box 3; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United 
States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; and 
Memorandum for the President from Robert Murphy, Acting Secretary of State, 29 
May 1954; Dulles-Herter Series, Box 3; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President 
of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
87 Martin, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 217. 
88 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 29. 
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a distance of 586 miles (1,084 kilometres) from Bikini.89 Such was the extent of the 
fallout from CASTLE BRAVO that “not only were U.S. military personnel [exposed], 
but also foreign nationals and Marshall Islanders.”90 
Lewis Strauss observed the BRAVO and ROMEO shots, and returned to 
Washington at the end of March; he then released a statement addressing the fallout 
concerns of BRAVO. He rejected the notion that BRAVO was “out of control” or 
“devastating,” stating that “the yield was about double that of the calculated estimate 
– a margin of error not incompatible with a totally new weapon,” and instead 
attributed the fallout to an unexpected shift in wind direction.91 
The radiological contamination caused by BRAVO affected the rest of the 
CASTLE series. Because of the contamination of Bikini Atoll, test personnel received 
cumulative radiation doses that exceeded the maximum limit, which consequently led 
to a “gradual loss of personnel” (this despite the issuance of waivers permitting 
                                                
89 This ship was the Patapsco, and was associated with the CASTLE series. It had 
hurriedly left the test area two days before BRAVO because it lacked adequate 
protection against radiation. Martin, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 230. 
90 Ibid., 235. Across Rongerik, Rongelap, Ailinginae and Uterik Atolls, 28 U.S. 
personnel received a gamma dosage of 86 roentgens, 64 Marshallese received 183 
roentgens, 18 Marshallese received 81 roentgens and 157 Marshallese received 13 
roentgens, respectively. This dosage was accumulated between 4 and 78 hours after 
detonation. The operational limit for test personnel set at the beginning of CASTLE 
was 3.9 roentgens over a 13-week period. Coleman, "Operation CASTLE: Summary 
Report of the Commander," 71; Martin and Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 3. 
Cronkite et al. note that the maximum permissible exposure was set at 20 roentgens 
for the Marshallese, five times higher than the limit set for U.S. personnel. Cronkite, 
"Historical Events Associated with Fallout from Bravo Shot - Operation Castle and 25 
Y of Medical Findings," 177. 
91 This was the same statement, mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, in which 
he described nuclear weapons testing as “this awesome field.” Statement by Lewis L. 
Straus, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 31 March 1954; Press Conferences 
Series, Box 2; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-
1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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exposures to almost double the operational limit).92 The blast from BRAVO had also 
destroyed support facilities at Bikini Atoll. Further compromised by poor weather, the 
remaining shots of CASTLE were rescheduled and reordered. Shot ECHO was 
cancelled because of personnel exposure, shot NECTAR was moved from Bikini to 
Eniwetok, and shot ROMEO was moved to the crater formed by BRAVO. Not only 
were test devices and barges relocated but observation and measurement 
instrumentation as well, and all labour was carried out in a radioactive environment.93 
Shots ROMEO, KOON, UNION and YANKEE were fired at Bikini Atoll, and 
were all megaton-range thermonuclear tests with the exception of KOON which 
“almost fizzled” at 110 kilotons.94 NECTAR was fired at Eniwetok Atoll in the crater 
created by IVY MIKE and yielded 1.69 megatons. Although many of these shots were 
very high-yield – YANKEE, for example, yielded 13.5 megatons – none created the 
same widespread radiological contamination as BRAVO. Over a month after the 
NECTAR shot, Lewis Strauss together with Charles E. Wilson, the secretary of 
defense, issued a brief statement declaring that the “1954 series of thermonuclear 
tests…has been completed” and that these tests “were successful in the development 
of thermonuclear weapons.”95 
Strauss’s statement belied the public unrest that emerged as details of the 
fallout from BRAVO became known. It was criticism of this fallout, both 
international and domestic, that was the catalyst for, and driving force behind, the 
                                                
92 Martin and Rowland, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 4, 246. 
93 Ibid., 248-49. 
94 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 25; 
Martin, "CASTLE Series, 1954," 267; "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 
through September 1992,"  4-5. 
95 Statement by L. L. Strauss, Chairman, AEC, and Charles E. Wilson, Secretary, 
DOD, 18 June 1954; OF108 Atomic Energy-Atomic Power, 1957, Box 450; Official 
File; White House Central Files; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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embryonic test ban debate.96 Strauss was forced to reply to this growing criticism in a 
lengthy press conference in December of 1954, after which a report by the AEC on 
high-yield nuclear explosions was made public.97 This statement and the attached 
report make for interesting reading. After a cogent summary of the interaction of a 
nuclear fireball with the Earth’s surface and the distribution of fallout, Strauss 
dispassionately commented that BRAVO released sufficiently radioactive fallout “in a 
downwind belt about 140 miles (225 kilometres) in length and of varying width up to 
20 miles (32 kilometres) to have seriously threatened the lives of nearly all persons in 
the area who took no protective measures.”98 But Strauss also defended the high-yield 
tests of CASTLE: 
                                                
96 Robert Divine made this argument in 1978 but added that while Eisenhower was 
president a pattern emerged in which “sudden interest in nuclear tests” led to “intense 
debate and public discussion, and then the equally abrupt dropping of this issue.” 
Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 27. Glenn 
Seaborg, chairman of the AEC under Kennedy and Johnson, explicitly connected 
“widespread public concern” with the BRAVO fallout to disarmament proposals, 
including the test ban. Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 3-4. Benjamin Greene has more 
recently argued that the Eisenhower Administration first seriously considered a test 
ban proposal in 1954, in the aftermath of BRAVO. Greene, Eisenhower, Science 
Advice, and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1945-1963: 68-86. 
97 Elements of the Administration resisted the publication of this report, arguing that it 
“could have serious and far-reaching adverse effects upon our foreign programs, 
particularly in Western Europe.” Memorandum for Mr. Max Raab, Secretary to the 
Cabinet from Elmer B. Staats, Executive Office, Operations Coordinating Board, 9 
December 1954; Cabinet Secretariat: Records, 1953-1960, Box 1; White House 
Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Divine argues that the report was delayed 
until February 1955 to allow the State Department to negotiate with NATO countries 
the rearmament of West Germany. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test 
Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 36. 
98  Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, United States Atomic Energy 
Commission, February 1955; Cabinet Secretariat: Records, 1953-1960, Box 1; White 
House Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Emphasis from the original. Strauss 
went on to say that “about 7,000 square miles (11,265 square kilometres) of territory 
downwind from the point of burst [of BRAVO] was so contaminated that survival 
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It should be noted that if we had not conducted the full-scale thermonuclear 
tests mentioned above, we would have been in ignorance of the extent of the 
effects of radioactive fallout and, therefore, we would have been much more 
vulnerable to the dangers from fallout in the event an enemy should resort to 
radiological warfare against us.99 
 
Moreover, the report concluded, “a certain element of risk is involved in the 
testing of nuclear weapons” – which seems indisputable, although the scale of that 
risk certainly was not akin to “manufacturing conventional explosives or in 
transporting inflammable substances such as oil or gasoline on our streets and 
highways,” as was suggested.100 
One dimension of the importance of the CASTLE series that should not be 
taken for granted was that BRAVO set the upper limit for the yield of U.S. nuclear 
tests, and also proved the sensibility of overseas testing. Although largely accidental, 
the high yield and widespread fallout associated with BRAVO had the effect of 
capping U.S. tests in the Pacific at around 15 megatons, just as UPSHOT CLIMAX 
had the effect of stabilising the upper limit of tests at Nevada. Both Eisenhower and 
Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy, affirmed in the 
aftermath of BRAVO that “we [the U.S.] have no intention of seeking ways to make 
                                                                                                                                      
might have depended upon prompt evacuation of the area or upon taking shelter…” 
99 A Report by the United States Atomic Energy Commission on the Effects of High-
Yield Nuclear Explosions, February 1955; Cabinet Secretariat: Records, 1953-1960, 
Box 1; White House Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. This comment should be 
compared with one made by Strauss in his statement of March, in which he said that 
“one important result of these hydrogen bomb developments has been the 
enhancement of our military capability.” Here we see a hint of the blurred line 
between weapons development and weapons effects tests and the complex 
interrelationship between these. Statement by Lewis L. Straus, Chairman, Atomic 
Energy Commission, 31 March 1954; Press Conferences Series, Box 2; Eisenhower, 
Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
100 A Report by the United States Atomic Energy Commission on the Effects of High-
Yield Nuclear Explosions, February 1955; Cabinet Secretariat: Records, 1953-1960, 
Box 1; White House Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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larger ones [higher-yield thermonuclear weapons].” 101  CASTLE also seemed to 
justify, at least to Lewis Strauss, the conduct of high-yield atmospheric tests in the 
Pacific Trust Territory. In March he reminded his audience that it was “for this reason 
[the distribution of fallout] the Atomic Energy Commission has conducted tests of its 
largest weapons away from the mainland so that fall-out [sic] would occur in the 
ocean”; while in December he more explicitly communicated the separate functions 
of the test sites when he said that “only relatively small nuclear test explosions are 
conducted at the Nevada Test Site, in contrast to the high-yield thermonuclear devices 
at the Pacific Proving Grounds.”102 
Operation CASTLE was probably the most important test series conducted 
during the Eisenhower Administration, because it was unique in that it was 
simultaneously crucial to two dimensions not often reconciled: both for weapons 
design and for the test ban. The connection between these two dimensions was a close 
one, but the second was not possible without the first: it was the sheer scale of the 
detonation that made BRAVO important for weapons design, but the dangers of 
nuclear testing were more widely recognised as a consequence of that scale. CASTLE 
BRAVO demonstrated important developments in thermonuclear weapons, but at the 
same time the extensive fallout associated with the shot was the catalyst for 
                                                
101 Letter to W. Sterling Cole from President Eisenhower, 8 April 1954; Name Series, 
Box 6; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 
(Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Letter to the President from 
Sterling Cole, 5 April 1954; Name Series, Box 6; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as 
President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
102 Statement by Lewis L. Straus, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 31 March 
1954; Press Conferences Series, Box 2; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President 
of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; 
Statement by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, United States Atomic Energy Commission, 
February 1955; Cabinet Secretariat: Records, 1953-1960, Box 1; White House Office, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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arguments regarding a ban on weapons testing. Because of that fallout, and because it 
remained the highest yield shot ever fired by the United States, BRAVO henceforth 
cast a shadow over U.S. nuclear weapons tests. 
 
TEAPOT 
Operation TEAPOT consisted of fourteen nuclear tests and one non-nuclear 
test, and was the fifth series held at the Nevada Test Site and tenth held since the end 
of the Second World War.103 It was held between February and May of 1955, during 
which time the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (September 1954 – May 1955), the 
sovereignty of West Germany and the formation of the Warsaw Pact (May 1955) 
further defined the Cold War. 
The request for approval of TEAPOT was sent to Eisenhower at the end of 
August 1954. This was before the death of Aikichi Kuboyama as a result of CASTLE 
BRAVO. In his request, Strauss identified “a number of ideas that are highly 
important to the development” of tactical, air defense and light-weight thermonuclear 
weapons and that “verification of some of these ideas within the limits of laboratory 
techniques will be completed in late 1954,” necessitating a series of tests “to maintain 
progress in this field.”104 Robert Cutler replied on behalf of Eisenhower one week 
later and approved Strauss’ request.105 
                                                
103 The non-nuclear test was shot HADR (High Altitude Dress Rehearsal), a high-
explosive device detonated to calibrate measurement equipment and practice for the 
nuclear shot HA (High Altitude). 
104 Lewis Strauss to President Eisenhower, 30 August 1954; Executive Secretary’s 
Subject File Series, Box 4; National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961; White 
House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
105 Memorandum for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from Robert Cutler, 
7 September 1954; NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 1; Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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Of the fourteen nuclear tests of TEAPOT, four were primarily weapons effects 
tests and the remaining ten were weapons design tests – although these definitions 
relate to their primary purpose, and multiple experiments relating to both paradigms 
were conducted at each shot.106 The goals of these tests were to develop small-
diameter implosion systems for use in air defense and tactical weapons; develop small 
thermonuclear weapons for use by ground support aircraft and guided missiles; and 
further develop understanding of the military effects of nuclear explosions, especially 
for civil defense purposes.107 
TEAPOT also involved training programs for the armed forces. Shots WASP 
and WASP PRIME – 1 and 3 kilotons of TNT equivalent, respectively – were used by 
the Strategic Air Command to test airdrop delivery techniques. 108  Similarly, 
approximately 8,000 personnel took part in the DESERT ROCK VI exercises at shots 
WASP, MOTH, TESLA, TURK, BEE, ESS, APPLE 1, MET and APPLE 2.109 The 
tactical exercise conducted at APPLE 2, which yielded 29 kilotons, was the largest of 
the TEAPOT series, and involved a tank battalion reinforced with mechanised and 
helicopter-borne infantry assaulting a position close to ground zero.110 
Notable about Operation TEAPOT was the novelty of at least two of the shots. 
Shot HA was the first high-altitude test held by the U.S., and was detonated at an 
                                                
106 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-7. 
107 Lewis Strauss to President Eisenhower, 14 January 1955; Administration Series, 
Box 4; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers and President of the United States, 1953-1961 
(Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Two of the five stated purposes 
remain redacted. 
108 Jean Ponton, et al., "Operation TEAPOT, 1955," in United States Atmospheric 
Nuclear Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, D.C.: Defense 
Nuclear Agency, 1981), 34; "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through 
September 1992,"  4-7. 
109 Ponton, "Operation TEAPOT, 1955," 35, 60. 
110 Ibid., 67-68. 
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altitude of 36,620 feet (11.16 kilometres), yielding 3 kilotons. Conversely, shot ESS 
was the deepest shot yet fired underground, and was detonated seventy feet (20 
metres) beneath the surface, yielding 1 kiloton.111 Both underground and high-altitude 
tests would receive greater attention in the PLUMBBOB, HARDTACK and ARGUS 
series. Similarly, TEAPOT included the highest percentage of weapons effects tests of 
any series yet held by the United States.112 
From the perspective of the historical narrative of U.S. nuclear testing, 
however, TEAPOT was most interesting for its modesty. It represented an 
unintentional pause after CASTLE. TEAPOT was held to improve tactical nuclear 
weapons systems, which indeed it did, but nowhere were the dramatic field tests of 
atomic artillery like UPSHOT GRABLE. Similarly, the sixth DESERT ROCK 
exercise was of lesser scale than those that had preceded it. It was perhaps the habit of 
alternating test series between Nevada and the Pacific, between low and high yield, 
that led to the characteristic of domestic debate about nuclear testing that Divine 
noted – that pattern where controversy and opposition would suddenly spike and then 
abruptly fade away. 
 
WIGWAM 
Operation WIGWAM was a one-shot test series held in the Pacific Ocean at 
the same time that TEAPOT was concluding in Nevada.113 WIGWAM involved a 
                                                
111 Ibid., 9; "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-7. 
For comparison, the only previous subsurface shot, JANGLE UNCLE, was detonated 
at a depth of seventeen feet (5 metres). Ponton, "Operation BUSTER-JANGLE, 
1951," 26. 
112 Both BUSTER-JANGLE and TEAPOT involved four tests explicitly conducted 
for weapons effects purposes; TEAPOT, however, involved fewer shots overall, 
making 28.5% of the shots of Operation TEAPOT weapons effects tests. 
113 WIGWAM was detonated on 14 May 1955 while the last shot of TEAPOT 
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single deep-underwater nuclear test that included many of the experiments that were 
associated with the cancelled CHARLIE shot of Operation CROSSROADS in 1946. 
WIGWAM was fired at a location approximately 500 miles (804 kilometres) 
south-west of San Diego, California.114 WIGWAM was the first of only two shots 
fired in this area in the history of U.S. nuclear testing, and the first test conducted 
outside the Pacific Proving Ground or Nevada Test Site since TRINITY in 1945.115 It 
was a location carefully selected through oceanographic surveys to provide the 
essential conditions for the test – that is, of sufficient depth to contain the detonation – 
while also to minimise radiological contamination – with well-known currents and far 
from shipping lanes and fishing areas.116 
The primary purpose of WIGWAM was “to obtain information from which 
can be determined the maximum range at which hull-splitting damage to a submerged 
typical submarine at a single depth can be assured.”117 Related to this primary purpose 
was the need to determine “the safe range for a surface ship in the vicinity of this 
[underwater nuclear] detonation,” and “determine the fallout and contamination 
problems resulting from the explosion.”118 
                                                                                                                                      
ZUCCHINI was detonated on 15 May. 
114  Following the convention of the Department of Energy, and because the 
WIGWAM series involved only one shot, WIGWAM shall be used to refer 
interchangeably to both the series and shot name. "United States Nuclear Tests: July 
1945 through September 1992,"  6-7. 
115 The second shot was SWORDFISH of Operation DOMINIC in 1962 that also 
tested an antisubmarine weapon. See Chapter Five. 
116 S.E. Weary, et al., "Operation WIGWAM," in United States Atmospheric Nuclear 
Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear 
Agency, 1981), 1-11. 
117 Letter from Lewis Strauss and Robert B. Anderson to President Eisenhower, 8 
December 1954; Administration Series, Box 4; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers and 
President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
118 Weary, "Operation WIGWAM," 3-1. 
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The WIGWAM device was detonated at a depth of 2,000 feet (609 metres) 
and yielded 30 kilotons of TNT equivalent.119 None of the task force ships was closer 
than 30,000 feet (9.1 kilometres) from the test device, and almost all were upwind of 
the detonation point.120 All of the initial energy of the device was contained within the 
water – unlike CROSSROADS BAKER, a shallow underwater test, in which much of 
the energy escaped into the atmosphere – and it was this characteristic of the test that 
most interested the U.S. Navy.121 
 The depth of the WIGWAM test also made WIGWAM the cleanest U.S. 
nuclear test series. Of the oceanic test series conducted by the United States between 
1946-1962, the average percentage of test personnel who received zero radiation 
exposure was 32% while for continental test series that percentage was 52%; for 
WIGWAM, 94% per cent of personnel received a radiation exposure of zero. The 
remaining 6% of personnel at WIGWAM received a dosage no greater than .425 
roentgens, while 13% of personnel in oceanic test series received between 1 and 3 
roentgens and 5% of personnel received more than 3 roentgens.122 
WIGWAM was essential in the development of anti-submarine tactics and 
atomic depth charges, but more than that it opened up an entirely new medium and 
manner in which to test nuclear weapons.123 Deep underwater tests offered a relatively 
                                                
119 Letter from Lewis Strauss and Robert B. Anderson to President Eisenhower, 8 
December 1954; Administration Series, Box 4; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers and 
President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library and "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 
1992,"  6-7. 
120 Weary, "Operation WIGWAM," 1-13. 
121 Ibid., 1-3. 
122 Ibid., 4-4 and 4-5. The averages for oceanic test series were, presumably, spiked 
by CASTLE BRAVO. 
123 Letter from Lewis Strauss and Robert B. Anderson to President Eisenhower, 8 
December 1954; Administration Series, Box 4; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers and 
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safe and reliable way to test nuclear weapons that contrasted dramatically with 
CASTLE BRAVO. Alongside high-altitude and underground tests, underwater tests 
added more complexity to the debate regarding a nuclear test ban, and would 
complicate the monitoring of such a ban. These issues will be further discussed in 
Chapters Four and Six. 
 
REDWING 
Operation REDWING was a seventeen-shot test series held at the Pacific test 
site during the summer of 1956. It was the first series held at Bikini and Eniwetok 
Atolls since the fallout of the CASTLE series, and presumably for this reason 
REDWING went against the trend of increasing yield for each subsequent Pacific test 
series. Despite its relative restraint compared to CASTLE, REDWING was 
nonetheless a high-yield series, and was held “primarily to test high-yield 
thermonuclear devices that could not be tested in Nevada.”124 
Lewis Strauss identified four objectives for REDWING in his letter to 
Eisenhower seeking presidential approval for the series. The first objective was to 
“proof-test certain weapons in stockpile or to be stockpiled in the near future,” likely 
next generation thermonuclear weapons based on the results of IVY and CASTLE; 
the second objective was “to continue developmental research on promising 
weapons”; the third objective was “to continue long range weapons research of new 
techniques, ideas and designs,” although how this differed from the second objective 
is unclear; and finally, “to conduct a weapons effects program required by the 
                                                                                                                                      
President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
124 S. Bruce-Henderson, et al., "Operation REDWING: 1956," in United States 
Atmospheric Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, D.C.: 
Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 2. 
 Eisenhower, 1952-1958 
 114 
Department of Defense.”125 This same request from Strauss made the first connection 
between testing and the development of surface-to-air missiles – described as “the air 
defense problem” – along with clean fusion weapons, both of which would become 
increasingly important in the second Eisenhower Administration.126 
Debate preceded REDWING regarding public attendance of the tests. Herbert 
Hoover, former president and advisor to the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, 
counselled against press access to REDWING – fearing the kind of “sensational” 
incident that had followed CASTLE BRAVO.127 Hoover was supported by John 
Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, and the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). 
The AEC, however, felt that “barring its [the American Press] representatives from 
the test may cause not only embarrassment but hostile and distorted reporting based 
upon speculation and leaks, particularly if any embarrassing incident occurs.”128 
Eisenhower eventually worked out a compromise involving a limited number of press 
and foreign observers.129 
                                                
125 Letter from Lewis Strauss to President Eisenhower, 5 March 1956; Subject Series, 
Box 9; White House Central Files (Confidential Files), 1953-1961; Eisenhower, 
Dwight D.: Records as President; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
126 Ibid. The anti-ballistic missile and clean fusion weapons will be further explored in 
Chapter Four. 
127 “It is Mr. Hoover’s view that publicity regarding the test, some of which may be 
sensational, will adversely affect the US throughout the world.” Memorandum for the 
President from William H. Jackson, 7 March 1956; Administration Series, Box 22; 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann 
Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Members of the U.S. press were kept to a minimum, and foreign observers were 
limited to twenty and represented allies in NATO, South America, Asia and the South 
Pacific. Memorandum of Conference with the President March 21, 1956, 22 March 
1956; DDE Diary Series, Box 13; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the 
United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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At least fifteen “news representatives” attended the CHEROKEE shot, the 
second of the REDWING series and the first conducted at Bikini Atoll. 130 
CHEROKEE involved an airdrop from an operational B-52 bomber of a 
thermonuclear bomb, and “although of some scientific interest, was probably more a 
demonstration to the world of the deliverability of these weapons than an 
experiment.”131 The yield of CHEROKEE was 3.8 megatons of TNT equivalent, and 
far exceeded UPSHOT ANNIE, the test conducted at Nevada in 1953 that had also 
been observed by the press.132 CHEROKEE detonated at an altitude of 5,000 feet (1.5 
kilometres) but was considerably off target. Sources do not agree on how inaccurate 
CHEROKEE was – Strauss told Eisenhower it was 2.6 miles (4.2 kilometres) off 
target, while more recent scholarship argues it was 3.8 miles (6.1 kilometres) off 
target – but using either figure the CHEROKEE airdrop was far less accurate than the 
previous airdrop over Bikini, CROSSROADS ABLE in 1946, which had also missed 
its target but only by a distance of 2,130 feet (650 metres).133 In a letter to Colonel 
A.J. Goodpaster, advisor to President Eisenhower, Strauss described this lack of 
accuracy as an “error in point-of-aim,” and excluded the incident from the 
                                                
130 There were fifteen members of the press, one representative of the United States 
Information Agency and “about” twenty civil defense observers in attendance. Letter 
from Lewis Strauss to James C. Hagerty, Secretary to the President (Press), 2 April 
1956; OF108 Atomic Energy-Atomic Power, 1957, Box 450; Official File, 1953-
1961; White House Central Files; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. These were the first 
press observers to attend a Pacific test since CROSSROADS in 1946. Bruce-
Henderson, "Operation REDWING: 1956," 22. 
131 As a high-yield airburst shot, CHEROKEE should have provided information 
regarding air blast effects. Ibid., 2, 177. 
132 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  6-7. 
133 Letter from Lewis Strauss to President Eisenhower, 22 May 1956; Administration 
Series, Box 4; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-
1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Bruce-Henderson, 
"Operation REDWING: 1956," 181. Divine quotes the larger figure. Divine, Blowing 
on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 77. 
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information he recommended Eisenhower mention in the president’s press 
conference.134 
The inclusion of the press at CHEROKEE was a success but the scientific 
results were not. Writing to James Hagerty, the press secretary, after CHEROKEE, 
Strauss described the invitation to the press as a “ten-strike,” and that all the stories 
about CHEROKEE were “devoid of horror overtones” and “obvious attempts to be as 
factual as possible.”135 Moreover, the United States had demonstrated to the world its 
ability to deliver multi-megaton thermonuclear bombs from its existing strategic 
bomber platforms, and also demonstrated the progress made in the design of 
thermonuclear weapons from IVY and CASTLE. But the value of scientific data from 
CHEROKEE was lessened by the inaccurate delivery of the airdrop, and Strauss 
informed Eisenhower that “this error will result in a substantial loss of measurement 
data.”136 
The remaining shots of REDWING were conducted without problem with the 
exception of ZUNI and TEWA. Fired a week after CHEROKEE, shot ZUNI was 
conducted on the same island as CASTLE KOON. The high yield (3.5 megatons) and 
surface placement of ZUNI destroyed the western end of Eneman Island and carried 
the constituent material aloft in the bomb cloud. But CASTLE KOON, which had 
“almost fizzled” two years prior, deposited fissile material not consumed in the 
                                                
134 Strauss did, however, recommend that the president announce that the yield of 
CHEROKEE was “substantially below that of the largest detonations that have 
heretofore taken place at the [Pacific] proving grounds.” Memorandum to Colonel 
Goodpaster from Lewis Strauss, 22 May 1956; Subject Series, Alphabetical 
Subseries, Box 3; White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952-1961; 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
135 Letter from Lewis Strauss to James Hagerty, 24 May 1956; OF108 Atomic 
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Central Files; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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reaction across Eneman Island; this residue of plutonium and uranium was vapourised 
and dispersed by the ZUNI shot. ZUNI and the remains of KOON thus heavily 
irradiated most of Bikini Atoll and “very light fallout” was reported on Eniwetok.137 
TEWA was the highest-yield shot fired during REDWING and caused the 
most serious fallout of the series. It was fired from a barge inside Bikini Atoll and 
yielded 5 megatons of TNT equivalent.138 TEWA heavily contaminated the northern 
islands of the atoll, delaying recovery teams, but an unexpected change in winds 
shifted the stem and upper portion of the bomb cloud toward Eniwetok Atoll.139 
Fallout reached Eniwetok nine hours after the shot and continued to fall for seventeen 
hours, and was concentrated by rain showers. 140  Personnel at both Bikini and 
Eniwetok Atolls received maximum dosages of 2.5 roentgens (far less than U.S. 
personnel on Rongerik Atoll after CASTLE BRAVO); nonetheless, the maximum 
permissible exposure for the REDWING series was raised from 3.9 roentgens to 7 
roentgens after TEWA.141 
The REDWING series of tests demonstrated a natural progression in 
thermonuclear weapons design. Where IVY MIKE demonstrated a fusion reaction 
and CASTLE BRAVO demonstrated a fusion reaction using dry lithium deuteride, 
REDWING CHEROKEE demonstrated a clearly weaponised device and its delivery. 
Yet, despite the increase in number of shots per series, a trend that had moved upward 
from the beginning of U.S. testing with only a few exceptions, REDWING challenged 
the related tendency of increasing yield. To be fair, it would have been very difficult 
indeed to exceed the runaway yield of the CASTLE series – but not impossible and, it 
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141 Ibid., 212. 
 Eisenhower, 1952-1958 
 118 
must be stressed, REDWING was the first opportunity to challenge that trend. 
REDWING arrested the tendency toward higher and higher yields so that while it 
would itself be eclipsed by HARDTACK I, no series exceeded the yield of CASTLE. 
Nevertheless, while the total yield of REDWING was less than a third of the total 
yield of CASTLE, six of its seventeen shots – or thirty-five per cent of the series – 
were of megaton-range weapons. This detail is not insignificant given the vastly 
greater scope of REDWING, which included almost three times as many shots as 
CASTLE and almost nine times as many shots as IVY. 
 
PLUMBBOB 
Operation PLUMBBOB was an extensive test series held at Nevada between 
May and October of 1957 and involved twenty-four nuclear shots and five safety 
experiments. Included in PLUMBBOB was the highest-yield atmospheric test ever 
held in the continental United States as well as a deep underground shot that 
profoundly affected concurrent negotiations for a test ban between the nuclear 
powers. It was this latter shot for which PLUMBBOB is most important, because “as 
the PLUMBBOB series went forward, the international effort was turning toward 
cessation of future testing.”142 
Lewis Strauss wrote to Eisenhower in December 1956 seeking approval for 
what was then known as Operation PILGRIM. Although “it was not possible at the 
present moment to specify exactly what shots are to be fired,” Strauss estimated 
                                                
142 P.S. Harris, et. al., "PLUMBBOB Series, 1957," in United States Atmospheric 
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approximately twenty-five nuclear shots and five or more safety tests.143 The schedule 
depended upon the results of REDWING that were still being analysed when Strauss 
sought Eisenhower’s approval; nonetheless, the letter outlined a set of general 
objectives. These included: tests of “certain air defense and anti-submarine 
warheads”; tests of “components and mockups which provide design information for 
thermonuclear devices” to be tested at HARDTACK I in 1958; “development tests 
toward achieving more efficient use of active material and warheads of smaller size 
and weight”; and a “deep underground test designed to explore this manner of 
testing.”144 The shots of PLUMBBOB were thus largely weapons design tests, and 
involved either proof testing of existing designs or data capture for subsequent 
designs – but not exclusively so. PLUMBBOB also involved safety tests of high-
explosive lenses and weapons effects tests for both the Department of Defense and the 
FCDA.145 Eisenhower’s approval of PLUMBBOB was conditional, “subject to his 
understanding that all the tests proposed will be held in Nevada.”146 
Eisenhower’s conditional approval could be interpreted as reluctance. The 
president certainly voiced reluctance in a meeting with the secretary of state, deputy 
                                                
143  Letter from Lewis Strauss to President Eisenhower, 21 December 1956; 
Administration Series, Box 4; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the 
United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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under-secretary of state and General Goodpaster less than a week after Strauss’s 
request and two days before Eisenhower’s approval. Referring to Strauss’s proposal, 
Eisenhower “expressed some doubt as to the advisability of these tests.”147 John 
Foster Dulles perceived “no difficulty” from the PLUMBBOB tests, because a recent 
Soviet test series “had provoked little comment.” 148  Eisenhower noted that 
“practically all of these explosions would be small,” but it was not until two months 
later that Strauss informed him that “none of [the PLUMBBOB shots] will be 
designed to yield more than 80 KT”149 – an upper limit that represented the highest 
yield of any test held in the continental United States and significantly higher than the 
61 kilotons of UPSHOT CLIMAX that Strauss had recommended against four years 
earlier. One wonders at Eisenhower’s sense of “small”, whether that sense had been 
affected by the multi-megaton shots in the Pacific, and wonders, too, at the 
president’s reaction to Strauss’s letter of 21 February. 
A number of the shots of PLUMBBOB are worth mention. There were at least 
two, possibly three, fizzles – very likely shots FRANKLIN and LASSEN in June, and 
possibly DIABLO in July. Strauss requested presidential authority to expend 
additional fissile material in August, stating that “the additions are due to the 
necessity to fire again modified versions of two earlier shots which did not realize the 
                                                
147 Memorandum of Conversation, Nuclear Tests, 26 December 1956; Dulles-Herter 
Series, Box 8; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-
1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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required yield.”150 Although he did not mention the shots by name, Strauss likely 
referred to FRANKLIN, the second shot of the series, which yielded only 140 tons of 
TNT equivalent, and LASSEN, the third shot, which yielded half a ton.151 A later 
analysis also mentions DIABLO, which purportedly “misfired” yet still yielded 17 
kilotons; it is possible that this was one of the shots to which Strauss referred although 
the relative yield makes it unlikely.152 At the opposite end of the spectrum was shot 
HOOD, which yielded 74 kilotons and was presumably that device to which Strauss 
referred in his letter of 21 February. HOOD was in excess of the yield of UPSHOT 
CLIMAX, which before PLUMBBOB had been the highest yield test held at Nevada. 
The JOHN shot was the first operational test of a nuclear warhead in an air-to-
air missile. JOHN detonated at 18,500 feet (5,638 metres) and yielded approximately 
2 kilotons.153 JOHN was significant for two reasons: first, because Charles E. Wilson, 
the secretary of defense, explicitly connected the development of this nuclear air-to-
air missile to the HA shot of Operation TEAPOT in 1955; and second, because in the 
same statement, made in January 1957, Wilson said that the Department of Defense 
had already begun deployment of the missile that would not be proof tested until 
JOHN in July 1957.154 These two comments from the secretary of defense suggest 
                                                
150  Letter to President Eisenhower from Lewis Strauss, 7 August 1957; 
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that developmental tests like HA were more important for weapons design than proof 
tests like JOHN. 
At each of the twenty-four nuclear shots of PLUMBBOB, Defense personnel 
were involved in Exercises DESERT ROCK VII and VIII. For most of the shots this 
involvement was limited to observation and training programs, but at shots 
BOLTZMANN and WILSON there were evaluations of decontamination equipment; 
at shot PRISCILLA, various emplacements, foxholes and trenches were subjected to 
overpressure and bombs, rockets, artillery shells and grenades were exposed to the 
blast to determine the effect of radiation on fuses; and at shots FRANKLIN, 
LASSEN, WILSON and HOOD, armoured vehicles were evaluated for protection 
from radiation.155 Shots HOOD and SMOKY, the two highest yield shots of the 
series, also involved troop manoeuvres and a mock helicopter assault on a position 
near ground zero.156 
The RAINIER shot of September was the first nuclear test wholly contained 
underground and was conducted, as Strauss wrote, “to explore this manner of testing 
[deep underground].”157 RAINIER was fired inside a tunnel dug horizontally into a 
mountain – it detonated 899 feet (274 metres) underground and as close as 790 feet 
(240 metres) from the surface of the slope.158 It yielded 1.7 kilotons, and completely 
collapsed the tunnel in which it had been placed, thus containing the blast and 
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resulting radiation.159 It was the most advanced underground test yet conducted by the 
United States – far deeper than TEAPOT ESS or JANGLE UNCLE – and arguably 
the first true underground shot in so far as the explosion was entirely contained rather 
than a shallow cratering experiment. The exploration of underground testing came at a 
critical time, as PLUMBBOB RAINIER contributed important information regarding 
the ability to detect underground tests and undermined concurrent efforts toward a test 
ban. Because of its importance in the negotiation of a test ban, RAINIER will be 
further studied in Chapter Four.  
PLUMBBOB was held at a time of particular pressure for Eisenhower and his 
administration. In August, while only halfway through the test series, the United 
States proposed a two-year ban on nuclear testing – but connected the ban to a freeze 
in production of fissile material that was rejected by the Soviet Union. In September, 
federal troops intervened in Little Rock, Arkansas. And, in October, the Soviet Union 
launched Sputnik, threatening the military and scientific leadership of the United 
States. Although PLUMBOB was part of this array of issues facing the Eisenhower 
Administration in 1957, the confluence of these domestic and international pressures 
eclipsed PLUMBBOB in contemporary significance. The PLUMBBOB series, then, 
perhaps as no other, reminds us that nuclear testing was only a part of a wider system 
of interconnecting problems that the president faced at any given time. 
 
HARDTACK I 
Operation HARDTACK Phase I, or HARDTACK I, was the final test series 
held at Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls in the Pacific, and involved thirty-four nuclear 
shots held between April and August 1958 that varied greatly in yield and type. 
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HARDTACK I also included three shots of Operation NEWSREEL, a high-altitude, 
weapons effects series performed by the Department of Defense. In terms of scale, 
HARDTACK I was the crescendo of nuclear testing during the Eisenhower 
Administration. 
Eisenhower’s reactions to HARDTACK are particularly interesting, and speak 
more eloquently to his reluctance to conduct large nuclear tests than any so far 
related. The president expressed his reluctance early in the planning of HARDTACK 
during a conference with the secretary of state and the national security advisor held 
in August 1957, while PLUMBBOB was being held in Nevada.160 Eisenhower 
questioned the length of HARDTACK – “why was it necessary to have so many 
shots? Could the series not be limited to not over twelve or so?”161 – at a time when 
HARDTACK was planned as twenty-five to twenty-six shots, rather than the thirty-
four that eventuated. Eisenhower suspected that “these tests will continue for a longer 
and longer period of time” and that there would be “difficulty in appearing honest 
before the world while carrying on such long drawn-out tests.”162 When Lewis Strauss 
joined the conference later that day, Eisenhower “urged Admiral Strauss to try to fire 
the test shots in a shorter period.”163 
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Strauss responded by outlining the rationale for the scope of HARDTACK. He 
explained that the number of shots for the series – at that time twenty-five, which the 
president thought was too high – “had been arrived at arbitrarily.”164 Each of the two 
nuclear laboratories (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) requested twenty shots 
and the Department of Defense requested ten, a figure that Strauss had, “at first 
glance, cut in half.”165 It was this rationale, along with mention of the test of a 
thermonuclear bomb of such high yield as to rival CASTLE BRAVO, that led 
Eisenhower to lament “our statecraft was becoming too much a prisoner of our 
scientists.”166 
To be fair, much of the reluctance Eisenhower showed toward HARDTACK 
was related less to testing as it was to testing while negotiating a test ban with the 
Soviet Union. The president said as much in the meetings of 9 August 1957: he “felt 
that an excessive amount of time consumed in testing served to magnify our efforts to 
the world at a time when disarmament negotiations are under way.”167 Eisenhower 
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was more explicit in a conference with the secretary of defense one week later. His 
comments are worth quoting in full: 
When [Secretary] Wilson brought up the subject of Operation HARDTACK, 
the President stated that this subject has him in a more awkward position 
than any other he can think of. Here he is talking disarmament and at the 
same time planning a four-month period of atomic weapons testing which 
will involve twenty five shots.168 
 
HARDTACK was kept within a period of four months but increased in extent 
to thirty-four shots – this despite Strauss’s “every intention” to reduce the number of 
shots. Eisenhower and Strauss noted that the scope of HARDTACK affected the test 
ban negotiations such that the position of the United States “must be that we cannot 
suspend testing until a date at least a year from now.”169 
The HARDTACK series featured seven megaton-range tests, including 
HARDTACK POPLAR of 9.3 megatons of TNT equivalent, the fifth highest yield 
test ever held by the United States.170 Neither the AEC nor the State Department 
could justify the testing of high yield weapons; this requirement came from the 
Department of Defense, which was “interested in ascertaining the size of yield which 
may be carried in the B-52 [bomber].”171 Strauss suggested, and Eisenhower agreed 
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as one of the conditions for his approval of the series, that no weapons be tested with 
a yield higher than “the 1954 test” – that is, the 15 megatons of CASTLE BRAVO.172 
(This was a particularly misleading compromise that Strauss had offered: as we have 
seen, the high yield of BRAVO was achieved mostly through error and accident, and 
was intended to yield only 5 megatons. HARDTACK POPLAR rivalled the yields 
intended and achieved in shots such as CASTLE ROMEO.) The testing of high-yield 
devices raised the issue of fallout that Strauss addressed three months later. While the 
specifics remain redacted, it is clear that even at an early stage of planning, when 
twenty-three tests were anticipated, HARDTACK was expected to make a “slightly 
greater” contribution to world-wide fallout than Operation REDWING of 1956 but far 
less than Operation CASTLE.173 While HARDTACK was underway, Eisenhower 
learned from Hans Bethe, a physicist who made crucial contributions to the 
development of the hydrogen bomb and member of the President’ Science Advisory 
Committee, that the Soviet experience of fallout was far worse than the American, 
although this seems not to have relieved the president.174 
Most notable of the extensive HARDTACK series of shots were those that 
made up Operation NEWSREEL, a weapons effects study by the Department of 
Defense conducted at high altitude. These three shots were fired “to test [the United 
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States’] capability to detect nuclear detonations [at high altitude] and to obtain effects 
information applicable to high-altitude missile and counter-missile programs.”175 Shot 
YUCCA began HARDTACK on 28 April and was fired from a balloon at an altitude 
of 86,000 feet (26,212 metres) above Eniwetok Atoll.176 YUCCA had a similar yield 
to the preceding high-altitude shots, TEAPOT HA and PLUMBBOB JOHN, at 1.7 
kilotons of TNT equivalent but was held at far higher an altitude than those other 
shots.177 Shots TEAK and ORANGE, the dramatic conclusion to HARDTACK in 
August, were of much greater yield and fired at a much greater altitude. Both devices 
were fired from rockets and both yielded 3.8 megatons; TEAK detonated at an 
altitude of 252,000 feet (76,809 metres) while ORANGE detonated at 141,000 feet 
(42,976 metres).178 Serious concerns about flash blindness, which, because of the 
altitude of the tests, would affect a great area, forced the tests to be moved from 
Bikini Atoll to Johnston Island.179 These concerns were warranted, as experiments at 
TEAK showed that rabbits endured chorioretinal burns to their eyes at distances 
“exceeding 480 km [298 miles].”180 
While the Department of Defense was interested in the effects of flash 
blindness in high-altitude tests, it was probably more interested in the effects of these 
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tests on radio communications. The ionization caused by high-altitude events 
degraded radio communications through the decay of fission products, which created 
gamma rays and beta radiation. The extent of this degradation depended upon the 
location and fission yield of the shot, which is to say that high-yield, high-altitude 
shots like TEAK and ORANGE had the “most severe” effect.181 The debris from 
TEAK rose to an altitude of 500 kilometres [310 miles] in twenty minutes, and the 
fission products within this debris “were sources of serious communication blackouts 
in the South Pacific, New Zealand and Australia.”182 ORANGE had a less pronounced 
but longer-lasting effect on radio communications because of its lower altitude of 
detonation. Herman Hoerlin, a physicist present on Johnston Island for the TEAK and 
ORANGE shots, dramatically recalled 
not so much the difficulties encountered by the JI [Johnston Island] 
communication people in making contact with the outside world but rather the 
desperate attempts of other transmitting stations to obtain a response from JI. 
One of the first transmissions actually received at JI in the morning hours after 
the [TEAK] event was “Are you still there?”183 
 
The degrading effect of high altitude explosions on radio communications was 
of interest to the Department of Defense, because it represented the ability to blackout 
an enemy’s communications and so retard that enemy’s military efforts. James 
Killian, special assistant for science and technology to President Eisenhower, 
anticipated that the phenomena associated with high-altitude nuclear explosions “may 
affect the entire NIKE-ZEUS program [an anti-ICBM missile system]” although the 
effects to which Killian referred were more readily studied in Operation ARGUS.184 
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Indeed, both of the effects observed in the HARDTACK shots – flash blindness and 
radio interference – were further explored in the subsequent ARGUS and later 
DOMINIC series of tests. 
Also scheduled for HARDTACK was a single high-yield, “clean” shot that 
was to be observed by the United Nations. This was a controversial test, and the road 
to its cancellation was paved by revealing debate within the Eisenhower 
Administration. Eisenhower appears to have been informed of this “clean” test in 
November of 1957, and Strauss noted that the “matter is under intensive study and 
you will be asked to review out plans at an early date.”185 More information became 
available the following March. The AEC and the OCB recommended that an 
“additional test shot” of a 6 megaton thermonuclear device be appended to 
HARDTACK, and that “fifteen qualified international scientists selected by the 
United Nations and a representative group of international news media” be invited to 
observe this test.186 Of most concern to the United States Information Agency 
(USIA), however, was the “cleanliness” of the test. The USIA pointed out that 
although the president had publicly stated that the test would be 96% “fallout-free,” 
the AEC could not guarantee that figure and, “if it were not possible to achieve such a 
figure in the test, the backfire from world opinion would be too great to justify having 
it.”187 Eisenhower nonetheless made a statement to the press the next day outlining 
                                                
185  Letter from Lewis Strauss to President Eisenhower, 23 November 1957; 
Administration Series, Box 5; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the 
United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
186  Letter from Robert Cutler to President Eisenhower, 24 March 1958; 
Administration Series, Box 11; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the 
United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. The 
test was to be conducted in the Pacific, suggesting it would belong to HARDTACK I 
rather than HARDTACK II. 
187 Part of the division between the AEC and USIA was whether a specific percentage 
should be outlined in the president’s statement – the USIA believed that a percentage 
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plans for this test, although conspicuously without a percentage qualifying the 
anticipated reduction in fallout.188 
The director of the USIA, George V. Allen, wrote a more convincing 
memorandum opposing the “clean” test four months later. In this letter, Allen framed 
his opposition in terms of the United States’ interests, specifically that the 
demonstration “would not be likely to achieve the purpose originally intended.”189 
Most importantly, Allen identified reasons close to Eisenhower’s own thinking: that it 
was “preferable for [the United States] to avoid actions which might be construed as 
antagonistic to the basic purpose of the Geneva talks.”190 The cancellation of the 
“clean” test was put in these terms by the new secretary of defense, Neil McElroy, 
and the new chairman of the AEC, John McCone, in August: “In view of the proposed 
suspension of testing, it does not seem appropriate to continue work on the announced 
laboratory demonstration scheduled for this autumn.”191 It is possible that the shot 
                                                                                                                                      
must be given, while the AEC disagreed. Memorandum for General Cutler from Roy 
M. Melbourne, 25 March 1958; NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 2; Office 
of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White 
House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Memorandum for General Cutler 
from Abbott Washburn, 25 March 1958; NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 
2; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; 
White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
188 Statement by the President, 26 March 1958; NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, 
Box 2; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-
1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
189 Memorandum for Members of the Operations Coordinating Board, 23 July 1958; 
NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 2; Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
190 Allen also suggested that the “focus of world attention [is] on the Middle East,” 
presumably referring to the concurrent U.S. intervention in Lebanon and British 
intervention in Jordan. Ibid. 
191 The cancellation of the “clean” shot was buried four paragraphs into the statement 
by McElroy and McCone. Plans for the Conclusion of U.S. 1958 Test Program, 26 
August 1958; OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 5; Office of the Special Assistant 
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was cancelled because the United States ran out of time before the beginning of the 
moratorium, although for reasons identified in the following sections dedicated to 
ARGUS and HARDTACK II this is unlikely; moreover, Eisenhower cancelled at 
least one other shot because of the “impressions gained in Geneva” rather than the 
pressures of the 31 October deadline.192 
HARDTACK I was something of an apogee for nuclear testing during the 
Eisenhower years – comprising the second highest yield and number of shots of the 
ten series held between 1952 and 1958. It included three important high-altitude tests 
as well as a variety of surface shots. HARDTACK, like UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE, also 
saw the transition between chairmen of the AEC, as Lewis Strauss – who had 
dominated atomic energy policy during his tenure – stepped aside for John 
McCone.193  
Most interesting of HARDTACK I, however, were the shots that were not 
held – which acted as exemplars of the discursive interaction between the drive to test 
                                                                                                                                      
for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
192 The best information about this second cancelled shot comes from Gordon Gray, 
Eisenhower’s National Security Advisor. This additional shot was proposed after 
HARDTACK I had completed and was immediately opposed by the State 
Department. Gray sought Eisenhower’s approval but was met with “some irritation” 
from the president, who said that “he had announced the [test] suspension and now 
‘they’ wanted to have another big test.” Discussion among the President’s science 
advisors, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John McCone and Neil McElroy 
led to this test being “waived” because “it would be undesirable to have a large test 
before October 31st [the start of the test moratorium].” Memorandum for the Record, 
27 August 1958; Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, Box 3; Office of the 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House 
Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
193 John McCone was later brought in, as an example of bipartisanship, to the 
Kennedy Administration as Director of Central Intelligence, a role that also included 
him in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of October 1962. 
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and the awareness of the forthcoming test moratorium. These two forces were held in 
tension by, on the one hand, the AEC and Department of Defense, and on the other, 
the State Department, the USIA, and Eisenhower himself. This tension was a defining 
feature of HARDTACK, and played out in internal debate about the scope and length 
of the test series; it will be further discussed in Chapter Five. 
The weapons effects tests of shots YUCCA, TEAK and ORANGE provided 
important information regarding high-altitude nuclear detonations, and led directly to 
the subsequent series, Operation ARGUS. 
 
ARGUS 
Operation ARGUS was conducted in the South Atlantic Ocean during late 
August and early September 1958 and included three high-altitude shots. It was the 
first test series conducted for purely weapons effects purposes since CROSSROADS 
of 1946. ARGUS was also the first post-war series that was not previously announced 
by the United States and was held in complete secrecy.194 This series was notable for 
many reasons, foremost that it “not only provided data on military considerations but 
also produced a great mass of geophysical data, pure scientific material of great 
value.”195 Indeed, ARGUS was described by the New York Times as “the greatest 
                                                
194 ARGUS was kept so secret because its effects were global, and could be observed 
by any nation; “the most obvious way to prevent other nations from acquiring 
experimental data was to deny them accurate knowledge of the operation’s timing and 
objectives.” The White House rationalized this secrecy by adopting the “line” that 
ARGUS was part of HARDTACK, and that it had never been the United States’ 
policy to announce every shot of a series. C.B. Jones, et. al., "Operation ARGUS 
1958," in United States Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel 
Review (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 18. 
195 Ibid., 2. This data included “the first extensive experimental evidence concerning 
the structure of the earth’s [sic] magnetic field above a thousand miles or so.” 
Memorandum for the President from J.R. Killian Jr., 3 November 1958; Office of the 
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scientific experiment ever conducted” and by James Killian as “probably the most 
spectacular ever conducted.”196 
ARGUS was rushed by the forthcoming test moratorium. A memorandum 
from the assistant to the secretary of defense described this with some incongruity: 
“The possibility that events in the near future may create conditions unfavourable to 
the continuation of nuclear tests…lends urgency to the accomplishment of an 
important experimental program now under development.”197 Admiral Mustin Lloyd, 
the commander of the ARGUS taskforce, reported that a “sense of urgency was 
injected into this planning due to the political climate then prevailing, which rendered 
the future of nuclear testing politically uncertain.”198 As a result, ARGUS was “one of 
the most expeditiously planned and executed” of all U.S. test series – the period of 
five months from inception to execution contrasted with the “one or more years” of 
planning for other series.199  
                                                                                                                                      
Special Assistant for Science and Technology Policy (James R. Killian and George B. 
Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-1961, Box 1; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
196 This headline from the New York Times was from March 1959 after information 
about ARGUS had been leaked to that publication, incurring Eisenhower’s 
“vehemence.” Ibid., 12. 
197 Memorandum for Brig. Gen. A. D. Starbird, et. al. from Herbert B. Loper, 21 April 
1958; Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Jame R. Killian 
and George B. Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-1961, Box 1; White House Office; 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
198 Jones, "Operation ARGUS 1958," 18.  
199 Jones, “Operation ARGUS 1958,” 11. Killian noted that this five-month period 
also involved the launch and coordination of the Explorer IV satellite for 
measurements – a not unimpressive accomplishment at the infancy of the U.S. space 
program. Memorandum for the President from J.R. Killian, Jr., 3 November 1958; 
Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Jame R. Killian and 
George B. Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-1961, Box 1; White House Office; Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library. Following the memorandum of 21 April 1958, Eisenhower 
approved ARGUS on 1 May. Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 1, 
1958; Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 3; White House Office: Office of 
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From a position in the South Atlantic a task group of U.S. ships made three 
launches of missiles carrying nuclear warheads into the upper atmosphere. The yield 
of these warheads was between 1 and 2 kilotons.200 The detonations varied in altitude 
between 124 miles (200 kilometres) for ARGUS I and 335 miles (540 kilometres) for 
ARGUS III.201 The ARGUS shots were the highest altitude shots conducted by the 
United States until that time, and ARGUS III remains the highest altitude shot ever 
fired by the United States.202 Each detonation produced a fireball of “expanding, 
glowing” debris that was “confined and guided” by the Earth’s magnetic field along 
magnetic field lines.203 Half of this material plunged down atop the atmosphere while 
the other half arched across the equator over 4,000 miles (6,440 kilometres) to 
intersect again with the Earth near the Azores Islands. At both points, in the South and 
North Atlantic, U.S. Navy ships observed aurorae and radar reflections. 
ARGUS produced effects of profound military importance. These included the 
“absorption and reflection of radio waves and radar beams.”204 This effect was a 
further development over the results of HARDTACK TEAK and ORANGE and was 
“important for space warfare.”205 A new feature over those previous tests was that the 
                                                                                                                                      
the Staff Secretary, 1952-1961; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
200 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  12-13. 
201 Hoerlin, "United States High-Altitude Test Experiences: A Review Emphasizing 
the Impact on the Environment," 4. 
202 The STARFISH shot of Operation DOMINIC was detonated at a higher altitude 
than ARGUS I and ARGUS II. 
203 Memorandum for the President from J.R. Killian, Jr., 3 November 1958; Office of 
the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Jame R. Killian and George B. 
Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-1961, Box 1; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
204 Effects of Nuclear Weapon Explosions in the Outer Atmosphere, A Brief Status 
Report, 24 July 1958; Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology 
(Jame R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-1961, Box 1; White 
House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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debris of the ARGUS tests formed an area several hundred kilometres across and 
above an altitude of 70 miles (112 kilometres) that, in addition to interfering with 
radio communications, also reflected radar. This effect was particularly consequential 
for the design of both ballistic missiles, which would penetrate such an area, and anti-
missile defensive batteries, which might intercept incoming missiles at that altitude. 
The layer of high-energy electrons created by the ARGUS shots also posed a 
threat to space vehicles. This effect could damage or disable both ballistic missiles 
and satellites, and threatened manned space flight.206 ARGUS demonstrated that “a 
small number of megatons exploded at a suitably high altitude can make manned 
space flight impossible for a period of time which [had] not yet been precisely 
determined but may be as long as several months.”207 Recall that, in 1958, the year 
following Sputnik, the United States was perceived to be losing the space race – this 
should not be forgotten when one notes that ARGUS established the United States’ 
ability to imperil satellites and manned spacecraft. 
ARGUS also further developed the optical effects experiments of 
HARDTACK I. It was determined that roughly 20% of the yield of a device detonated 
in the upper atmosphere might be emitted in the optical band, although the brightness 
of the blast would be determined by its altitude.208 At 500 miles (800 kilometres) 
distance, the light from a one-megaton detonation in its first millisecond was 
determined to be about twenty times stronger than direct sunlight over a similar 
period.209 HARDTACK TEAK had caused permanent retinal damage at a distance of 
                                                
206 None of the ARGUS shots did damage a satellite, although DOMINIC STARFISH 
disabled multiple satellites in 1962. See Chapter Five. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Effect on the Ground, undated; NSC Series, Briefing Subseries, Box 2; Office of 
the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House 
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300 miles (480 kilometres). The optical effect of a high-altitude detonation tapered off 
at an altitude over 200 miles (320 kilometres), but between 50 and 200 miles there 
was an indeterminate point where yield and altitude of blast would produce 
permanent damage to the eye over the greatest possible area.210 
The various weapons effects observed in the ARGUS series – radar reflection, 
radio absorption, high-energy electrons and flash blindness – significantly affected 
many weapons systems. These included: all anti-ballistic missile systems; some radar 
and communications equipment; Strategic Air Command communications, including 
the SAC recall system; satellites and manned space vehicles; and all aircraft, whose 
pilots were vulnerable to intense optical flash.211 The extent to which ARGUS 
influenced these weapons systems speaks to its importance as a test series, as it does 
to the necessity to, if hastily, conduct these experiments before the test moratorium 
took effect. Expedited though ARGUS was, it was not the last series to be conducted 
by the United States before the moratorium – Operation HARDTACK Phase II began 
six days after ARGUS III. 
 
HARDTACK II 
Operation HARDTACK Phase II, or HARDTACK II, was the final test series 
held before the test moratorium took effect on 31 October 1958 and was thus the final 
test series to be conducted during the Eisenhower Administration. HARDTACK II 
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was held at the Nevada Test Site during August and October, and – although a smaller 
program than PLUMBBOB – it was an extension of “PLUMBBOB studies and 
subsequent laboratory research.” 212  The tests that comprised HARDTACK II 
continued up until 30 October 1958, one day before the moratorium came into effect, 
and the test program was designed “to provide data for continuation of long range 
programs which otherwise might have been terminated or seriously handicapped by a 
moratorium on weapon tests.”213 In other words, HARDTACK II was to furnish data 
that could be studied during the moratorium. 
It is the relationship between this series and the imminent test moratorium, 
rather than the tests themselves, that distinguishes HARDTACK II. Documented 
above was the rushed nature of the penultimate Operation ARGUS; as the final series 
before the moratorium, the program for HARDTACK II was even more accelerated. 
The press as a result nicknamed the series “Operation Deadline.”214 In approximately 
six weeks, the United States conducted thirty-six shots, although half of these were 
safety experiments of negligible yield.215 HARDTACK II was inescapably hurried 
because the number of shots allocated to the series increased even after the series 
began, and it is this acceleration that is most remarkable about HARDTACK II. 
HARDTACK II was first put to Eisenhower by Lewis Strauss in November 
1957. Although not yet named or even envisioned as a separate phase of the 
HARDTACK series, Strauss sought permission to fire “two or three very small yield 
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nuclear shots” at the Nevada site “after HARDTACK had been completed.”216 That 
these shots were to be fired at Nevada, rather than in the Pacific alongside the other 
shots of HARDTACK I, “was in the interest of reducing to a minimum the number of 
shots in HARDTACK.”217 Strauss’ rationale was precarious, but it is unclear if 
Eisenhower saw it as such. Strauss was more specific the following January when he 
requested approval for “some two to ten safety tests” to be conducted at Nevada.218 
Eisenhower approved what was HARDTACK I along with what would be 
HARDTACK II on 31 January 1958.219 
More information became available in June. Strauss in writing and in a 
meeting requested approval for additional shots for HARDTACK II (although how 
many Strauss requested is not known). It was then known as MILLRACE, and in 
endorsing preparations for the series, Eisenhower insisted that it be brought forward 
“so that at the end of August…[Strauss] could fly people back from the Pacific [from 
HARDTACK I], with preparations already made in Nevada so that the tests could 
continue without interruption.”220 Eisenhower anticipated the commencement of the 
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moratorium: he told Strauss that tests could continue into September or October but 
that “the same would not be true if we went into November.”221 
The AEC publicly announced HARDTACK II one month before it began. In 
that statement, an unspecified but “limited number” of shots were acknowledged.222 
These shots were described as underground tests which gives some clue to the 
planned extent of the series at that time – only twelve shots of the series were held in 
shafts or tunnels.223 However, the AEC statement articulated purposes for the series 
beyond the safety tests that Strauss had requested in January, purposes that 
correspondingly spoke to a widening of scope for the series.224  
This widened scope was confirmed in a letter to Eisenhower from John 
McCone less than two weeks before HARDTACK II began. “In light of the 
anticipated test suspension,” McCone wrote, “the AEC and Department of Defense 
have reviewed weapons development requirements” and “determined that certain test 
shots…would be essential to the advancement of our weapons technology.”225 
McCone requested approval for nine nuclear detonations and seven safety tests.226 
This number increased again three days before the first test when at least two nuclear 
shots and two safety tests were added.227 Still more shots were added to HARDTACK 
                                                
221 Ibid. 
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II while it was underway and as the moratorium drew nearer: by 25 October it had 
grown to nineteen nuclear shots and seventeen safety shots, and a further request on 
27 October brought the planned series to twenty nuclear shots and eighteen safety 
shots.228 HARDTACK II was far from the two or three shots imagined by Strauss in 
November 1957, and one wonders at Eisenhower’s response to its expansion given his 
unenthusiastic reaction to the growth of HARDTACK I. 
As the last series before the moratorium, HARDTACK II was also the last 
opportunity that Eisenhower had to observe a nuclear test as president. Recall that 
Eisenhower had been invited, and declined, to attend UPSHOT ANNIE in 1953 and 
CASTLE ROMEO in 1954; Divine also suggests that the president had been invited 
to TEAPOT in 1955. 229  When a reporter asked if Eisenhower would attend 
REDWING in 1956, the president replied that he did not “believe it was essential that 
I go…[because] the reports are very detailed.” 230  McCone, recognising that 
HARDTACK II series was “likely to be the last for some time,” made invitations to 
various staff to observe the shots.231 These invitations were brought up in a meeting 
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with the president on 29 September who, quite astonishingly, “expressed envy saying 
that he had always wanted to see a test but had always been advised that it was 
unwise.”232 Eisenhower’s private confession lends veracity to his public statement in 
June 1959 that “I just haven’t been allowed to go to the tests.”233 
As the final series before the test moratorium took effect on 31 October 1958, 
HARDTACK II offers a valuable example of nuclear testing within a limited 
timeframe. The imperative to test weapons did not seem to be opposed by the forces 
that worked against the expansion of HARDTACK I, and as result the program for 
HARDTACK II continued to accelerate even as the deadline approached. It is 
difficult to imagine that, without the imposition of the moratorium, a handful of safety 
tests could grow into a full-scale test series, but indeed they did, and it was on that 
cynical note that U.S. nuclear testing during the Eisenhower years ended. 
 
Conclusion 
The ten nuclear test series conducted during the Eisenhower Administration 
led from the development to the deployment of thermonuclear weapons. First proved 
was the feasibility of a thermonuclear reaction at IVY; then the use of dry fusion fuel 
at CASTLE; then the ability to deliver such a weapon using an existing strategic 
platform at REDWING; and, finally, the various possible effects of such weapons at 
HARDTACK I. Each of these series were rational extensions of the results of 
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previous series, and speak to the continued, essential interest in weapons design tests. 
It is important to note, however, that once the development and deliverability of 
thermonuclear weapons had been assured, the emphasis of testing shifted to weapons 
effects tests, particularly high-altitude effects tests as seen at HARDTACK I and 
ARGUS. 
Of the test series held between 1952 and 1958 Operation CASTLE is 
conspicuous. CASTLE was by far the highest-yield test series ever held by the United 
States: its yield alone was greater than the combined yield of all other series held 
during these years. Its first shot was the largest device ever tested by the United 
States, and was the worst incident of fallout exposure in the history of U.S. nuclear 
testing. The importance of CASTLE comes from two interrelated but opposing 
dimensions: that, first, it was so crucial for the development of thermonuclear 
weapons while, second, the radiological contamination it caused was the catalyst for 
the test ban debate.234 
The results of these test series permitted impressive technical 
accomplishments in the American nuclear arsenal that corresponded to the 
aforementioned theoretical developments. Advances in yield-to-weight ratio resulted 
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in the miniaturisation of nuclear warheads: the 10,000-pound (4,535-kilogram) 
implosion fission bombs of 1949 had by 1954 been superseded by 1,000-pound (453-
kilogram) warheads that possessed yields equal to or greater than their larger 
predecessors.235 Under Eisenhower, the miniaturisation of warheads and subsequent 
diversification of delivery systems saw the end of the monopoly held by the strategic 
bomber – artillery, surface-to-surface rockets, tactical bombers, supersonic high-
altitude bombers, submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles were now also 
bearers of nuclear warheads. Diversification of delivery systems during the 1950s 
owed much to the test series held under Eisenhower. 
The nuclear test series conducted during the Eisenhower Administration 
represented the peak of U.S. nuclear testing. Under Eisenhower, nuclear testing was 
dramatic and extensive, largely because testing had been normalised under Truman 
and because Eisenhower had inherited from Truman the emphasis on the development 
of thermonuclear weapons. By comparison, testing under Kennedy was an awkward 
appendage, limited in scope, and undertaken largely for political rather than 
developmental purposes. I return to the nuclear test series of the Kennedy 
Administration in Chapter Five; in the next chapter, I discuss the paradigm of 
weapons effects tests that had existed as early as CROSSROADS of 1946 but which 
received greater emphasis in the later series of the Eisenhower Administration. 
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Chapter Four 
The Expansion and then Suspension of Nuclear Testing 
 
 
“We would know of any explosion which yielded more than 10 KT equivalent, unless 
the Soviets took the most extraordinary precautions to prevent us learning about a 
test.” 
Lewis Strauss, 27 May 1954. 
 
“…the United States has done all that it really needs to do in this field [nuclear 
testing]…” 
French foreign minister Couve de Murville, 21 August 1958. 
 
 
During the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States strained 
uneasily in its relationship with nuclear weapons. That the U.S. should possess – and, 
by extension, test and develop – these weapons was a notion that had been normalised 
in the preceding years. Within a few years nuclear weapons had become an essential 
part of both the defense of the nation and its sense of identity. But after the IVY 
MIKE test of 1952, and especially so after the CASTLE BRAVO test of 1954, the 
profundity and enormity of thermonuclear weapons came to be more widely 
understood, and the concerns of radiation, fallout and lifetime dosage crept into a 
society that was otherwise enjoying a period of relatively peaceful, post-war 
economic growth. Even as test series were held yearly in Nevada and the Pacific, and 
within the atmosphere of McCarthyism and its legacy, the United States grappled with 
the test ban debate as the president sought a path toward disarmament. 
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When discussing U.S. nuclear testing during the Eisenhower Administration, 
historians tend to focus upon the test ban debate that resulted in the test moratorium of 
1958.1 This is a deserved focus. The suspension of nuclear testing was an especially 
important accomplishment of Eisenhower’s presidency, which can be more fully 
appreciated through recognition of the general expansion of U.S. nuclear testing that 
preceded the moratorium. This specific appreciation is, however, lacking in the 
literature. This chapter shall discuss the relationship between nuclear testing and the 
test moratorium and, in so doing, situate the discussion of a test suspension agreement 
within the context of a remarkable acceleration in U.S. nuclear testing. 2  This 
seemingly contradictory circumstance – where testing expanded at the same time as 
efforts to halt that testing – offers an excellent example of Scott D. Sagan’s “domestic 
politics” or “parochial” model for nuclear weapons development. 
That the attention of historians such as Robert A. Divine, Benjamin P. Greene 
and Jacqueline M. Bird is drawn to the domestic politics behind U.S. nuclear weapons 
                                                
1 The best examples are the excellent works of Robert Divine and Benjamin Greene. 
Divine’s book Blowing on the Wind examines the debate in the public sphere 
regarding the test ban and, although limited by the classification of archival material 
at the time he wrote, Divine accurately argues that Eisenhower had long envisioned a 
nuclear test cessation agreement but his leadership style frustrated that ambition. 
Benjamin Greene writes more recently and discusses the relationship between the 
Administration, particularly the president, and the science community – especially in 
regard to science advice. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 
1954-1960. Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 
1945-1963. This chapter makes extensive use of the work of Divine and Greene, but 
focuses particularly on the parochial discourse within the Eisenhower Administration 
and makes little comment on the president’s leadership style or the science advice he 
received except where it relates to that discourse. 
2 In this chapter, I use the terms “test suspension” and “test cessation.” The former 
refers to the test moratorium, an impermanent agreement to halt testing. The latter 
refers to the idealised and more comprehensive agreement for which Eisenhower 
strived but which would not be realized until the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. 
The term “test ban” refers more generally to both concepts. 
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and testing policy speaks to the particular importance of that internal debate within 
the Eisenhower Administration. Sagan’s work on the reasons states develop nuclear 
weapons again lends itself to understanding this internal debate and its relationship to 
U.S. testing.3 Sagan offers a model to explain the spread of nuclear weapons which he 
titles the “domestic politics model” but which I shall refer to as the parochial model.4 
According to this idea, internal actors within a state are able to affect that state’s 
policies through influence of the government. Although Sagan’s work relates to the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, I argue that his article can be adapted to help explain 
U.S. nuclear testing specifically. Sagan identifies three potential sources of influence 
upon nuclear weapons policy within a state, all of which have equivalents within the 
Eisenhower Administration: the nuclear weapons industry, here the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC); the professional military, here the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); 
and certain politicians, here the Department of Defense or the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCAE).5 The tension between the parochial interests of these actors 
and their opponents within the government is illustrative of the contours of the debate 
as well as the interests that domestic actors invest nuclear weapons. The debate within 
the Eisenhower Administration regarding nuclear testing, particularly its cessation, 
perfectly fits this model of domestic politics and vested, parochial interests. 
In Chapter Three, I explored the ten nuclear test series conducted by the 
United States during the Eisenhower presidency; in this chapter I shall further explore 
the consequences of these series as seen through the lens of the parochial model. 
There was a real and vital connection between the domestic politics of the test ban 
                                                
3 In Chapter Two, I applied Sagan’s “norms model” to the normalization of testing 
under Truman. 
4 Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb," 63-73. 
5 Ibid., 63. 
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debate and the test series that were the subject of that debate, because at least three of 
these series provided important technical information of relevance to the debate. This 
information was seized upon by both sides and became a battleground in that 
parochial struggle. This chapter will be structured thematically rather than 
chronologically – beginning, first, with a brief examination of the structural and 
agential reasons for the rapid expansion of U.S. nuclear testing under Eisenhower, 
and, then, moving to the technical and discursive elements of the test ban debate that 
delineated the testing policies of the Eisenhower Administration and so aptly express 
Sagan’s parochial model. 
 
Weapons Effects and the Expansion of U.S. Testing 
A defining characteristic of U.S. nuclear testing under Eisenhower was its 
rapid and comprehensive expansion, and this growth was caused foremost by the 
shifting focus from weapons design to weapons effects tests. This thesis has 
previously investigated the paradigm of weapons design tests, to which approximately 
eighty per cent of U.S. nuclear tests under Truman belonged and through which the 
United States had developed the hydrogen bomb by 1952. The Eisenhower 
Administration inherited this focus on weapons design tests, and although these 
continued under Eisenhower, they received less focus, and tests conducted to examine 
and understand the effects of nuclear weapons began to supplement tests conducted to 
prove new design concepts. While these two purposes coexisted together, the 
increased demand for nuclear testing from the AEC and Department of Defense drove 
an overall expansion in both the number of nuclear tests and the scope of individual 
test series. 
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Of the roughly 150 nuclear tests carried out while Eisenhower was president 
(a total number complicated by the number of non-nuclear safety shots that were 
contained within these series) at least fifteen were explicitly for weapons effects 
purposes.6 This may seem a slight number but as was noted in previous chapters many 
U.S. nuclear tests included secondary objectives related to effects studies. An 
example of these mixed objective were the shots of the various DESERT ROCK 
exercises, many of which are referred to by the Department of Energy as weapons 
development tests, but which clearly involved effect studies and military training 
exercises. Whether as secondary objectives or particularly as the primary purpose of a 
test, the inclusion of weapons effects tests interfered with weapons design tests. This 
interference was caused by the growing complexity of effects experiments, and, 
beginning with Operations TEAPOT and WIGWAM in 1955, the Department of 
Defense began to sponsor test shots “expressly” for the purpose of effects testing.7 
Nonetheless, interference continued, because in some cases the requirements of 
weapons design and weapons effects tests were mutually exclusive, and by the time of 
the moratorium it was recommended that effects and design tests be “conducted 
separately in both time and place.”8 As the scope of testing under Eisenhower 
widened to include weapons design, weapons effects, training exercises and safety 
tests, there was a gradual dilution of the weapons design paradigm but – most 
importantly – because of the interference of these competing purposes there was also 
a general and steady expansion in U.S. nuclear testing. The incompatibility of the 
                                                
6 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  4-17. 
7  L.H. Berkhouse, et al., "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," in United States 
Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, 
D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1983), 140. 
8 This recommendation was borne out in the DOMINIC tests of 1962. Ibid. 
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various objectives of testing acted to generate more individual nuclear tests to 
accommodate each of these objectives. 
The technological and technical achievements of the weapons design 
paradigm of testing have already been explored.9 By the time of the test moratorium 
in 1958 the United States had developed and refined the fusion bomb, miniaturised 
both it and its fission predecessor, and proven its ability to deliver nuclear weapons by 
rocket, missile, strategic bomber and even artillery. Just as significant as these 
achievements was the United States’ increasingly sophisticated understanding of 
nuclear weapons effects. Weapons effects tests studied  
the effects of detonations on military systems…[including]…measurements of 
how the nuclear burst altered the environment in which the military system 
operated, and…the performance or survival of the military equipment or 
system itself during and following direct exposure to the detonation.10  
 
Most obvious of these effects were those related to airburst detonations, which 
evolved eventually into high-altitude detonations. Airbursts involved the detonation 
of a nuclear weapon at certain height above the surface. The military advantages of an 
airburst – which exposed a larger area to more destructive blast effects than a surface 
burst – were immediately apparent, and both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki devices 
were detonated as airbursts. There were also advantages for using airbursts during 
testing. Detonations at altitude produced less fallout, because fallout was partly 
generated through the contact of the nuclear fireball with the surface, which drew up 
large quantities of material into the bomb cloud that were then irradiated and 
dispersed. Several weapons design tests under Truman, foremost Operation 
RANGER, involved airdrops but the weapons effects studies of Operation BUSTER-
                                                
9 See Chapter Two, which discusses the weapons design paradigm explicitly. Chapter 
Three concluded with a discussion on the diversification of nuclear weapons during 
Eisenhower’s presidency. 
10 Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 31. 
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JANGLE specifically measured the blast overpressures generated by airburst weapons 
and these latter tests profoundly affected contemporary plans for the use of nuclear 
weapons.11 Probably more so than CROSSROADS, BUSTER-JANGLE were the 
most crucial effects studies of the Truman period because they revealed 
miscalculations of blast pressures that could only have been understood through 
effects testing. 
As technology and doctrine evolved, airbursts became of particular interest for 
the interception of aerial targets – first, of formations of enemy bombers and, then, as 
an anti-missile missile. Correspondingly, weapons effects tests moved from airburst 
to high altitude shots and, eventually, exoatmospheric tests. The first high altitude 
shot was conducted as part of Operation TEAPOT in 1955, and a proof test of an air-
to-air missile developed from the results of TEAPOT was held at PLUMBBOB in 
1957.12 In the following year, three high altitude shots – two of which were of 
megaton-yield – were fired as part of Operation HARDTACK Phase I, and a further 
three exoatmospheric shots were fired as part of Project ARGUS. Rather than raw 
effects data such as blast as a function of yield and altitude, these high altitude shots 
produced important information regarding electromagnetic effect on radio 
communications, radar blackouts, and radiation damage to spacecraft and satellites. 
Shots TEAK and ORANGE of Operation HARDTACK I created extensive radio 
blackouts as a result of the debris from the test and the gamma rays generated by this 
debris. Communications at Johnston Island were “cut off for many hours,” civilian air 
traffic to and from Hawaii was suspended for a similar period because of interrupted 
radio communications, and New Zealand and Australia experienced radio blackouts in 
                                                
11 See Chapter One. 
12 See Chapter Three. 
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the medium and high frequency ranges.13 The movement of high-energy electrons 
produced by the ARGUS space tests produced disruptive radio noise, and the 
interaction of these effects with the Earth’s ionosphere created radar reflections.14 
Together with the absorption of radio waves, these radar reflections were described as 
the “most important effects” of exoatmospheric shots because they represented the 
ability to blackout an enemy’s radar prior to an attack so as to aid penetration of that 
enemy’s air defenses (during the Kennedy Administration, nuclear detonations used 
to this effect would be known as “precursor bursts”).15 Finally, both HARDTACK I 
and ARGUS shots produced belts of trapped radiation within the Earth’s magnetic 
field that both damaged unprotected space vehicles (such as satellites or re-entering 
ICBMs) and was potentially lethal to astronauts. Such was the concern about the latter 
effect that James Webb, the director of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, later prevailed upon President Kennedy to restrict tests in 1962 to 
lower altitudes. 16  These phenomena were crucial because they showed that, in 
addition to their raw destructive power, nuclear weapons could be used in high-
altitude detonations to retard an enemy’s ability to communicate with his forces, his 
ability to detect and intercept attack, and could even serve defensively to knockout 
                                                
13 Hoerlin, "United States High-Altitude Test Experiences: A Review Emphasizing 
the Impact on the Environment," 17-18. 
14 Memorandum for the President from James R. Killian, Jr., 3 November 1958; 
Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology (James R. Killian and 
George B. Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-1961, Box 1; White House Office; Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Library. 
15 Effects of Nuclear Weapon Explosions in the Outer Atmosphere, a Brief Status 
Report, 24 July 1958; Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology 
(James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-1961, Box 1; White 
House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
16  Hoerlin is critical of this “highly emotional” appeal and blames it for the 
cancellation of DOMINIC URRACA. The cancellation of URRACA will be explored 
in Chapter Five. Hoerlin, "United States High-Altitude Test Experiences: A Review 
Emphasizing the Impact on the Environment," 46. 
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communications or spy satellites and potentially damage, dilute or destroy an 
incoming missile attack. Weapons effects testing not only confirmed these abilities 
but also measured their extent so that they could be integrated into detailed plans for 
the use of nuclear weapons. 
Complementary to the structural momentum for expansion found in 
diversified reasons for testing was a far more agential one: Lewis Strauss.17 Greene is 
particularly critical of the chairman of the AEC for the offences of “over-selling” 
concepts like the clean bomb, restricting advice that the president received, and even 
“red-baiting” test ban advocates like Hans Bethe.18 That Strauss sought to protect U.S. 
testing from a cessation agreement is indisputable. As part of that defense, Strauss 
also had some responsibility for the expansion of U.S. nuclear testing, specifically in 
the number and/or yield of shots conducted within certain series – here I am thinking 
particularly of Operation HARDTACK Phase I, which Strauss set “arbitrarily” at 
twenty-five shots but which despite his “every intention” grew to thirty-four shots, 
including seven multi-megaton shots.19 This series offers a pointed example of the 
parochial interests of an actor within a government working to influence testing 
policy: in this case the chairman of the AEC, with little subtlety but with much 
agency, consistently increasing the scope of a particular test series. Strauss’s actions 
in relation to HARDTACK I, but also to nuclear testing generally during his tenure, 
bear out Sagan’s parochial model. 
                                                
17 Strauss’s determination to extensively test nuclear weapons can be partly explained 
by his deep opposition to communism. For a useful source on Strauss, see Richard 
Pfau, No Sacrifice Too Great: The Life of Lewis Strauss (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virgina, 1984. 
18 Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1945-1963: 
127. For more on the tribulations of Hans Bethe, see Jacqueline M. Bird, Scientists in 
Conflict: Hans Bethe, Edward Teller and the Shaping of United States Nuclear 
Weapons Policy 1945-1972  (Claremont: Regina Books, 2008). 
19 See Chapter Three. 
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The progression from the normalisation of nuclear testing under Truman to its 
expansion under Eisenhower was for the most part organic. Once the possession of 
weapons and the act of testing those weapons was normalised and even accepted as a 
dimension of American state identity, the impetus to further develop those weapons 
led to an increase in the number, scope and tempo of U.S. test series. Gone were the 
operational pauses seen under Truman, such as in 1947, 1949 and 1950, years during 
which no U.S. nuclear tests were conducted; rather, the United States conducted at 
least one test series, and sometimes two or three, each year between 1952 and 1958. 
Yet, unlike the acceleration of testing that followed Truman’s decision in 1950 to 
pursue the hydrogen bomb, the acceleration under Eisenhower lacked a specific 
objective looming on the theoretical horizon. Rather, it was the further development 
of that weapon, including its miniaturisation and the diversification of its delivery 
platforms together with exploration of its effects, that propelled the U.S. nuclear 
testing program onwards. The competing requirements of these various objectives 
necessitated more and more tests. But the norm that this expansion rested upon – that 
nuclear testing was rational and acceptable state behaviour – was gradually eroded as 
the decade progressed. Despite parochial attempts by test advocates to populate that 
theoretical horizon with potential developments like the anti-missile missile and clean 
bomb, the expansion under Eisenhower was nonetheless arrested and testing 
voluntarily abandoned. I will now turn to the important elements of the process that 
led to the test moratorium, beginning with those most closely related to actual testing. 
 
Tests, Test Detection, Technical Matters 
At the same time that nuclear testing drove ahead understanding of weapons 
effects, so too did these tests contribute information relevant to the monitoring of any 
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cessation agreement and a fuller appreciation of the difficulties of test detection. This 
appreciation was firstly an American one but was later shared with the Soviets 
through the forum of negotiations in Geneva; and the technical information provided 
by U.S. underground nuclear tests in 1957 and 1958 greatly complicated the 
negotiations for a cessation agreement between Washington and Moscow. These 
technical matters also became important discursive themes within the Eisenhower 
Administration as it grappled during its second term with the nuances of the test ban, 
the moratorium, and the monitoring of Soviet nuclear tests. No analysis of the path to 
the test moratorium can be complete without an appreciation of the technical matters 
that arose and ultimately spoiled efforts toward a test ban agreement during 
Eisenhower’s presidency.  
The two test series that contributed most to the issues of test detection and the 
monitoring of a cessation of testing were Operation PLUMBOB, held between May 
and October in 1957, and Phase II of Operation HARDTACK, held in September and 
October in 1958.20 These series included a number of underground nuclear shots that 
furnished much data regarding the detectability of nuclear weapons detonated 
underground. The first of these was PLUMBBOB RAINIER, which was fired at the 
Nevada Test Site (NTS) on 19 September 1957. RAINIER was intended to 
demonstrate a method of nuclear testing that did not release fallout, and its success 
had obvious consequences – as Divine notes, “if world opinion forced the United 
States to stop testing in the atmosphere, RAINIER showed how the AEC could still 
verify its nuclear advances.”21 But because RAINIER so successfully contained the 
radiation associated with the shot, it demonstrated that underground nuclear tests 
could only be detected using a seismograph. Moreover, only about 1% of the energy 
                                                
20 For more information on these series, see Chapter Three. 
21 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 158. 
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of the 1.7 kiloton detonation was translated into a seismic wave, which was recorded 
on seismographs “several hundred miles” from the shot as a magnitude 4.2 earthquake 
(using the contemporary Richter rather than the modern moment magnitude scale).22 
These same seismographic records could not easily distinguish the RAINIER event 
from a small earthquake that followed less than an hour after the detonation.23 The 
data regarding detection of underground nuclear detonations provided by RAINIER 
had obvious and troubling implications for the monitoring of a test cessation 
agreement.24 Analysis of this data by physicists Hans Bethe and Harold Brown 
concluded that 
Complete containment of a test explosion underground, though devised as a 
method for making testing easier by eliminating fallout, may also serve as 
the most effective method of concealing the existence of tests, and may make 
it very difficult to gather effective proof that such tests have been carried out 
in violation of a suspension agreement.25 
 
                                                
22 Appendix C: Concealment and Detection of Nuclear Tests Underground, Harold 
Brown and Hans A. Bethe, appended to Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs from J.R. Killian, 28 March 1958; NSC Series, 
Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 2; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
23 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 158. 
24 The “inconclusive” results of PLUMBBOB RAINIER were further complicated by 
misinformation publicised by the AEC many months later. The AEC reported in 
March 1958 that the seismic signals of RAINIER “had not been detected by seismic 
stations more than 250 miles [402 kilometres] from the Nevada test site.” However, 
the Coast and Geodetic Survey confirmed that a station in Alaska had detected 
RAINIER at a distance of 2,300 miles [3,701 kilometres]. Senator Hubert Humphrey 
(D-MN) accused the AEC of deliberately distorting evidence for political reasons. 
The AEC apologized for an “inadvertent” and “bureaucratic” mistake. Ibid., 188. 
25 Appendix C: Concealment and Detection of Nuclear Tests Underground, Harold 
Brown and Hans A. Bethe, appended to Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs from J.R. Killian, 28 March 1958; NSC Series, 
Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 2; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
Harold Brown would later serve as Secretary of Defense in the administration of 
Jimmy Carter. 
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From the results of RAINIER, the United States concluded that a threshold 
existed at around magnitude 4.5 on the Richter scale above which underground 
nuclear detonations could be detected using seismographic methods. RAINIER had 
yielded 1.7 kilotons and produced a magnitude 4.2 signal; thus, tests that fell under 
this threshold and escaped detection would consequently be of a limited yield. It was 
with this threshold in mind that U.S. scientists began discussing inspection and 
detection with their Soviet counterparts in Geneva in July 1958. The Geneva 
Conference of Experts, which included scientists from the United States and the 
Soviet Union, met to discuss issues of test detection as they related to a possible 
suspension agreement, and it was through this forum that the U.S. communicated the 
results of RAINIER. Through “protracted and difficult negotiations” over July and 
August, the Conference of Experts recommended a detection system similar to that 
which had already been proposed to the NSC in April.26 Assuming a threshold of 
magnitude 4.5, both systems “would have a good capability of detecting underground 
tests of about 5 kilotons” and “estimated that 90% of the earthquakes of equivalent 
magnitude could be identified as earthquakes and distinguished from explosions.”27 
The effectiveness of such a system left between twenty and one hundred earthquakes 
per year with a magnitude equivalent to a 5 kiloton test unidentified.28 
But the data that generated the threshold that was the basis of these detection 
systems was itself derived from a single test. Bethe and Brown noted in their analysis 
                                                
26 The system submitted to the NSC was from the Ad Hoc Working Group, which 
was established in January of 1958 to study “the military effects of a possible test 
cessation and of the feasibility of detecting atomic weapons tests.” The Ad Hoc 
Working Group submitted its findings on 3 April, 1958. Considerations on 
Discontinuance of Atomic Weapons Tests; Office of the Special Assistant for Science 
and Technology (James R. Killian and George B. Kistiakowsky): Records, 1957-
1961, Box 8; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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of the implications of RAINIER for test concealment and detection that “experiments 
are urgently needed to establish the actual relation between yield and seismic 
signal.”29 This was because RAINIER was fired in volcanic tuff that “probably gives 
a relatively small seismic signal…equivalent to an air shot of about 20 times greater 
yield.”30 Other geological mediums could produce different seismic signals – hard 
rock, for example, would be more conductive while less dense, unconsolidated rocks 
would further attenuate the seismic signal – and an understanding of the effects of a 
nuclear detonation in these mediums was necessary. The underground shots of 
HARDTACK II responded to this need. 
Twelve shots of Operation HARDTACK II were fired in tunnels or 
underground, and it were these that profoundly revised the data garnered from 
Operation PLUMBBOB. 31  The seismic signatures of the HARDTACK II 
underground tests were two-thirds the strength of those expected based on the data 
from PLUMBBOB RAINIER; moreover, the seismographic stations that detected 
RAINIER in the previous year were shown to be overly sensitive by the HARDTACK 
II tests. The overall effect was a general revising downward of the potential to detect 
underground nuclear tests such that “a given signal strength [required] about twice as 
                                                
29 Appendix C: Concealment and Detection of Nuclear Tests Underground, Harold 
Brown and Hans A. Bethe, appended to Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs from J.R. Killian, 28 March 1958; NSC Series, 
Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 2; Office of the Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Unlike the case of RAINIER, no single underground test of HARDTACK II 
generated information regarding seismic signals. However, a report to the assistant to 
the president for science and technology mentions, within the context of 
HARDTACK II, that “two explosions have greatly increased our knowledge of 
seismic signals produced by explosions.” Unfortunately, that part of the document 
that would identify the two important tests remains redacted. Ibid. 
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much explosive yield as had been previously supposed.”32 The conclusions reached 
by the Panel of Experts were immediately superseded. The accuracy of detecting 
shots above 5 kilotons in yield dropped from 90% to about 40%, while to retain that 
accuracy of 90% the detection threshold had to be raised from 5 kilotons to 25 
kilotons.33 This drop in accuracy and the corresponding increase in the yield of 
underground tests that could entirely escape detection had obvious implications for a 
nation – presumed by Washington to be the Soviet Union – that conducted a 
clandestine, underground testing program in violation of a suspension or cessation 
agreement.34 
Gordon Gray, the national security advisor, met with Edward Teller while 
HARDTACK II was underway and discussed just this possibility of violation.35 In the 
course of their discussion travelling from Las Vegas to the NTS, Teller articulated a 
number of interesting points. Teller stated that he did not believe atmospheric shots 
were essential for the development of weapons, “but are important for weapons 
effects.”36 This statement was likely true, given the importance of airbursts for effects 
tests, although it was a statement that could be made only at the end of 1958 when the 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. The number of unidentified earthquakes per year with an equivalent strength 
to a 5 kiloton test rose from between twenty and one hundred (using the RAINIER 
data) to 1500 (using the HARDTACK data). 
34 Eisenhower later questioned in his memoirs: “If such discoveries could bring about 
drastic changes in the structure of fact upon which we made our calculations, what 
new discoveries were in the offing?” Quoted in Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The 
Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 246. 
35 Gray became Eisenhower’s national security advisor in 1958, before which he had 
served as the chairman of the committee that revoked Oppenheimer’s security 
clearance in 1954. 
36 Memorandum of Conversation with Dr. Edward teller, 9 October 1958; Special 
Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 11; Office of the Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961; White House Office; Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library. 
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major weapons development shots that had led first to the atom bomb, then to the 
boosted fission bomb, finally to the hydrogen bomb, and then to the diversification 
and miniaturisation of these weapons, had already been fired in the atmosphere. Teller 
went on to suggest that “a series of underground tests, under 1 KT, progressively 
pursued, could enable the development of weapons of increasing yield without too 
great risk of detection.”37 Here Teller was saying that a test program conducted by a 
violator within that low-yield bracket of events that could not be accurately identified 
as weapons test could lead to technical developments in weapons design – and this 
comment was made before the results of HARDTACK II effectively expanded that 
bracket to include shots up to 25 kilotons. Unsurprisingly, Teller concluded his 
discussion with Gray with the observation that a test moratorium was not in the 
interest of the United States, but remarked that if the moratorium was to go ahead 
then it should ban only those shots “that can be policed.”38 
Perhaps most concerning of Teller’s statements during that discussion with 
Gordon Gray was related to a theory that would come to be known as decoupling. 
Noting that an underground test was likely “more difficult to detect…if it is fired in 
hard rock,” Teller also commented that “it is believed that an appropriate structure 
around the device could, in effect, decouple the transmission of shock waves to the 
earth.” 39  Decoupling involved the detonation of a nuclear device within a 
subterranean, hollow chamber that would absorb an amount of the shockwave and 
thus muffle the seismic signal that was transmitted into the surrounding earth. 
Because it remained a theory, scientists could not agree on the exact amount to which 
decoupling would reduce a seismic signal. For example, John McCone, the new 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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chairman of the AEC following the departure of Lewis Strauss at the end of June 
1958, stated in a meeting with the NSC that “concealing underground explosions 
through detonation in specially designed chambers or holes” would decouple the 
seismic signal “by a factor of 10 to several hundred times.”40 McCone then quoted 
Teller to the effect that a 1.7 kiloton device, detonated in a chamber 120 feet (36.5 
metres) in diameter would produce “virtually no detectable signal” while a 200 
kiloton device, detonated in a chamber 360 feet (109.7 metres) in diameter would 
produce a seismic signal equivalent to a 1 kiloton test.41 James Killian, special 
assistant to Eisenhower for science and technology, immediately rejected these 
figures. Killian stated that decoupling remained a theoretical study and that the same 
study to which McCone referred had calculated much larger chamber sizes than those 
articulated by Teller. Nonetheless, the notion that an underground test could be more 
effectively hidden through decoupling only further undermined efforts toward, and 
muddied the debate regarding, a test cessation agreement. 
If the opponents of the test moratorium can be accused, from the safety of the 
post-Cold War world, of one failing, it was that they often confused possibility with 
probability. On the issue of decoupling this failing was acute. Because decoupling 
was possible, opponents such as Teller and McCone saw decoupling as probable, and 
in the debate regarding the moratorium they made that probability seem more likely 
by understating the difficulties involved in decoupling (such as understating the size 
of decoupling chambers). Killian wrote a memorandum to Eisenhower over a month 
before the aforementioned NSC meeting in which he outlined a handful of technical 
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factors relating to the test ban negotiations, and among these factors Killian discussed 
the inherent difficulties of decoupling. He noted that “by deliberate concealment” it 
would be possible to decouple the seismic signal of an underground nuclear test “by a 
factor of 10 or more” and possibly “by a factor much larger than this” – but nowhere 
did he mention the “several hundred times” that McCone submitted.42 Certainly, the 
detection threshold of a system such as that outlined by the Panel of Experts “would 
be as high as several hundred kilotons” – but only if the violator “resorted to very 
expensive measures to try to achieve concealment.”43 This is a crucial point. The 
excavation and construction of the kind of underground chambers envisioned by 
decoupling would be expensive, possibly prohibitively expensive. Indeed, Killian 
wrote that “attempts to conceal tests, either underground or in outer space, would be 
very costly.”44 Killian derived at least some of this information from Bethe, who had 
only days before written to Killian that the excavation of a decoupling chamber would 
be “fairly costly” and that cost would increase if the decoupled shot was part of the 
kind of progressive test series Teller imagined because “its use might be limited to a 
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single occasion because it might cave in.”45 Bethe and Brown also highlighted the 
difficulties of scaling involved in decoupling higher yield tests – the reduction of 
seismic signals appeared easier for low-yield shots than for high-yield, because “the 
digging of underground caves large enough to give a substantial reduction of seismic 
signal from a 50-kiloton explosion will be very costly and may in fact be 
impossible.”46 
In addition to the problems of actually constructing underground chambers for 
decoupled tests, the act of excavation itself would potentially be observable even if 
the seismic signals themselves were not. Bethe suggested that roads or other “unusual 
human activity” would be indicators of test preparations in remote areas, while human 
intelligence would identify preparations in populated areas.47 This suggestion may 
seem overly optimistic coming from a test ban advocate, but it touched on another 
important point. The spoil from excavation as well as the activity of excavation itself 
could be observable to high-altitude surveillance, and, although not assured, offered 
along with the extreme cost of construction a deterrent against decoupling. The CIA 
submitted a national intelligence estimate in 1961 that mentioned just this. Noting that 
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the combination of decoupling within a hard medium (such as granite or salt) could 
achieve great reduction of seismic signal, the report crucially countered that “the scale 
of operations required for carrying out decoupling tests is such that other intelligence 
techniques would have an increased opportunity for detecting them.”48 Indeed, these 
“other intelligence techniques” were successful in detecting a Soviet high-explosive 
experiment in Kyrgyzstan in the winter of 1959-60 during which the Soviet Union 
apparently used conventional explosives “to study methods of clandestine nuclear 
testing.”49 
Eisenhower accepted these arguments by 1959. In a meeting in July that year, 
the president said that “the cost of concealment of large-size tests would appear to be 
exorbitant,” and commented further “on the estimate that 15 million tons of earth 
must be moved in order to accomplish maximum reduction of the seismic signal of a 
100 KT test shot.”50 Allen Dulles agreed to these comments and added that the Soviet 
Union would fear detection of the construction necessary for effective decoupled 
tests. That both the president and director of the CIA accepted these arguments in 
1959 partly explains their commitment to an unverified test suspension agreement in 
1958. 
The matter of underground test detection and particularly of decoupling 
demonstrates the looping interrelationship between nuclear testing and any agreement 
that would suspend or cease testing. The results of the PLUMBBOB series in 1957 
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generated awareness of the problems regarding test detection, and this awareness in 
turn drove a need for further testing that was borne out in the HARDTACK II series 
in 1958 – and the results of HARDTACK II in turn impelled further testing. In the last 
half on 1959 – that is, a year after the test moratorium had begun – efforts were made 
within the Eisenhower Administration to conduct a fresh series of tests with the 
express intent to experiment with decoupling. In July, discussion between Gordon 
Gray and George Kistiakowsky (who had taken over as Eisenhower’s science advisor 
after Killian) remarked that tests fired using decoupling could “be possible within 
about 18 months to two years” and that these tests would determine “how big” the 
decoupling chambers could be made and the “practical upper yield limit for this type 
of testing.”51 By December, the AEC had drafted an announcement of this series. 
Underground tunnels and shafts were constructed in granite outcroppings at the 
Nevada Test Site, and the AEC was looking further beyond the NTS and “surveying 
sites suitable for the construction of a large cavity for possible use for a nuclear 
experiment to investigate seismic decoupling.”52 This draft called for a 5 kiloton shot 
in a granite medium, two 5 kiloton shots “near the Rainier [sic] site but at appreciably 
greater depth,” plus an additional shot of unknown yield “in an environmental 
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situation designed to decouple explosion energy from seismic energy.”53 In a cabinet 
meeting held on 11 December to discuss the ongoing Geneva negotiations, 
Eisenhower approved the test series but lamented that he “did not know how to 
handle the public relations aspect without serious propaganda danger during the 
presently announced moratorium period.”54 Eisenhower’s approval came at a time 
when the officially announced moratorium of one year had expired on 31 October, but 
had been voluntarily extended through to 31 December. The president “felt that these 
experiments should go forward as quickly as possible after 1 January.”55 This series 
did not in fact go ahead – on 29 December Eisenhower announced the end of the 
moratorium but pledged that the United States would not resume nuclear testing 
without prior notice, and no U.S. nuclear tests were held until the NOUGAT series in 
1961. Nonetheless, this test series that almost-was remains a final reminder of the 
feedback loop between testing and the issues of test detection, and this loop imparted 
momentum to continued testing, even during the moratorium. 
While much of the focus of test detection was placed on underground testing, 
weapons tests conducted by the United States in 1958 had revealed another medium 
in which nuclear testing could escape detection: outer space. As part of Operation 
HARDTACK Phase I, three shots of Operation NEWSREEL had been fired at 
altitudes between 86,000 feet and 252,000 feet (26,212-76,809 metres) to determine, 
among other objectives, the United States’ capability to detect high-altitude nuclear 
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detonations.56 NEWSREEL demonstrated that nuclear tests fired at altitudes between 
twenty and “a few hundred” miles were “easily detectable” largely because of the 
effect they had upon the Earth’s ionosphere.57 However, tests fired beyond this 
altitude (that is, in outer space) could escape detection. This realisation began what in 
hindsight seems a bizarre speculation on the extent to which the United States or the 
Soviet Union might go to violate a test cessation agreement. Using rockets to launch 
nuclear devices beyond orbit of Earth, it was speculated that tests could be conducted 
behind the Moon, in orbit of Mars, or even behind the Sun. Such tests would take 
“about a year” to reach their destinations and as a result “tests cannot be conducted in 
quick succession.”58 The U.S. delegation to the Geneva Conference proposed a 
system of satellites that would detect the x-rays generated by outer space tests, and 
anticipated that such a system could detect a one megaton test at a distance of one 
billion miles (1,609,344,000 kilometres).59 Yet, as with decoupling in the case of 
underground tests, outer space tests could be further hidden by conducting them 
behind a planet or by hiding the emission behind “suitable shields”: 
One can think of very large rockets (millions of pounds of thrust, as are now 
under development by NASA) lifting a nuclear weapon inside a very heavy 
and elaborate shield to altitudes of hundreds or thousands of miles. All long-
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range [that is, detectable] effects of the weapons will subside before the 
shield is destroyed.60 
 
The notion that clandestine nuclear testing could be conducted through the 
solar system seems a peculiar one but it is important to remember that it dates from 
the dawn of the space age. The superpowers had developed only embryonic space 
programs in 1959 but already nuclear weapons tests had moved into the high 
atmosphere and beyond. Moreover, the Soviet Union with Sputnik had visibly 
established its lead in the space race only two years earlier. The same distrust that was 
shown in the field of underground test detection was naturally transferred to the field 
of outer space, a field in which the Soviet Union, at least at the end of the 1950s, was 
technically ahead of the United States. But most important, for the purposes of test 
detection, speculation on outer space testing, outlandish as it was, illustrated not only 
the immense technical difficulties associated with a test cessation agreement but that 
these difficulties had to be fully explored and understood in order to have confidence 
in such an agreement. 
While initially intended to experiment in mediums that would reduce or 
eliminate fallout, the underground nuclear weapons tests of PLUMBBOB in 1957 and 
HARDTACK II in 1958 – and, to a lesser extent, the high altitude tests of 
HARDTACK I in 1958 – also demonstrated the increasing difficulty of detecting 
nuclear tests that a determined power could conduct clandestinely. These difficulties 
were explored, debated, and at times politicised in the months leading up to the test 
moratorium that began on 31 October 1958, and they continued to pose problems 
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through 1959. At the core of these technical matters of detection was a conflict 
between possibility and probability, and figures within the Eisenhower 
Administration on both side of the test ban debate portrayed their arguments in terms 
of that tension between possibility and probability. The need to objectively determine 
the probability of evading detection created a feedback loop that encouraged more 
and further nuclear testing, a loop not dissimilar to that which in the first half of the 
1950s had greatly expanded U.S. nuclear testing to accommodate weapons effects 
studies. The methods of conducting clandestine tests that avoided detection were 
difficult and expensive and, at least in the case of decoupling, could potentially be 
detectable even if the test itself was not. But so long as these methods remained 
possible a test cessation agreement would be imperfect, and it was with these 
technical matters at the forefront of debate that the Eisenhower Administration 
committed to the test moratorium. 
 
Moratorium 
The moratorium on nuclear testing began on 31 October 1958 and remained in 
effect until after Eisenhower had left office. It was a voluntary suspension agreement 
that stood in place of a wider, more effective and, importantly, adequately monitored 
cessation agreement that was to be negotiated in Geneva concurrent to the 
moratorium. This cessation agreement did not eventuate, leaving an imperfect 
moratorium that could be (and eventually was) violated. Nonetheless, the moratorium 
was crucial for stemming the spiralling expansion of nuclear testing during 
Eisenhower’s presidency. Furthermore, debate within the administration regarding the 
moratorium is useful for exploring the rational purposes of nuclear testing. This 
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debate provides an apt demonstration of Sagan’s parochial model in the context of 
U.S. nuclear testing. 
Divine in 1978 speculated that Eisenhower as early as 1954 showed an interest 
in test suspension. Greene gives Divine deserved recognition for the accuracy of his 
speculation.61 The early discussion of an agreement to limit nuclear testing dates from 
before the CASTLE BRAVO shot of March 1954. Chapter Three mentioned the 
efforts of Vannevar Bush – the scientist and engineer who advised President 
Roosevelt on scientific matters and who helped administer the Manhattan Project – to 
prevent the first test of the hydrogen bomb in 1952 and so develop an agreement with 
the Soviet Union preventing their full development. By early 1954, efforts to limit 
large-scale nuclear tests such as test of hydrogen bombs had been taken up by 
Thomas E. Murray, one of the commissioners of the AEC.62 Writing to Eisenhower in 
February 1954, Murray suggested “an attempt to negotiate an agreement to limit 
testing activities” as “a possible step leading to international control of atomic 
weapons.”63 Murray noted that the development of high yield weapons required “full-
scale” testing, and that “by their nature such tests cannot be kept secret”; for just this 
reason, Murray supposed, any agreement to limit high yield testing would be “self-
policing.”64 In addition to the lessening of world tensions, Murray identified a more 
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compelling and tangible reason for such an agreement. While the development of high 
yield weapons relied upon full-scale tests, a moratorium on testing “might prevent the 
future development of the much larger yield weapons about which scientists were 
now theorizing.”65 But Murray was writing at an awkward time for the administration 
to consider test suspension, and Murray knew it. He concluded his letter to the 
president acknowledging that it was “untimely” to present his plan “on the eve of our 
next Pacific tests.”66 Indeed, CASTLE BRAVO was detonated less than a month after 
Murray’s letter, and its radiological effects and the controversy they generated did 
much more for the cause of a test ban agreement than Murray’s letter of February. 
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the chairman of the JCS, submitted the views of 
that body regarding a test moratorium to the NSC at the end of April, and this 
memorandum articulates the early opposition of the Department of Defense to a test 
suspension agreement. At the core of the JCS opposition was the notion that, in 1954, 
the United States had an “indeterminate advantage” over the Soviet Union in the 
development and production of thermonuclear weapons, and that although a 
moratorium could potentially freeze this lead, it would not prevent the Soviet Union 
from continued theoretical developments that could then be proven through nuclear 
tests if Moscow chose to abrogate an agreement.67 This fear was partly realised in 
1961. Radford noted that the advantage that the United States held in 1954 would 
“readily be neutralized” in such a circumstance and, as a result, the political 
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advantages of a test suspension agreement were “transitory in nature” while the 
military disadvantages would be “far-reaching and permanent.”68 
Serious discussion within the administration of a test ban proposal began in 
the months after BRAVO. Meetings of the NSC at the end of May and again at the 
end of June discussed such a proposal in surprisingly detailed terms – and this at a 
time when the Army-McCarthy hearings had begun only months prior but before the 
furore over BRAVO reached a crescendo with the death of Aikichi Kuboyama, the 
radioman of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon.69 A committee of the State 
Department had studied the issue of a test ban “intensively” in the fortnight before the 
May meeting and proposed a suspension of tests above 100 kilotons, a threshold 
below which tests in the Soviet Union were difficult to detect and below which the 
United States could still make important technological and theoretical developments 
in the field of nuclear weapons. The meeting of May saw John Foster Dulles, the 
secretary of state, express concern that the “propaganda ball” could be taken from 
Washington by Moscow if a test ban was proposed and the Soviet Union responded 
by proposing a lower threshold, perhaps fifty kilotons.70 This was probably the 
beginning of Dulles’s wavering support for a suspension agreement.71 Although the 
matter was deferred until the next meeting of the NSC, several particularly prescient 
comments were made at the May meeting. The president asked about the “largest size 
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weapon” the Soviets could test without being detected by the United States. Strauss 
replied that “we would know of any explosion which yielded more than 10 KT 
equivalent, unless the Soviets took the most extraordinary precautions to prevent us 
learning about a test.”72 Such precautions may have included those mentioned above, 
including decoupling and outer space testing, which would not be fully understood 
until at least four years after Strauss made this statement. Eisenhower reacted to 
Strauss’s comment with some poignant solemnity – “it was…a matter of despair to 
look ahead to a future which contained nothing but more and more bombs” – that 
spoke to his deeper desire to limit nuclear testing.73 
The NSC returned to the topic of a moratorium proposal in June and further 
details were discussed. In addition to the threshold of 100 kilotons, it was now 
proposed that a moratorium last only until January 1956, that is, for eighteen months. 
A moratorium lasting this long “would be advantageous to the United States from a 
technical point of view” but would be disadvantageous “if it was to last any longer.”74 
Strauss explained to the president why it was important to recommence testing in 
1956. The AEC and the JCS required a “small megaton weapon for defense against 
hostile aircraft” and work was still underway on just such a device, which would not 
be ready to test until 1956. The JCS believed that testing such a weapon and adding it 
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to the U.S. nuclear arsenal was “indispensable.”75 Here Strauss had identified at least 
one potential use of nuclear testing that was more important than a suspension 
agreement, which, as was entirely characteristic of Strauss, missed completely the 
point of a suspension agreement as it was imagined by Bush, Murray, and later Adlai 
Stevenson and Eisenhower himself. Similarly, the combined proposals of an 
exemption of tests below 100 kilotons with the set expiry date of January 1956 was a 
position that had been tailored to Washington’s advantage, a fact that the Soviet 
Union “would quickly grasp.”76 The Soviet Union had by June 1954 conducted seven 
tests in three series (compared to the United States’ forty-seven tests in ten series) and 
Moscow would need to conduct high-yield tests in the future in order to produce and 
stockpile multi-megaton weapons. 77 A test moratorium such as that contemplated by 
the NSC would freeze the United States with a substantial lead over the Soviet Union. 
At this point, in the middle of 1954, it seems that the NSC saw a test moratorium as a 
strategy to consolidate the United States’ lead in nuclear weaponry, while also scoring 
a propaganda victory, and it was not yet seen as a serious step toward halting the arms 
race. Indeed, in this June meeting, the sobriety with which Eisenhower had concluded 
the May meeting was entirely absent. The president spoke in terms of the relative 
power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and was confident 
that there was “no way in which the United States could be licked by any enemy in a 
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protracted war of exhaustion unless we were the victims of surprise atomic attack.”78 
The president concluded this meeting of the NSC by saying that “in any event we 
were not going to stop conducting tests of atomic weapons, and that there was no 
reason to do so until some new alternative was in sight.”79 Such an alternative would 
not realistically emerge until two years later during the presidential election of 1956. 
Limited and flawed as these early efforts toward a suspension agreement were, 
it is important to question why they were unsuccessful and why history remembers 
the nuclear test moratorium commencing in 1958 and not 1954. Greene attributes 
much of the blame for its failure on Lewis Strauss, whose mastery of bureaucracy and 
command of Eisenhower’s ear far exceeded proponents like Murray and even 
Eisenhower’s chief of disarmament, Harold Stassen. That mastery would not be 
eroded until 1957 when the crisis sparked by Sputnik led to a fundamental change in 
the way Eisenhower received advice on scientific and technical matters.80 Certainly, 
the internal opposition within the administration was crucial to the failure in 1954 to 
seriously consider a suspension of nuclear tests. But Eisenhower faced a more vague, 
less determinate problem. Many years later, after the departure of Strauss and when 
the moratorium had begun, the president confided to his scientific advisors that 
beginning three or four years ago [that is, around 1955-56] he had the idea of 
stopping atmospheric tests. He encountered enormous resistance and found 
very little support initially. The lesson is that the great task is to bring thinking 
along, since in a democracy public opinion weighs so heavily.81 
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Greene argues that the 1954 consideration of a test ban failed because Strauss 
“deftly controlled scientific conclusions” regarding the ban and because Eisenhower 
would not overrule the arguments of his advisors.82 This is certainly true. However, 
while the debate in 1954 was not of the magnitude as some years later, it was 
nonetheless important because it began the “great task” of “bringing thinking along” 
to the point where, in 1958, the United States voluntarily suspended testing.83 That 
this task began relatively early in Eisenhower’s tenure should not be understated, 
because it allowed test ban proponents to continue this process in the remaining years 
of the administration. The fallout, both radiological and in the public debate, from 
CASTLE BRAVO accelerated this process, as did the election campaign of the 
Democratic nominee for the 1956 presidential election, Adlai Stevenson. 
The 1956 election was a re-match of that which in 1952 had brought 
Eisenhower to office, and it resulted in the re-election of Eisenhower by an even 
greater percentage of both the electoral college and popular vote than 1952. The 1956 
election is important for the understanding of U.S. nuclear testing, because 
Eisenhower’s opponent, Adlai Stevenson, campaigned partly on the issue of a nuclear 
test ban. Both Divine and Greene explore the election campaign in great detail and 
this thesis contributes nothing new to its understanding.84 It is sufficient to remark 
that Stevenson – at first with trepidation but then with growing confidence – 
transformed the test moratorium into a central election platform that in turn produced 
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a vibrant and sometimes vitriolic public debate. Divine especially credits Stevenson’s 
“eloquent advocacy” for bringing the test ban to the forefront of public discussion and 
achieving “a remarkable feat of public education.”85 Stevenson certainly transformed 
the test ban from the province of a particularly vocal but small minority to a core 
issue in a presidential election, and part of his success was in relating nuclear testing 
to the well-being of the American voter – specifically, in terms of radiation and 
fallout and public health. Although he lost the election, Adlai Stevenson gained 
substantial support on the issue of the test ban.86 
Pedagogic though his campaigning on this issue was, Stevenson inevitably 
politicised an issue of great importance for the Eisenhower Administration and for the 
president personally. While Stevenson’s discussion of a test ban remained tentative 
and uncommitted Eisenhower refrained from public comment, but privately expressed 
distaste that Stevenson had brought such an important issue into partisan politics; 
indeed, the aversion shown by Eisenhower was not dissimilar to that of Truman in 
1952 when the IVY MIKE test was conducted during the week of the presidential 
election. The NSC had discussed a test suspension agreement since at least 1954, and 
by 1956 “the time seemed opportune,” in the words of Divine, to pursue serious 
negotiations with the Soviet Union.87 But Stevenson’s advocacy of a test ban during 
the election campaign practically assured opposition from the Eisenhower 
Administration, such that by the end of the campaign Eisenhower was himself voicing 
arguments that smacked of Strauss and the JCS. At the end of October, Eisenhower 
                                                
85 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 112. 
86 Stevenson became the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Kennedy 
Administration and in that capacity presented evidence of the installation of nuclear 
missiles in Cuba by the Soviet Union in October 1962. His famous “hell freezes over” 
speech was featured in the 2000 film Thirteen Days. 
87 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 111. 
 The Expansion and then Suspension of Nuclear Testing 
 
 178 
commented directly and at length on the issue of the test ban. He described the 
“critical issue” as not one of testing nuclear weapons but rather of preventing their use 
in war, stating that nuclear testing was a “lesser matter,” and that the present rate of 
testing of thermonuclear weapons did not “imperil the health of humanity.” 88  He 
further observed that testing had resulted both in cleaner weapons and weapons for 
the defense of the American people, and that the United States’ “commanding lead” 
in the field of nuclear weaponry could be “erased or even reversed” if Washington 
agreed to a test ban.89 Greene is intensely critical of the administration’s response to 
Stevenson. He concludes that Eisenhower’s victory in 1956 “resulted in a moratorium 
on his policy of candor [sic] to the American people on nuclear issues.”90  In 
hindsight, the Eisenhower Administration was probably unlikely to achieve a test 
moratorium in 1956 and so the positive effect of Stevenson’s public discussion of a 
test ban was of greater consequence than the negative effect of its politicisation. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting and useful to consider the possibilities of a test 
moratorium negotiated with the Soviet Union before the 1957 PLUMBBOB and 1958 
HARDTACK II test series complicated the issue of test detection. 
Before the issue of test detection became acute with the results of the United 
States’ underground tests, opposition to any test suspension or cessation agreement 
was framed in terms of its retarding effect on U.S. nuclear weapons development. The 
continued, progressive development of nuclear weapons was associated with the 
security of the United States. In April of 1956, before the emergence of the test ban as 
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an issue in the presidential election, the chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force (and later 
to be chairman of the JCS) General Nathan Twining wrote to Charles Wilson, the 
secretary of defense, arguing the need for multimegaton thermonuclear tests. Twining 
articulated two reasons for such tests: first, to better understand and control fallout 
and so develop cleaner weapons; and, second, to develop and improve nuclear air 
defense warheads.91 Eisenhower mentioned both of these arguments in his statement 
of 24 October (cited above). The president returned to them in 1957 in a letter to 
Congressman Sterling Cole (R-NY):92  
There has been a great enhancement of our defensive strength through the 
developments which have come from the test program to date. We have 
increased the numbers, the deliverability, the efficiency and versatility of our 
weapons. Most recently, we have learned that certain of them can be made in 
such a manner that radioactive fall-out [sic] is very greatly minimized.93 
 
It seems from his statements in 1956 and 1957 that the president repeated the 
arguments of those advisors opposed to a test ban when he conversed with sources 
outside the administration. This characteristic was probably a result of his reluctance 
to overrule his advisors on matters of the test ban, despite his own reservations, a 
reluctance that many other authors have noted.94 Thus, these comments are likely not 
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entirely indicative of the president’s own opinions but do show the reliance upon 
technical development that opponents used as a counter to the test ban proposal. 
While technical arguments remained, the issue of radiation emerged in the 
aftermath of the 1956 campaign. In 1957 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
(JCAE) convened a Special Subcommittee on Radiation, before which Willard Libby, 
a commissioner in the AEC, testified in June. Libby remarked that the United States 
required new weapons and that these new weapons “must be tested if we are to rely 
upon them in an emergency”; moreover, there was no substitute for testing to 
determine reliability for either a conventional or nuclear weapon.95 To Libby, test 
suspension or cessation meant “cutting off attempts to achieve further improved 
designs – designs which could lessen still further radioactive contamination from 
detonations.”96 The design of a clean nuclear weapon – a theoretical device that 
produced less or no radioactive fallout97 – was championed by opponents of the test 
ban. Edward Teller made the case for clean weapons in the 10 February 1958 edition 
of Life magazine, and this was followed by a memorandum to Eisenhower from the 
AEC which further detailed Teller’s arguments. Beginning with the now-standard 
refrain that the dangers of testing nuclear weapons were eclipsed by the dangers of 
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their use in war, this memorandum informed the president that the United States’ 
clean weapons capabilities were “embryonic” and that there were no clean weapons in 
the nation’s nuclear stockpile as of early 1958.98 Compelling reasons for clean 
weapons were manifold. Foremost was to diminish the indiscriminate nature of 
nuclear weapons so that they more closely approached conventional weapons “in 
characteristics and reputation” and consequently have wider applications in both war 
and peace.99 Such applications obviously appealed to American ideas of morality and 
self-interest. 
But some of these military applications as they related to a clean weapon were 
dubious and spoke to the greater problem of the military need for clean weapons. For 
example, it was observed that hardened targets such as missile silos or underground 
bunkers required high-yield, surface-burst weapons to ensure their destruction, 
presumably because airburst detonations did not create the required blast 
overpressure. The memorandum of February 1958 suggested that clean weapons 
could fulfil this requirement with reduced fallout, but testing had shown that the 
interaction between the surface and the nuclear fireball produced large quantities of 
fallout, and this interaction remained the same if a clean weapon were detonated on 
the surface. This was a fact of which the AEC was aware and which Strauss himself 
had publicised in 1955.100 Similarly, clean weapons were expected to be heavier and 
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less efficient in the use of nuclear material than “present” weapons, which lessened 
their appeal to the military because of the unfavourable relationship between weight, 
deliverability and effect.101 Behind the promising façade of the clean weapon was a 
less-favourable reality: a theoretical concept that could not be realistically achieved 
and the military did not favour even if the fundamental problems were solved. 
The twin, connected arguments of continued technical development of nuclear 
weapons and the need for a clean bomb were used by the JCS and Department of 
Defense in March 1958. General Maxwell Taylor wrote to the secretary of defense 
and articulated the opinions of the JCS on test cessation and these were in turn relayed 
to the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation.102 Taylor wrote that because of the 
United States’ imposing lead in numbers of nuclear weapons and production of fissile 
material, a moratorium against testing would allow the U.S. to “hold this position 
until about 1964.”103 The emphasis of this statement was on the size of the U.S. 
stockpile. A cessation of nuclear testing after the HARDTACK test series of that year 
would result, “at the very least, in a technological parity in nuclear weapons 
development between the two countries.”104 Gone was the notion that the United 
States could freeze its technological and theoretical advantage through a test 
moratorium that was seen in the discussions of 1954; rather, the U.S. possessed a 
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much larger stockpile that expanding Soviet production would only equalize in 1964. 
Taylor remarked that continued improvements in yield-to-weight ratios, second-
generation intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles, and anti-missile 
missiles were only possible through testing – and recommended that “under no 
circumstances” should the United States discuss test cessation with the Soviet Union 
until the completion of the “key shots” of HARDTACK.105 To Taylor’s list deputy 
secretary of defense Donald Quarles appended the development of clean weapons, 
and commented upon the emerging concern that the Soviet Union might conduct 
clandestine nuclear test series.106 
Interestingly, James Killian agreed with the JCS on at least one important 
point during a meeting with the president less than a month later. Killian presented the 
report of the Science Advisory Committee on the cessation of nuclear testing which 
concluded that a moratorium would “leave the United States in a position of technical 
advantage for a few years, which will otherwise be lost.”107 It is unclear whether 
Killian was referring to a technological advantage or to the kind of numerical 
advantage to which General Taylor referred. Nonetheless, the Science Advisory 
Committee concurred that the United States should cease testing only after the 
completion of HARDTACK.108 The meeting concluded with Killian outlining the 
opposing sides in the parochial test ban debate: the science advisor and his committee 
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favoured a moratorium, while those in the AEC and Department of Defense 
disagreed. 
This division crystallised throughout 1958. In May both sides further 
enunciated their arguments to the president. Advocates of the test ban attacked the 
darling of the AEC, JCS and Department of Defense: the anti-intercontinental ballistic 
missile (AICBM) or anti-missile missile. The basic problems of the AICBM, the 
Science Advisory Committee argued, were non-nuclear in nature and could not be 
solved through further nuclear tests. These problems were technical and involved the 
electronic and guidance systems of the AICBM, and the warheads expected to be 
available after the completion of HARDTACK were to be adequate once “very 
difficult” technical problems with the delivery system were solved.109 Moreover, the 
United States was far ahead of the Soviet Union in the field of the AICBM largely 
because Soviet “warhead capabilities” – presumably Moscow’s emphasis on heavy 
lift rocketry rather than light and accurate missiles – placed “very serious limitations” 
on a Soviet anti-missile missile.110 (The Department of Defense would eventually 
concede that the fundamental problems of the AICBM were “engineering rather than 
nuclear” but not until a year later.)111 Meanwhile the JCS repeated its position that a 
test ban would threaten weapons development programs – including tactical 
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warheads, warheads for an AICBM, and clean weapons – but added that “[e]ven if the 
HARDTACK tests are a complete success, there will be a continued need for 
additional testing.” 112 This was a very different tone to that sounded by Taylor just 
weeks before.  
The repetition ad nauseum of the position of the JCS became a feature of the 
test moratorium. The JCS, appealing through the secretary of defense, wrote to 
Eisenhower no less than five times between March 1958 and August 1959 to express 
their opposition to the moratorium.113 In addition to the letters of 13 March and 30 
April, the chairman of the JCS wrote to the secretary of defense again on 15 August 
1958,114 and at least another two more times in August 1959 to appeal the extension 
of the moratorium.115 Very little in these letters diverged from the arguments already 
outlined by the JCS in early 1958. General Twining consistently requested further 
testing, stating unequivocally that “the results at HARDTACK demonstrate the 
absolute necessity of testing weapons” for both developmental and proof-testing 
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reasons.116 Twining feared the “stagnation” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal that was the 
“inevitable result” of a future without nuclear testing.117 Many of the statements made 
by Twining in his 1959 letters are verbatim copies of the statements from his 1958 
letters, and it is a powerful image, indeed, to see the chairman of the JCS repeating – 
Twining used words like “reaffirm” and “re-emphasize” – himself in multiple letters 
sent over an eighteen-month period. One can imagine Twining’s frustration at the 
shift within the administration against the AEC and Department of Defense – a 
frustration that advocates of a test ban must also have felt in the early years of the 
Eisenhower Administration. Such was the scale of that shift that in forwarding the last 
of these appeals by Twining, Neil McElroy, the new secretary of defense, commented 
that for reasons “of world opinion and public concern over the hazards of atmospheric 
testing, I cannot support a position in favour of the resumption of relatively unlimited 
testing.”118 
At the end of March 1958 the Soviet Union concluded a series of 
thermonuclear tests and almost immediately declared a unilateral test suspension. 
Although Moscow was being disingenuous – Khrushchev had waited until the Soviet 
series was complete but before HARDTACK began, and the Soviet suspension 
coincided with the natural pause between test series – the Soviet suspension did place 
an onus upon the United States to respond. Killian presented the conclusions of the 
Science Advisory Committee to the president two weeks later, which, as noted above, 
recommended the cessation of U.S. nuclear tests. On 28 April the United States 
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commenced Operation HARDTACK Phase I. Finally, at the end of June, Lewis 
Strauss resigned from his chairmanship of the AEC, partly because his influence over 
Eisenhower had been almost entirely eroded by the reorganisation of presidential 
science advice following the Sputnik scare, but partly also due to the enemies that 
Strauss had accumulated in Washington (including at least one member of the JCAE) 
through his earlier, successful effort to strip Oppenheimer of his security clearance. 
Following these events, debate within the Eisenhower Administration regarding the 
moratorium intensified, particularly in the lead-up to the conclusion of the Conference 
of Experts in Geneva on 21 August and the announcement of the moratorium itself on 
22 August. 
The five days leading up to Eisenhower’s announcement of a one-year 
moratorium on nuclear testing were filled with revealing discussion on the details of 
that moratorium. The bulk of the NSC met on 18 August to draft the president’s 
statement for the moratorium, which the president stressed would be proposed only if 
technical agreement was reached at Geneva. Even at this late stage there was 
disagreement on the merits of a test moratorium: Killian believed the U.S. would be at 
a technical advantage relative to the Soviet Union through test cessation while 
McCone and Quarles regarded cessation as a military disadvantage. 119  The 
disagreement of the AEC, JCS and Department of Defense was obvious (the JCS 
were not represented at this conference). McCone said that the AEC “unanimously 
opposes the cessation of tests,” but in a marked change from his behaviour with 
Strauss in years past Eisenhower “said he recognized that fact” but dismissed it 
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because the AEC was not concerned with world political opinion.120 Two features of 
the moratorium were enunciated in this meeting: first, that tests would resume “on 
some certain date” in the absence of negotiated, adequate test controls; and, second, 
that no exception would be allowed for underground tests during a moratorium 
because “half of the impact would be lost.”121 Here again Eisenhower overruled 
McCone and Quarles, who argued in favour of continued underground tests during the 
moratorium.122 
With the single-mindedness of his predecessor, McCone pursued underground 
testing the next day. On the morning of 19 August he saw Gordon Gray to say that he 
was “deeply disturbed about the President’s decision not to go along with fully 
contained underground testing during the one-year unilateral suspension.”123 Both 
McCone and Gray went before Eisenhower that afternoon to discuss the chairman’s 
“severe misgivings.”124 The president was sympathetic, particularly to the argument – 
which seemed to bear the hallmark of Teller – for peaceful nuclear tests, but 
ultimately directed McCone to the Department of State. Eisenhower met the next 
morning, 20 August, with Killian and Christian Herter, the acting secretary of state, 
and discussed elements of McCone’s plea from the day before. The president said that 
the issue of peaceful tests carried out during the moratorium was “causing a great deal 
of difficulty within our own government” and that he thought it “a reasonable 
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solution” to allow such tests during the moratorium.125 Herter disagreed, citing 
scientific objections and the fear that the Soviet Union might misuse such peaceful 
tests to effectively cheat on the moratorium. Rather, he suggested that the moratorium 
be reduced to nine months rather than twelve, although this risked the appearance that 
Washington was discontinuing tests only until its next series was ready in the middle 
of 1959. This was of course exactly what the Soviet Union had done at the end of 
March. Remarkably, Eisenhower apparently continued to hedge toward the AEC even 
at this late juncture, and very important dimensions of the test moratorium had not yet 
been firmly decided two days before it was announced. 
The president and the secretary of state met with the foreign minister and 
ambassador of France on 21 August, the day that the Panel of Experts in Geneva 
submitted its conclusions. In this meeting, foreign minister Couve de Murville 
“reminded” Eisenhower that 
the French Government does not agree with the action contemplated in the 
statement [the suspension of nuclear tests], in that it is not prepared to 
announce the same kind of undertaking on its part…[because] the United 
States has done all that it really needs to do in this field, but the French must 
carry out testing in order to produce weapons in the future.126 
 
That the United States could carry the United Kingdom but not France with it 
into voluntary moratorium is unsurprising given the Gaullist impulse to develop 
nuclear weapons, the importance of testing to that development, and France’s modest 
progress in the field relative to the U.S. and U.K. But there is a more important point 
found in de Murville’s words: suspension of testing could only realistically be 
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contemplated by a nuclear power that had already tested extensively and developed 
weapons as a result of those tests. This was a notion hinted at by test ban advocates 
within the Eisenhower Administration but never clearly articulated, and it is 
unsurprising that it was France – itself on the cusp of becoming a nuclear power in 
1958 – that enunciated it. More surprising was Eisenhower’s response to de Murville. 
Referring to the peaceful tests he had rejected the day before, Eisenhower said that 
U.S. scientists “feel that revolutionary advances in this field can be made through 
testing” and that they were opposed to the moratorium for this reason; the president, 
however, felt that there was greater promise in the Geneva negotiations and that 
suspension of testing would offer the Soviet Union an opportunity to “deliver” on its 
dubious proposal of March.127 Nowhere in his comments with de Murville was the 
prevarication on peaceful nuclear tests Eisenhower had shown in the previous days; 
but instead the president outlined a conception of the moratorium as a political 
measure of Soviet intentions. What the president did not say, and this author wonders 
if he contemplated, was that the United States had little to lose from a moratorium in 
August 1958. As Herter said, a moratorium of at least nine months would complement 
any test series of 1959, and as Eisenhower said to de Murville, in the absence of 
agreement with the Soviet Union, the United States would “be obliged to go as fast as 
we can in developing weapons” and thus resuming tests.128 With its established lead 
in the development of nuclear weapons the United States could afford to suspend tests 
even if only to assess the credibility of the Soviet Union. At the very least, 
Washington was shifting the onus of responsibility back to Moscow just as 
Khrushchev had done to Eisenhower in March. 
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On 22 August 1958, Eisenhower announced the voluntary moratorium from 
the White House. He welcomed the successful conclusion of the Conference of 
Experts and their consensus regarding test detection (consensus that predated the 
complications from HARDTACK II). The president announced that the United States 
would “proceed promptly to negotiate an agreement with other nations” for the 
suspension of nuclear tests based on the conclusions of the Panel of Experts, and that 
in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is prepared, 
unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on 
its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the 
beginning of the negotiations [31 October 1958].129 
 
On the same day, Eisenhower wrote to Norris Bradbury and Edward Teller as 
the directors of the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore laboratories to inform them 
of the suspension of testing for one year and “under certain conditions of progress 
toward real disarmament” on a year-by-year basis after that.130 Jacqueline Bird briefly 
mentions Teller’s reaction to this letter from the president, which must surely have 
been the physical embodiment of all that Teller had railed against in the preceding 
four years.131 Despite his, the JCS, Strauss and later McCone’s part in the parochial, 
domestic debate, the test moratorium had come to fruition. 
                                                
129 The White House, Statement by the President, 22 August 1958; Speech Series, 
Box 27; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 
(Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
130 Bradbury’s response was a curt and delayed one, but Teller’s was more fulsome. 
He concluded with some passive-aggressiveness by saying that “in the meantime we 
are going to work vigorously under the limitations imposed on us by the present 
moratorium.” Letter to Dr. Bradbury from President Eisenhower and Letter to Dr. 
Teller from President Eisenhower, 22 August 1958, also Letter to President 
Eisenhower from Edward Teller, 28 August 1958, also Letter to President Eisenhower 
from N.E. Bradbury, 18 September 1958; all within Subject Series, Box 9; 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President, White House Central Files 
(Confidential File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.  
131 Bird noted that because of the moratorium Teller “now faced the major challenge 
of holding his laboratory [Lawrence Livermore] together.” Bird, Scientists in 
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The path to the test moratorium was an illustrative one for the study of nuclear 
testing. Beginning in 1954 it was an extension of the efforts of Vannevar Bush at the 
end of the Truman Administration and, championed now by AEC commissioner 
Thomas Murray, sought to ban tests of hydrogen bombs. In that year came CASTLE 
BRAVO, the highest yield test ever conducted by the United States and also the worst 
incident of radiological contamination in the history of U.S. nuclear testing. BRAVO 
brought the issue of fallout into the public consciousness, and that consciousness was 
sharpened by the election campaign of 1956 when Adlai Stevenson campaigned for a 
test ban. Stevenson inevitably politicised an important international issue, which 
prevented an early effort to negotiate a cessation agreement with the Soviet Union. 
Nonetheless, his efforts helped build public support for test suspension, while the 
widening of Eisenhower’s science advice following Sputnik in 1957 helped the 
president build support within his administration. The Soviet Union’s unilateral 
suspension in March 1958 pressured the United States further and, although not 
entirely genuine, was probably as important a catalyst for the U.S. announcement of 
22 August as any of the aforementioned. Along the path to the moratorium, both 
advocates and opponents laid out arguments that communicated reasons the United 
States conducted nuclear tests. Foremost was technological development: that testing 
was crucial for the United States to maintain its superiority in nuclear weapons over 
the Soviet Union, which could otherwise catch up during a moratorium through either 
theoretical development that could be confirmed by breaking the moratorium or 
through clandestine testing. Of the many imminent technological developments 
highlighted by opponents of the moratorium, the AICBM and clean warhead were 
dearest. Advocates of the moratorium demonstrated that the first, the AICBM, could 
                                                                                                                                      
Conflict: Hans Bethe, Edward Teller and the Shaping of United States Nuclear 
Weapons Policy 1945-1972: 124. 
The Expansion and then Suspension of Nuclear Testing 
  193 
not be improved through nuclear testing; while the second, the clean warhead, was an 
ultimately ineffective response to the more convincing argument of the dangers of 
radiation associated with atmospheric testing. Technological development of nuclear 
weapons through continued testing was so broad a field of discourse within the 
Eisenhower Administration that it touched upon all three of the core issues related to 
the moratorium: the danger of radiation, the ability to detect tests, and the national 
interest.132 Following Eisenhower’s announcement of 22 August, the United States 
had only five weeks to further develop its weapons before the moratorium took effect. 
 
Accelerated Testing in October and November 1958 
In Chapter Three, I argued that the United States cynically accelerated its test 
schedule in the last months before the moratorium. Operation HARDTACK Phase II 
was planned in November 1957 to include only two or three test shots, but as the 
moratorium became a firmer reality the series was expanded twice in August, again in 
September, and again in October 1958, and it eventually included twenty nuclear 
shots and eighteen safety shots.133 This acceleration was a characteristic natural to the 
imminent deadline of the moratorium: for the AEC and Department of Defense, more 
tests furnished more data to study during the period of test suspension, while for 
Eisenhower and moratorium advocates, it was an affordable price to pay for that 
period of suspension. But it was not a characteristic unique to the United States. 
After its unilateral suspension in March, the Soviet Union resumed testing at 
the end of September and in the two weeks between 30 September and 13 October the 
Soviet Union conducted nine nuclear tests that were detected by the United States. 
                                                
132 Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960: 184. 
133 See Chapter Three for details on this expansion, which continued up until the week 
the moratorium took effect. 
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Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, reported to the NSC that these were mostly 
airbursts and varied in yield between 5 kilotons to “more than 2 megatons,” and were 
conducted – Washington believed – to demonstrate weapons for stockpile, reduce the 
weight of designs, or as “an over-all technological motivation to improve the Soviets’ 
relative position.”134 Allen Dulles reported a further eight tests to the NSC on 30 
October, bringing the total Soviet tests for that month to seventeen – still fewer than 
HARDTACK II, but nonetheless conducted “with terrific speed and in what appeared 
to be rather haphazard fashion.”135 At least two of these tests were roughly twice the 
yield of any previous Soviet nuclear test, although the exact yields Dulles specified 
remain redacted.136 Interestingly, McCone, who shared the opinion of the CIA that 
this Soviet series was “haphazard”, said that the AEC “could not believe that the 
Soviets had learned very much with the kind of instrumentation they had been using 
in this recent series of tests.”137 If the United States was accelerating its nuclear tests 
before the moratorium to derive data to analyse during the period of suspension – data 
that would turn out to be crucial for the issue of test detection at the very least – then 
                                                
134 Discussion at the 382nd (Special) Meeting of the National Security Council, 
Monday, October 13, 1958; NSC Series, Box 10; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as 
President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
135 Discussion at the 384th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, 
October 30, 1958; NSC Series, Box 10; Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 
1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File); Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
136 Ibid. For a analysis of Soviet nuclear testing, see Robert S. and Arkin Norris, 
William M., "Soviet Nuclear Testing, August 29, 1949 - October 24, 1990," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists 54.n3, no. May-June (1998). Although this article does not 
specify the yield of the Soviet tests of October 1958, it does list the six highest yield 
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They were thus probably less than 10 megatons. 
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McCone’s statement suggests that the Soviet Union had accelerated its own tests for 
very different reasons. 
The Soviet diplomatic response to the moratorium hints at the motivation for 
its accelerated testing. On 25 October, over a month after the president’s 
announcement of the voluntary moratorium, Eisenhower stated that despite the 
willingness of both the United States and United Kingdom to suspend testing from 31 
October, the Soviet Union had not accepted the offer of the U.S. and U.K.138 Indeed, 
the Soviet Union did not commit itself to stopping tests with the kind of public 
declaration that Eisenhower had made on 22 August. This was made clear when on 1 
and 3 November Moscow conducted two further nuclear tests seemingly in violation 
of the moratorium, although John Foster Dulles conceded that the Soviet Union had 
not violated an agreement because it had not committed itself to that agreement. 
Eisenhower announced these tests on 7 November – one wonders whether this date 
was chosen deliberately to coincide with Soviet celebrations of the fortieth 
anniversary of the October Revolution. The president remarked that the Soviet tests 
had been conducted despite the commencement of negotiations in Geneva on 31 
October, and that both the U.S. and U.K. had committed themselves to suspend 
testing even though they had been testing weapons at that time. Most crucial of the 
president’s statement regarding Washington’s obligations was that 
This action by the Soviet Union relieves the United States from any obligation 
under its offer to suspend nuclear weapons tests. However, we shall continue 
suspension of such tests for the time being, and we understand that the United 
Kingdom will do likewise. We hope that the Soviet Union will also do so. If 
                                                
138 The White House, Statement by the President, 25 October 1958; OF108-A Atomic 
Weapons, Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (7), Box 451; White House Central Files, 
Official File, 1953-1961; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. 
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there is not shortly a corresponding renunciation by the Soviet Union, the 
United States shall be obliged to reconsider its position.139 
 
Eisenhower never received a corresponding renunciation, but these two tests 
were the last the Soviet Union conducted while he was president. That the Soviet 
Union made no attempt to conceal them, and that Soviet negotiators at Geneva made 
major concessions only a week later, suggests that the “haphazard” and accelerated 
Soviet tests of October and November 1958 represented, in the words of Divine, “a 
final move in the Soviet war of nerves, intended only for its psychological impact on 
the West.”140 The notion that nuclear tests could fulfil diplomatic purposes is a notion 
that came to the fore under President Kennedy, and will be explored in Chapter Six. 
Although the moratorium was in effect after 3 November it was insecure and 
ultimately impermanent: the Soviet Union had not publicly renounced testing, and the 
United States thus felt itself relieved of the obligation to suspend testing, and these 
respective positions eventually led to a resumption of nuclear testing in 1961. 
 
Conclusion 
During the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States first 
accelerated its nuclear testing program but then voluntarily suspended those tests. The 
outcome that was the moratorium does not appear easily reconcilable with the 
preceding process of acceleration. But they were very much related and, at an abstract 
level, the acceleration and the suspension represented the parochial, domestic politics 
that acted within the Eisenhower Administration and which defined the two sides of 
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the test ban debate. That U.S. nuclear testing had become so extensive and pervasive 
by 1958 further emphasises the achievement that was the test moratorium. 
The debate over the test ban between roughly 1954 and 1959 also highlighted 
larger issues about nuclear weapons and their testing. Public understanding of fallout 
and its global health effects that emerged after the CASTLE BRAVO test posed 
important questions about the rationality and responsibility of the superpowers that 
possessed thermonuclear weapons, tested them, and exposed “the world’s population 
to even a slight health hazard in the name of national security.”141 Similarly, the 
notion that a suspension of testing could function as a prelude for disarmament was 
connected to the notion that nuclear testing was a crucial and inimitable requirement 
of weapons development. Important thought these issues were, the parochial 
discourse within the Eisenhower Administration typically took place on the 
battlegrounds of the danger of fallout, the ability of the United States to detect nuclear 
tests, and the national interest. 
In hindsight, the United States had probably achieved just about all it could 
hope for from nuclear testing at the time that it committed to the test moratorium, 
although this was less the case in 1958 as it was in 1961. With the exception of the 
AICBM, the U.S. lacked a specific objective that loomed on the technological horizon 
as the hydrogen bomb had done under Truman. Through the nuclear test series 
conducted between 1952 and 1958 the United States had developed a diverse and 
effective nuclear arsenal that included deliverable strategic and tactical weapons. It 
had also through weapons effects tests come to understand the very important results 
of high altitude and exoatmospheric nuclear explosions, including radar and radio 
blackouts and damage to space vehicles. Finally, the many safety shots conducted 
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during Eisenhower’s tenure – tests of no or low nuclear yield conducted to confirm 
the safety of the devices for transport and in emergencies like an air crash – gave the 
United States increased confidence in its nuclear arsenal. One side of the test ban 
debate promised important developments through continued testing – such as the 
AICBM and nuclear weapons with greatly reduced fallout – but for various reasons 
these promises were misleading and sometimes illusory. The United States had in 
1958 reached the point where continued testing would be of greater help to the Soviet 
weapons program than the American.142 With the significant accomplishments of the 
nuclear test series before 1958, the United States could enter into a moratorium in that 
year with more assurance than at any time before then. 
The great accomplishment of the test moratorium was to arrest, even 
temporarily, the looping drive for more and more nuclear tests. This drive had many 
sources. First, the expansion of U.S. testing under Eisenhower came mostly from a 
diversification of the purposes for such testing, which grew from weapons design to 
include weapons effects, troop training exercises, and safety tests. Some of these 
purposes could be accomplished together in one test, but others had competing 
requirements that necessitated separate tests. Second, information relevant to the 
monitoring of the test suspension or cessation agreement – such as the detection of 
underground or outer space tests – necessitated further testing to confirm or measure a 
theory that resulted from a previous series. This was an impetus not unlike the 
development of nuclear weapons design, particularly under Truman. Third, the desire 
of one side of the test ban debate to continue nuclear weapons development with 
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promises of clean weapons and defensive nuclear missiles obliged further testing. 
This latter reason best exemplifies Sagan’s domestic politics or parochial model for 
nuclear weapons development, according to which internal actors within a 
government can affect important decisions of a state’s nuclear weapons (and, in this 
case, testing) policy. That the moratorium arrested the impetus for continued nuclear 
testing is an accomplishment the significance of which cannot be overstated. 
Ironically, the outlines of that moratorium were not essentially different from 
those of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Atmospheric tests were suspended 
under the moratorium because of the relative ease of their detection, while the 
difficulties of detecting underground tests of a yield below a certain threshold meant 
that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could be entirely sure that the 
other was not conducting clandestine testing. But in the absence of a treaty that 
codified this circumstance, or in the absence of a detection system such as that 
negotiated at Geneva concurrent to the moratorium, the danger always remained that 
one of those powers could at any time recommence nuclear testing. In addition to the 
potential for Soviet clandestine testing, Washington also feared that Moscow would 
use the moratorium to prepare an extensive test series, abrogate the moratorium, and 
quickly recommence nuclear testing. Exactly this latter fear was realised in 1961. 
The negotiations at Geneva – the Conference on the Discontinuance of 
Nuclear Weapons Tests – continued through 1958 and 1959. The United States’ 
voluntary moratorium was to end on 31 October 1959 but Eisenhower extended it to 
31 December; on that day, the president ended the moratorium but pledged that the 
United States would not resume testing without prior notice. Negotiations made 
progress in the first months of 1959 until on 1 May a high-altitude U-2 spyplane 
piloted by Gary Powers was shot down by the Soviet Union over Sverdlovsk. After an 
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embarrassing series of diplomatic blunders by the United States, the Soviet Union 
withdrew from the Paris summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower and the 
Geneva negotiations became icy, leaving Eisenhower sombre and disillusioned. 
George Kistiakowsky recalled speaking to the president in the weeks after the 
incident: 
The President began to talk with much feeling about how he had concentrated 
his efforts the last few years on ending the cold war, how he felt he was 
making big progress, and how the stupid U-2 mess had ruined all his efforts. 
He ended very sadly that he saw nothing worthwhile left for him to do now 
until the end of his Presidency.143 
 
With the looming collapse of the Geneva negotiations, it was only a matter of 
time until one side or the other, impelled by various structural reasons, resumed 
nuclear testing. As the first president limited by the Twenty-Second Amendment, 
Eisenhower left office on 20 January 1961 with a warning to the nation about the 
parochial interests of the military-industrial complex. On 1 September the Soviet 
Union resumed nuclear testing and the United States responded with its own test 
series two weeks after that. I turn to U.S. nuclear testing under President Kennedy in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Kennedy, 1961-1963 
 
 
“On such short notice, however, these [test shots] would have to be on a ‘go, no-go’ 
basis – indeed, this would be the only purpose of the test since adequate diagnostic 
instrumentation could not be implaced [sic] and made operative in time.” 
 Letter to McGeorge Bundy from Glenn T. Seaborg, 30 August 1961. 
 
“With the completion of the current series, the United States will have more high 
yield high-altitude effects data than the Soviet Union…” 
Letter to Robert McNamara from Gerald W. Johnson, 25 July 1962. 
 
 
U.S. nuclear testing under Kennedy was an awkward but necessary accessory 
to the overall narrative of nuclear testing and nuclear weapons development. The test 
moratorium undertaken by Eisenhower and Khrushchev was an imperfect and 
impermanent solution to the complications of nuclear testing, and that moratorium 
was abrogated by the Soviet Union at the end of August 1961. What resulted was a 
rapid, spasmic set of tests by both Moscow and Washington that evolved, on the U.S. 
side, into the five test series examined in this chapter. This period of testing lasted 
almost exactly two years and concluded with the Limited Test Ban Treaty on 10 
October 1963. These two years and five test series were a vigorous but unwieldy 
valediction to U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing. 
The nuclear test series held under Kennedy, although brief, were nonetheless 
numerous and complex. U.S. nuclear testing was an essentially continuous affair from 
September 1961, when testing recommenced, through to October 1963, when 
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atmospheric testing ended and the Limited Test Ban Treaty became effective. A total 
of 133 nuclear shots were fired during this period, more than four times the number of 
shots fired in the eight years of testing under Truman and almost ninety per cent of 
the total fired in the six years of testing under Eisenhower. Gone, however, were the 
easily distinguishable test series of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Test 
series overlapped in time and space and this confluence complicates the historical 
narrative. 
This fifth chapter examines those U.S. test series. The relationship between 
Operations NOUGAT, SUNBEAM, STORAX, DOMINIC and FISHBOWL was a 
byzantine one, and deserves some explication. Operations NOUGAT and STORAX 
were held at the Nevada Test Site between 1961 and 1963 and were so broad and 
interconnected that they were differentiated only by the end of the fiscal year. Shots 
fired before 30 June 1962 were part of NOUGAT, while shots fired after that date 
were part of STORAX.1 Operation SUNBEAM was conducted at Nevada in July 
1962 as part of STORAX, and is referred to in some documents as DOMINIC II. 
Simultaneously, Operation DOMINIC was held at the Pacific Proving Ground 
between April and November 1962. Carried out within the frame of DOMINIC was 
Operation FISHBOWL.2 NOUGAT, STORAX and SUNBEAM can be separated 
from DOMINIC and FISHBOWL by their location; while SUNBEAM can be 
discriminated from STORAX, and FISHBOWL from DOMINIC, because these 
                                                
1 Subject: MERRIMAC Event, 17 July 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 301; 
National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy; John F. Kennedy Library. 
2 FISHBOWL was a series of high altitude tests not dissimilar from NEWSREEL 
within HARDTACK I in 1958. 
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subseries were conducted as Department of Defense weapons effects tests rather than 
weapons development tests.3 
Because of this interrelationship, then, this chapter will be structured 
differently from Chapters One and Three. Rather than explore each test series 
separately and in turn, as was the case in previous chapters, this fifth chapter shall be 
structured by tests held at the Nevada Test Site and tests held in the Pacific. Because 
NOUGAT and STORAX were so closely related they shall be examined together, 
with SUNBEAM as the bridge between. 
 Nuclear testing under Kennedy took place in a context different to that of 
Truman and Eisenhower. The moratorium had shown that testing could be controlled 
and even abandoned, and the tests held under Kennedy contrasted to this example of 
restraint. Certainly, testing during this period would end with a more rigorous and 
durable system of prevention than that which had ended testing in 1958. But 
preceding that test ban treaty were two years of underground and atmospheric testing 
that spanned the deepest crisis of the Cold War – the Cuban Missile Crisis. More to 
the point, the test moratorium also acted to make the division between the Eisenhower 
and Kennedy Administrations all the more pronounced, especially in the field of 
nuclear strategy.4 This was a discursive distinction that the uninterrupted test series of 
the early 1950s had helped to bridge between Truman and Eisenhower. 
                                                
3 Even this relationship has been simplified: some sources refer to shots added to 
STORAX as STORAX II and even STORAX III, while joint U.S.-U.K. tests held as 
part of STORAX were technically part of Operation ROLLER COASTER. This 
thesis refers to each of these as part of STORAX. 
4 Much good work has been written about the Kennedy Administration’s shift to a 
focus on limited, tactical nuclear war, flexible response and eventually graduated 
deterrence. For a good overview, see chapter fifteen of Freedman, The Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy: 215-31. For a good account of the effect of the interaction between 
operational plans, political crises and technical developments upon nuclear strategy 
under Kennedy, see chapter nine of Burns, A Global History of the Nuclear Arms 
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NOUGAT, SUNBEAM and STORAX 
The three test series NOUGAT, SUNBEAM and STORAX consisted together 
of 97 nuclear shots that were held essentially continuously between September 1961 
and June 1963. All shots – with one exception – were fired at the Nevada Test Site, 
and for this reason shall be explored together in this chapter. Most were underground 
shots but not all. 
Operation NOUGAT was the hurried response to the resumption of testing by 
the Soviet Union. Moscow had announced its decision to abandon the test moratorium 
and resume nuclear testing on 30 August 1961, two weeks after construction began on 
the Berlin Wall. It conducted its first test, an atmospheric shot that yielded 150 
kilotons of TNT equivalent, two days later.5 Glenn Seaborg, the chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) under President Kennedy, gives an excellent 
account of the United States’ rush to respond.6 In a letter to national security advisor 
McGeorge Bundy, Seaborg lamented that the only tests that could be conducted on 
such short notice were “go, no-go” shots (meaning proof tests of new weapons) and 
that little data could be garnered from such tests because diagnostic equipment could 
                                                                                                                                      
Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics, 1: 257-88. Campbell Craig argues that, despite 
its efforts and intentions, the Kennedy Administration was unable to shift away from 
the strategy and policies of the Eisenhower era until at least 1962. See chapter eight of 
Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War: 121-36. 
5 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: 81-85. 
6 Glenn T. Seaborg was a remarkable figure in American science. He shared the 
Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1951 for his work with transuranic elements, and was 
chairman of the AEC between 1961 and 1971. Seaborg also advised U.S. leaders on 
issues related to nuclear weapons and their control throughout the Cold War and into 
the post-Cold War world. His memoir of the test ban negotiations includes a detailed 
account of the American response to the Soviet resumption of testing. See chapter six 
of ibid., 81-92. This response will be further examined in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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not be installed. 7  It was under these circumstances that Operation NOUGAT 
commenced two weeks later, and eventually included forty-five shots. 
The United States began testing on 15 September with an underground shot 
that was expected to yield 2 kilotons but possibly yielded 6 kilotons.8 This was the 
ANTLER shot of Operation NOUGAT.9 Despite its relatively modest yield and 
underground location, ANTLER released radiation that was detected offsite. This was 
the start of a trend; altogether, twenty-seven shots of the NOUGAT series, or sixty-
per cent, vented radiation into the atmosphere, although only eight of these released 
radiation that was detected offsite.10 This venting clearly contradicted Kennedy’s 
announcement on 5 September of the resumption of testing, which promised that there 
would be “no fallout” from the underground shots.11 This consistent though accidental 
release of radiation from underground tests speaks to the hastened preparations for 
NOUGAT. 
The NOUGAT shots were largely weapons related tests, as Seaborg had 
articulated to Bundy in September 1961. Many of the experiments held in the first 
half of 1962 were “designed to further [U.S.] understanding of the behaviour of 
fission assemblies,” for either low-yield fission devices or the triggers for high-yield 
                                                
7 Ibid., 87. 
8 Ibid., 89. 
9 The Department of Energy and Carter and Moghissi put the yield of ANTLER at 2.6 
kilotons, which contradicts Seaborg’s testimony. ANTLER is one of the only shots in 
the series for which the yield is specified rather than given as a range. It seems more 
likely that the yield was 2.6 kilotons and that Seaborg’s recollection is incorrect or 
overly-dramatic. "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  
16-17 and Melvin W. Carter and A. Alan Moghissi, "Three Decades of Nuclear 
Testing," Health Physics 33 (July 1977): 62. 
10 Ibid., 16-23. 
11 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: 89. 
 Kennedy, 1961-1963 
 
 206 
thermonuclear devices.12 At least two shots of the series, however, were weapons 
effects tests and were supported by the Department of Defense. These were the 
HARD HAT and DANNY BOY shots, fired in February and March, respectively. 
HARD HAT was an underground shot that yielded 5.7 kilotons and was fired at a 
depth of 965 feet (294 metres) in granite to determine the shock effects of a nuclear 
detonation in hard rock.13 DANNY BOY was a cratering shot that was “neither 
confined completely underground nor purely atmospheric” and so “could be classed 
in either category.”14 DANNY BOY yielded 430 tons of TNT equivalent and was 
distinct from the previous cratering, weapons effects tests of Operation JANGLE of 
1951 in that DANNY BOY was detonated in a different medium – “hard dry rock” – 
and measured the “containment and localization of radioactivity” afforded by that 
medium, and probably also the seismic signal produced.15 
Also conducted as part of Operations NOUGAT and STORAX were two shots 
of Project Plowshare, a program that explored the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, 
including construction of underground facilities, accessing deeply buried oil and 
natural gas deposits, creating new isotopes for scientific and medicinal research, and 
                                                
12 Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn Seaborg, 10 January 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 299A; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy; 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
13 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Gerald W. Johnson, Assistant to 
the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), 21 June 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, 
Box 300; National Security Council Files; Papers of President Kennedy; John F. 
Kennedy Library and "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 
1992,"  18-19. 
14 Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn Seaborg, 19 February 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 300; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy; 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
15 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Gerald W. Johnson, Assistant to 
the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), 21 June 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, 
Box 300; National Security Council Files; Papers of President Kennedy; John F. 
Kennedy Library and "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 
1992,"  18-19. 
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excavation. The first of these shots was GNOME, which was fired in December 1961. 
GNOME was described to Kennedy by Seaborg as “a multi-purpose experiment” that 
included as its objectives “the further development of several possible applications of 
nuclear explosives…specifically useful for peaceful purposes.” 16  GNOME was, 
indeed, intended to assist the design of nuclear explosives used for excavation as well 
as determine if the heat produced in an underground nuclear blast could be used for 
power generation, but also contributed “information of value to the weapons 
development program” and was planned so as not to interfere with the concurrent 
weapons test program.17 GNOME involved the underground detonation of a low-yield 
device within a salt formation, and was conducted at a site near Carlsbad, New 
Mexico. GNOME was thus the first continental test held outside the Nevada Test Site 
since TRINITY in 1945. GNOME was expected to yield “about five kilotons” but 
yielded only 3 kilotons.18 Despite its detonation at a depth of 1,200 feet (365 metres), 
GNOME was one of the aforementioned shots that vented radioactive materials 
detectable offsite. 
The second of the Project Plowshare shots was SEDAN, which was fired in 
July 1962. SEDAN was added to the test program in May while NOUGAT was 
underway and, like GNOME, it was intended to measure blast effects of both “large-
scale earth-moving projects” and ground-penetrating weapons. 19  SEDAN was a 
                                                
16 Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn Seaborg, 12 October 1961; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 299A; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid and "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  16-17. 
19 Letter to McGeorge Bundy from Leland J. Howarth, 4 May 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 300; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy; 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
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thermonuclear device with a relatively clean fission yield of less than thirty per cent.20 
The AEC nonetheless anticipated due to its yield that SEDAN would vent radioactive 
material, and suggested that a delay of two months would permit the use of “a much 
cleaner device” that “would reduce the amount of vented radioactivity by a factor of 
20.”21 The test was nevertheless conducted in July with the dirtier device – SEDAN 
was fired at a depth of 650-700 feet (198-213 metres) and yielded 104 kilotons, the 
second largest device ever tested in the continental United States.22 It created a crater 
1,280 feet (390 metres) in diameter and 320 feet (97 metres) deep, and, like GNOME, 
released radioactive material detected offsite. 
Because SEDAN was conducted after 30 June 1962 it was considered part of 
Operation STORAX rather than NOUGAT, even though it was held less than a week 
after the preceding Nevada test, NOUGAT SACRAMENTO.23 The first stage of the 
United States’ return to nuclear testing had ended, and it was an inauspicious thing: 
despite Kennedy’s promises to the American people, and despite being an almost 
exclusively underground series, sixty per cent of the NOUGAT shots had spread 
radioactive material into the atmosphere and eight shots had vented radioactivity 
outside the Nevada Test Site. Little was learned except that devices designed and built 
during the moratorium did or did not function; indeed, the notable shots of the series, 
those of Project Plowshare, were neither exclusively peaceful tests nor did they 
contribute much new data to weapons effects studies. But the United States had 
                                                
20 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  24-25. 
21 Letter to McGeorge Bundy from Leland J. Howarth, 4 May 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 300; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy; 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
22 Ibid and "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  24-25. 
23 Because NOUGAT was followed by SUNBEAM and because SEDAN was a 
similar test to GNOME, I have included SEDAN with NOUGAT even though it was 
by technicality a part of STORAX. 
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responded quickly to the Soviet resumption of testing – probably the defining feature 
of NOUGAT, and one better explored in the next chapter. As the fiscal year ended 
with June, NOUGAT rolled seamlessly into Operation STORAX. 
STORAX was a fifty-two shot test series held between July 1962 and June 
1963. Like NOUGAT, STORAX was an extensive, relatively low yield, underground 
series of weapons design tests. Most notable of these tests were the shots of the 
SUNBEAM subseries, a set of four shots conducted over ten days in July 1962. 
SUNBEAM was distinguished from STORAX by its sponsor, purpose and testing 
medium: it was a Department of Defense weapons effects series that was fired above 
ground.24 
SUNBEAM commenced with the shot LITTLE FELLER II on 7 July, a shot 
for which Kennedy personally had shown some curiosity. In a meeting with Glenn 
Seaborg and Roswell Gilpatric, the deputy secretary of defense, Kennedy “expressed 
an interest in having an operational test made of the Davy Crockett weapon.”25 
LITTLE FELLER II was the first test of that weapon “under simulated tactical 
conditions.”26 The Davy Crockett was a man-portable, low-yield, tactical nuclear 
weapons system for which Kennedy had an expected interest given his 
                                                
24  SUNBEAM is designated in the contemporary literature as DOMINIC II to 
differentiate it from the DOMINIC tests held simultaneously in the Pacific; this thesis 
adopts the later name of SUNBEAM used by the Department of Energy. 
25 Memorandum of the President’s Decisions at the Meeting on Nuclear Weapons 
Requirements on May 3, 1962; Subjects, Reference Box 104; President’s Office Files; 
Papers of President Kennedy; John F. Kennedy Library. 
26 Jean Ponton et al., "Operation DOMINIC II: Shots LITTLE FELLER II, JOHNIE 
BOY, SMALL BOY, LITTLE FELLER I 7 July - 17 July 1962," in United States 
Atmospheric Weapons Tests Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington, D.C.: 
Defense Nuclear Agency, 1983), 1. 
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administration’s emphasis upon limited war and flexible response. 27  LITTLE 
FELLER II detonated with a low yield, likely a subkiloton yield.28 Weapons effects 
studied at this shot included “blast, shock, cratering, prompt nuclear radiation, and 
fallout effects of a low-yield detonation.”29 Some of these effects were observed with 
specific reference to armoured vehicles: five tanks, previously used in the 
HARDTACK tests of 1958, were instrumented and exposed to the blast.30 Suggested 
here was an awareness that weapons such as the Davy Crockett could be used against 
Soviet armour. 
LITTLE FELLER II was followed within a week by shots JOHNIE BOY and 
SMALL BOY. Both were subkiloton yield detonations, but each tested different 
weapons effects.31 JOHNIE BOY was another cratering experiment in a history of 
such experiments dating back to 1951 but with an emphasis upon measuring the 
distribution of debris and permanent ground deformation that resulted from the 
                                                
27 Indeed, in the same meeting in which he expressed interest in a test of the Davy 
Crockett, Kennedy “urged the completion…of the reappraisal of tactical nuclear 
weapons” that he had previously requested of the Department of Defense. 
Memorandum of the President’s Decisions at the Meeting on Nuclear Weapons 
Requirements on May 3, 1962; Subjects, Reference Box 104; President’s Office Files; 
Papers of President Kennedy; John F. Kennedy Library. 
28 Many of the tests conducted at Nevada under Kennedy have yields recorded not as 
specific figures but rather as ranges, and this remains the case even in the Department 
of Energy data. LITTLE FELLER II was classed as “low” yield, meaning “less than 
20 [kilotons].” "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  x, 
24-25. This bracket is particularly misleading in the case of the Davy Crockett 
warheads, which possessed subkiloton yields. 
29 Ponton, "Operation DOMINIC II: Shots LITTLE FELLER II, JOHNIE BOY, 
SMALL BOY, LITTLE FELLER I 7 July - 17 July 1962," 75. 
30 Ibid., 77-78. 
31 JOHNIE BOY is the only test of the SUNBEAM series attributed a specific yield of 
half a kiloton. Ibid., 93-94; "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through 
September 1992,"  24-25. 
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crater.32 SMALL BOY, meanwhile, measured electromagnetic pulse effects similar to 
those observed in the high altitude series held before the test moratorium. As part of 
this study, two B-52 strategic bombers each bearing two stand-off, air-launched cruise 
missiles flew over the SMALL BOY site at the time of detonation in order to observe 
the effects of nuclear radiation and electromagnetic pulse upon that missile system.33 
Interestingly, vented radiation from the large SEDAN test – which was conducted 
over a week before SMALL BOY– affected some of the ground-based instruments 
installed for SMALL BOY.34 
The final test of SUNBEAM was shot LITTLE FELLER I. This shot was a 
complete test of the Davy Crockett weapons system that involved the launch of a 
warhead from a rocket launcher mounted atop an armoured personnel carrier.35 
Conducted as part of this test was the military exercise IVY FLATS, which involved 
approximately a thousand soldiers who fired the Davy Crockett warhead and then 
conducted tactical manoeuvres near ground zero.36 An operational test of a complete 
weapon system such as LITTLE FELLER I – including launch from a military vehicle 
                                                
32 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  94-99. 
33 Ponton, "Operation DOMINIC II: Shots LITTLE FELLER II, JOHNIE BOY, 
SMALL BOY, LITTLE FELLER I 7 July - 17 July 1962," 146. 
34 Ibid., 115-19. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36  Although involving a smaller number of soldiers than the DESERT ROCK 
exercises of the Eisenhower years, IVY FLATS nonetheless appears to have been 
quite an intense exercise. It involved rifle platoons of a mechanised infantry battalion, 
supported by tanks, attack helicopters, artillery and conventional Davy Crockett 
rockets, attacking simulated enemy targets close to the LITTLE FELLER I 
detonation. Ibid., 156-67. 
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and the following troop exercise – was not possible with underground testing, an 
argument made by Seaborg in his recollections on the topic.37 
STORAX shots were fired before, during, and for the most part after the 
SUNBEAM subseries. Already examined was SEDAN, the first shot of STORAX and 
the second of the Project Plowshare tests. STORAX MERRIMAC was fired on 13 
July, between the SUNBEAM shots JOHNIE BOY and SMALL BOY. 38 
MERRIMAC was an underground shot that was detonated at a depth of 1,370 feet 
(417 meters); almost two hours after the test the ground above the shot chamber 
subsided, forming a crater 600 feet (182 meters) in diameter and 40 feet (12 meters) 
deep.39 MERRIMAC is recorded as having an intermediate yield, meaning anywhere 
between 20 and 200 kilotons – although the lower limit seems more likely given that 
vented radiation was not detected offsite as was the case with SEDAN.40  
The remaining forty-six shots of STORAX were conducted after the 
completion of SUNBEAM, between July 1962 and May 1963. These shots were 
divided into phases and, interestingly, presidential approval for the series was given 
on a phase-by-phase basis. The first phase, STORAX I, covered those shots fired 
before 30 September; the second phases, STORAX II, covered shots between 1 
October and 31 December; while the third phase, STORAX III, included all shots 
fired in 1963.41 The first phase of the series was dominated by the SUNBEAM and 
                                                
37 Seaborg mentions three types of tests that could only be conducted above ground: 
high yield tests, tests “designed to prove the effectiveness of complete weapons 
systems,” and anti-missile tests. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: 90. 
38 Subject: MERRIMAC Event, 17 July 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 301; 
National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy; John F. Kennedy Library and 
"United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  24-25. 
39 Ibid. 
40 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  x, 24-25. 
41 Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn T. Seaborg, 28 September 1962; Carl 
Kaysen, Reference Copy, Box 376; National Security Files; Papers of President 
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Plowshare shots, together with a series of seven low yield weapons development 
tests.42 The second phase was planned to include thirteen shots but to which a 
fourteenth shot was later added, and sought to develop “multipoint detonation 
systems,” “higher yield gun-type devices,” and reduce the vulnerability of devices, 
presumably to interference from nearby nuclear explosions or from premature 
detonation of a warhead’s conventional explosive lens.43 The third phase continued 
the weapons development and safety tests, but involved novel experiments in which 
two devices were fired “approximately simultaneously so that only one seismic signal 
results”; this technique was used to reduce “observable off-site seismic signals 
resulting from weapons development experiments” and was a clear response to 
concurrent test ban negotiations.44 Fired in this manner were shots ACUSHI and 
FERRET on 8 February 1963; shots KAWEAH and CARMEL on 21 February; shots 
KOONTANAI and PAISANO on 24 April; and shots HARKEE and TEJON on 17 
May.45 Tests held simultaneously enjoyed some degree of obfuscation: for example, 
according to a definition later agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union, 
                                                                                                                                      
Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library and Letter to McGeorge Bundy from Glenn T. 
Seaborg, 14 March 1963; Carl Kaysen, Reference Copy, Box 376; National Security 
Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
42 Seaborg wrote to Kennedy at the conclusion of STORAX I with a summary of its 
preliminary results, including the tantalising statement “[p]ossibly the most important 
achievement of STORAX I was the” – the remainder of that paragraph is redacted. 
Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn T. Seaborg, 28 September 1962; Carl 
Kaysen, Reference Copy, Box 376; National Security Files; Papers of President 
Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Letter to McGeorge Bundy from Glenn T. Seaborg, 14 March 1963; Carl Kaysen, 
Reference Copy, Box 376; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library.  
45 The greatest margin of error between these simultaneous tests was 8.5 seconds 
between KAWEAH and CARMEL. HARKEE and TEJON were detonated precisely 
simultaneously. "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  
28-29.  
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KAWEAH and CARMEL were two separate tests while HARKEE and TEJON 
together constituted one test with two detonations.46 
Operations NOUGAT and STORAX were the most extensive underground 
tests yet conducted by the United States. While they contributed information 
regarding weapons design and weapons effects, perhaps their most important 
contribution was proving the ability to conduct, however imperfectly, entire test series 
underground. Before NOUGAT, the United States’ experience with underground 
testing was limited to a handful of shots, none earlier than PLUMBBOB RAINIER of 
1957. NOUGAT and STORAX showed that an entire series of shots could be fired 
underground in such a way as to be relatively economical, to not affect one another, to 
contain radioactive materials, and to produce useful information. Such a 
demonstration possibly went some way toward assuaging concerns, particularly in the 
AEC, that the Limited Test Ban Treaty would retard U.S. nuclear laboratories. 
With the conclusion of the SUNBEAM subseries, no further atmospheric tests 
were conducted at the Nevada Test Site; atmospheric testing continued with the 
concurrent DOMINIC series in the Pacific. I will return to the motivations behind the 
NOUGAT and STORAX series in the next chapter – but now explore the tests of 
Operation DOMINIC. 
 
DOMINIC and FISHBOWL 
Operation DOMINIC was the final atmospheric nuclear test series conducted 
by the United States before the Limited Test Ban Treaty banned atmospheric testing. 
DOMINIC was held between April and November 1962 and consisted of thirty-six 
                                                
46 See Protocol 2 of Section I of "Treaty Between The United States of America and 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear 
Weapon Tests (and Protocol Thereto)." 
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shots. In contrast to NOUGAT, DOMINIC was a measured, extensive and well-
planned test series that included a number of important experiments. Nonetheless, 
Operation FISHBOWL – a subseries to DOMINIC – was also marred by remarkable 
technical malfunctions. 
Operational planning for DOMINIC began some time around October 1961 in 
the weeks after the Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing and the rapid 
commencement of Operation NOUGAT. Robert S. McNamara, the secretary of 
defense, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to prepare plans “on an urgent basis” 
for tests involving: “an air drop with appropriate instrumentation and sampling 
required for a proof test”; “operational test firings of the ATLAS, POLARIS and 
ASROC systems”; “high altitude effects tests at an overseas location”; and “weapons 
development tests” in association with the AEC.47 Seaborg recounts the discourse 
within the Kennedy Administration that led to the decision to recommence 
atmospheric nuclear testing, and recounts also President Kennedy’s resistance to 
atmospheric testing. On 1 November, Kennedy announced that the United States was 
preparing for atmospheric testing; he made the final decision to resume atmospheric 
testing on 13 November – one month after McNamara’s memorandum was sent to the 
JCS.48 
The DOMINIC shots were held in the Pacific and were split between 
Christmas and Johnston Islands. Neither Eniwetok nor Bikini was used in DOMINIC, 
                                                
47  The memorandum also directed that “no public announcement [of these 
preparations] is desired,” presumably for operational reasons but also because 
Kennedy had yet to make the final decision to resume atmospheric testing. 
Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from Robert S. McNamara, 12 
October 1961; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 299; National Security Files; Papers of 
President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
48 See chapters eight through eleven of Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test 
Ban. 
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for reasons that shall be explored in the next chapter; for the purposes of this chapter 
it is sufficient to note that twenty-four airdrops were held near Christmas Island for 
exclusively weapons design purposes, while another five airdrops and five high-
altitude, rocket-borne tests were held at Johnston Island for mixed weapons design 
and weapons effects purposes.49 Finally, two weapons tests were conducted in the 
open ocean south west of San Diego (in a similar position to the WIGWAM test of 
1955).50 
These two open-ocean tests were shots FRIGATE BIRD and SWORDFISH, 
and were tests of complete delivery platforms – from launch “under conditions that 
might be encountered in time of war”51 through to detonation – in a manner similar to 
LITLLE FELLER I during Operation SUNBEAM. FRIGATE BIRD and 
SWORDFISH were the response to McNamara’s directive of October 1961 to prepare 
for “operational test firings of the ATLAS, POLARIS and ASROC systems.”52 
FRIGATE BIRD was an operational test of the Polaris submarine launched ballistic 
missile system, and, significantly, was the first operational test both of that weapons 
system and of a U.S. strategic ballistic missile generally.53 On 6 May, the USS Ethan 
Allen launched the missile from a position 1,500 nautical miles (2,790 kilometres) 
                                                
49  Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn Seaborg, 12 April 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 300; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library 
and Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 1. For a history of the U.S. Air 
Force’s involvement in DOMINIC operations, see Walter J. Boyne, "Big Bang," Air 
Force Magazine, no. December 2012. 
50 Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962." 
51 Ibid., 184. 
52 Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from Robert S. McNamara, 
12 October 1961; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 299; National Security Files; Papers 
of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
53 The Polaris had been deployed since 1957 and each of its systems had been tested 
separately. Underwater launches of the Polaris had taken place but none had ended 
with the detonation of a warhead. Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 184. 
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east-northeast of Christmas Island; the missile travelled 1,020 nautical miles (1,890 
kilometres) toward the island and detonated as an airburst. FRIGATE BIRD yielded 
between 200 and 1,000 kilotons of TNT equivalent.54 The objective of FRIGATE 
BIRD was to prove the efficacy of the Polaris system, “from launch through 
detonation,” and as such, no experimental program was associated with the test.55 The 
importance of FRIGATE BIRD was that it proved the deliverability of submarine 
launched ballistic missiles in the same way that REDWING CHEROKEE proved the 
deliverability of thermonuclear bombs from strategic bombers in 1956. Indeed, 
FRIGATE BIRD is described as the “capstone” to the Polaris missile system, and the 
test proved that the submarine “had joined the long range manned bomber and the 
land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force to form the three legs of the 
deterrent triad.”56 
Shot SWORDFISH followed FRIGATE BIRD less than one week later and 
involved an operational test of the Asroc nuclear anti-submarine rocket. 
SWORDFISH was planned to be held between Christmas and Johnston Islands, but 
commercial fishing in the area forced the test to be moved to a position 370 nautical 
miles (685 kilometres) south-west of San Diego, in the general area of the WIGWAM 
test.57 On 11 May, the USS Agerholme launched an Asroc rocket at a target raft, 
which then detonated with a low yield at a depth of 750 feet (228 metres) 
underwater.58 The explosion generated a spray dome 1,000 yards (914 metres) in 
                                                
54 "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  20-21. 
55 Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 184, 95. 
56 Ibid., 184. 
57 Ibid., 196, 99. 
58  DOMINIC SWORDFISH was the fifth U.S. underwater nuclear test, after 
CROSSROADS BAKER (1946), WIGWAM (1955) and shots WAHOO and 
UMBRELLA of HARDTACK I (1958). "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 
through September 1992,"  2-21. 
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diameter and 750 feet (229 metres) in height, and radioactive plumes erupted from 
this dome to a maximum height of 2,100 feet (610 metres).59 As the spray dome 
collapsed it left behind a patch of foam on the surface that had a diameter of about 
4,000 yards (3.6 kilometres) and remained visible for several hours after the test.60 
SWORDFISH involved a weapons effects program in addition to the proof test, 
although this effects program was not essentially different to that of WIGWAM: to 
determine the ability of submarine detection equipment to operate after an underwater 
nuclear detonation, and determine the radiation hazard posed to the delivery ship in 
the aftermath.61 The proof test of the Asroc system and experience in its use became 
particular portentous six months after SWORDFISH when U.S. destroyers equipped 
with the system grappled with Soviet submarines in the seas around Cuba. 
Most dramatic of the DOMINIC shots were those that belonged to the 
subseries Operation FISHBOWL. FISHBOWL was to DOMINIC what 
NEWSREEEL was to the HARDTACK I series of 1958: a subset of high altitude 
weapons effects tests sponsored by the Department of Defense that focused upon 
effects experiments related to the interception of ballistic missiles or the penetration 
of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile system. FISHBOWL, then, was an extension of the 
high altitude tests in the HARDTACK and ARGUS series – moreover, with the 
imposition of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, FISHBOWL would be the climax of those 
experiments. 
                                                
59 Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 207. 
60 SWORDFISH also generated a radioactive base surge that was larger but less 
visible than the foamed water. Ibid., 207-9. 
61 Appendix B to Proposed Atmospheric Test Program, 16 February 1962; Carl 
Kaysen, Reference Copy, Box 376; National Security Files; Papers of President 
Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
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While the DOMINIC series was publicly announced in March, no 
announcement was made about the FISHBOWL tests until late May.62 In April, 
Najeeb Halaby, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, enquired 
about the impact of high altitude tests on civil aviation.  Seaborg appreciated Halaby’s 
concern, and authorised him to disclose, “to the various domestic and foreign air 
carriers which would be concerned,” that “a few detonations are planned.”63 Public 
announcement of FISHBOWL was made on 28 May, and this statement immediately 
recognised the similarity between the upcoming series and the TEAK and ORANGE 
shots of 1958.64 
The many technical problems that disrupted the series constituted an important 
part of FISHBOWL. The series began inauspiciously on 2 June with the BLUEGILL 
shot. A liquid-fuelled Thor missile was launched from Johnston Island after midnight 
and, although it was later believed to be on a correct trajectory, tracking radar lost the 
                                                
62 At a meeting of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing Policy that decided 
the announcement of DOMINIC, mention of announcing FISHBOWL was limited to 
“[h]igh altitude test will be announced in time to warn viewers in Hawaii, with 
appropriate description of phenomenology.” Minutes of Meeting of NSC Committee 
on Atmospheric Testing Policy, 16 March 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 300; 
National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
63  Letter to Najeeb E. Halaby from Glenn Seaborg, 19 April 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 301; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
64 AEC and DOD Announce High Altitude Tests, 28 May 1962; Subjects, Reference 
Copy, Box 300; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. 
Kennedy Library. However, a meeting on 25 May of the bulk of the NSC Committee 
on Atmospheric Testing Policy agreed that public announcement of FISHBOWL 
would be made “for the benefit of the scientific community.” Record of Meeting on 
Nuclear Tests, 25 May 1962; Subject, Reference Copy, Box 300; National Security 
Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
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missile and “it was purposely destroyed for safety reasons.”65 There was no nuclear 
explosion, and the missile and its warhead were “lost by deep burial at sea.”66 
Seaborg advised Bundy that BLUEGILL would be repeated.67 
The unfavourable beginning to FISHBOWL soon grew worse. On 19 June, the 
second high altitude shot was attempted – shot STARFISH. Again a Thor missile was 
used, and again there was a technical problem, but this time more serious: after fifty-
nine seconds of flight, one of the rockets cut out and the missile was destroyed. The 
missile was at an altitude of 30,000 to 35,000 feet (9.1 to 10.7 kilometres) when it 
was destroyed, and debris showered down on Johnston Island and in the surrounding 
water. Some of this debris was contaminated by plutonium from the fissile 
assembly.68 
The two failed tests posed problems for the FISHBOWL schedule. In a 
meeting with his science advisors, McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, General Lemnitzer 
(chairman of the JCS) and Seaborg on 20 June, Kennedy announced his intent to 
complete FISHBOWL by 20 July, and concurred in the view that “the highest priority 
should be accorded” repeats of the failed BLUEGILL and STARFISH shots.69 As a 
result of the delays imposed by the earlier failures, Kennedy was by this time 
                                                
65 Letter to McGeorge Bundy from Glenn Seaborg, 9 June 1962; Subjects, Reference 
Copy, Box 301; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. 
Kennedy Library and Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 221, 27. 
66 Letter to McGeorge Bundy from Glenn Seaborg, 9 June 1962; Subjects, Reference 
Copy, Box 301; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. 
Kennedy Library. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 228-29. 
69 Memorandum of the President’s Decisions at the Meeting on Nuclear Tests on June 
20, 1962; Subjects, Box 104; President’s Office Files; Papers of President Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
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“reconsidering the necessity for conducting the Urraca [sic] test shot.”70 URRACA 
would indeed be cancelled, and its cancellation was tied to the progress of the other 
FISHBOWL shots.71 
The second attempt of the STARFISH shot was held on 8 July and was known 
as STARFISH Prime. This second attempt was successful. STARFISH Prime was 
carried aloft by a Thor missile, which detonated 400 kilometres above Johnston Island 
and yielded 1.4 megatons. 72  This was the second-highest altitude nuclear shot 
conducted by the United States after ARGUS III of 1958.73 The altitude and the yield 
of the STARISH Prime device generated widespread auroras visible across the Pacific 
area – in Hawaii, “an overcast, nighttime sky was turned into day for 6 minutes,” 
while in Kwajalein “a spectacular display” lasting seven minutes was observed.74 The 
DOMINIC test directors reported “a high degree of success for the scientific 
                                                
70 Ibid. 
71 McGeorge Bundy wrote a memorandum outlining the arguments for and against the 
URRACA shot two weeks after the meeting in which Kennedy began to reconsider 
the test. The crucial, and presumably deciding, point was that FISHBOWL was 
“running overtime” and that “on this basis it is Urraca [sic] we can do without.” 
Ironically, Bundy wrote that URRACA was “probably the most failure-proof of the 
three high-altitude shots” – a desirable feature in a series marred by repeated failure. 
The Urraca Problem, 3 July 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 301; National 
Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
72  "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  24-25; 
Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 220. 
73 URRACA, the cancelled shot of FISHBOWL, was planned to have detonated at an 
altitude of 1,300 kilometers. 
74 Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 229-30. While travelling in Turkey, 
this author had the fortune to meet a former diplomat from New Zealand who recalled 
as a child observing the effect of the Johnston Island high altitude tests. It seems most 
likely that he observed STARFISH Prime, whose effects were visible on both sides of 
the equator. He undoubtedly observed the auroral effects at the conjugate point in the 
South Pacific, rather than the direct glow that was observed in Hawaii. Hoerlin further 
discusses the STARFISH phenomenology. See Hoerlin, "United States High-Altitude 
Test Experiences: A Review Emphasizing the Impact on the Environment," 33-34. 
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programs” associated with STARFISH Prime.75 But such was the scale and altitude of 
STARFISH Prime that an extensive, high-energy electron belt was created in Earth’s 
Van Allen belt, damaging the solar cells of and ultimately disabling many satellites.76 
The damage to satellites prompted concerns about manned spaceflight, in its infancy 
in 1962. The Soviet Union was concerned about the safety of a cosmonaut in orbit a 
month after STARFISH Prime.77 McGeorge Bundy responded to this and other 
anxieties in a memorandum to the president in late August. He noted that the high-
energy electron belt created by STARFISH Prime was decaying; that the belt “created 
no radiation hazard to the recent Soviet orbital flights”; and that the belt would affect 
neither the forthcoming Mercury launch nor planned lunar exploration.78 Indeed, such 
was the immaturity of the U.S. and Soviet space programs at this time that 
STARFISH Prime detonated several hundred kilometres above the orbits of Mercury 
or Vostok flights and affected neither.79 
                                                
75  DOMINIC Test Bulletin No. 42, Subject 1. STARFISH PRIME EVENT 2. 
LITTLE FELLER II EVENT, 9 July 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 301; 
National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
76 Disabled satellites included Transit IV, TRAAC and Ariel, plus others. AEC-DOD 
Statement on Inner Radiation Belt, 20 August 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 
300; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
Soon after the Test Ban Treaty, NASA conducted a study of the effects of high 
altitude nuclear explosions on the Van Allen belts, satellites and spacecraft. See 
Wilmot N. Hess, "The Effects of High Altitude Explosions," (Washington, D.C.: 
National Aeronatics and Space Administration, 1964). 
77 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: 156. 
78 Memorandum for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 22 August 1961; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 300; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
79 Mercury flew as high as 260 kilometers, well below the belt of electrons created by 
STARFISH Prime. Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn Seaborg and Robert 
McNamara, 6 September 1962; Carl Kaysen, Reference Copy, Box 376; National 
Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
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On 25 July, a second attempt was made to fire the BLUEGILL shot. This 
attempt was named BLUEGILL Prime, and was a more dramatic failure than the first. 
The Thor missile malfunctioned after ignition but before launch; again the missile 
was remotely destroyed. Although the warhead did not go critical, the explosion 
scattered radioactive material across the facility, while burning rocket fuel spread the 
contamination into service trenches.80 BLUEGILL Prime put the Johnston Island 
launch facilities out of commission, which forced an operational pause as the facilities 
were decontaminated and repaired. The third attempt at the BLUEGILL test was 
named BLUEGILL Double Prime and was attempted on 15 October, eighty-two days 
after the failure of BLUEGILL Prime. BLUEGILL Double Prime again used a Thor 
missile, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Thor again malfunctioned ninety-five 
seconds after launch and was remotely destroyed.81  
Despite five attempts, only one test of FISHBOWL had been successful, and, 
by the failure of BLUEGILL Double Prime, FISHBOWL had exceeded Kennedy’s 
deadline of 20 July by almost three months. The president was unlikely to have had 
an opportunity to take issue with the failure, however: BLUEGILL Double Prime 
failed the same day that McGeorge Bundy briefed Kennedy that aerial reconnaissance 
photography had determined that the Soviet Union was installing nuclear missiles in 
Cuba.82 
The U.S. did not cease nuclear testing during the thirteen days of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, detonating four atmospheric shots associated with Operation 
DOMINIC. The first of these was DOMINIC CHAMA, an airdrop near Christmas 
                                                
80 Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 222. 
81 Ibid., 223-41. 
82 BLUEGILL Double Prime was fired shortly before midnight on 15 October (local 
time); at which time it was early morning on 16 October on the east coast of the 
United States. 
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Island that yielded 1.59 megatons on 18 October; this was followed the next day by 
CHECKMATE, a successful, low yield, high altitude shot from Johnston Island that 
was only the second success of the FISHBOWL series.83 BLUEGILL Triple Prime, 
the fourth attempt at the BLUEGILL shot, was successfully fired on 25 October. Even 
this overdue success was marred by complications: two personnel on Johnston Island 
received flash burns to their eyes as a result of the nighttime detonations, although 
neither resulted in permanent blindness. 84  The fourth of these tests was the 
appropriately named DOMINIC CALAMITY, an 800-kiloton airdrop shot over 
Christmas Island that was fired on 27 October – the tensest day of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the same on which one U.S. spy plane was shot down over Cuba and another 
strayed into Soviet airspace over Siberia.85 
Operation DOMINIC concluded in November 1962 with two successful shots 
of FISHBOWL: KINGFISH, on 1 November, and TIGHTROPE, on 3 November. 
Thus ended U.S. atmospheric testing. The concurrent underground STORAX shots 
continued, but DOMINIC was the last atmospheric test series conducted before the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty took effect in 1963. The total yield of the series remains 
                                                
83 CHECKMATE detonated at an altitude of 147 kilometres and less than three miles 
(4.8 kilometres) from its predicted location. As with the other nighttime shots of 
FISHBOWL, there is some discrepancy in the dates of the tests, as various sources 
use either local time or the time in Washington. DOMINIC Test Bulletin No. 53 
SUBJECT: CHECKMATE EVENT, 23 October 1962; Subjects, Reference Copy, 
Box 301; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy 
Library and "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,"  26-
27. 
84 Neither of the men was wearing protective goggles at the time of the detonation. 
Both received permanent eye damage but were not blinded. Hoerlin, "United States 
High-Altitude Test Experiences: A Review Emphasizing the Impact on the 
Environment," 13-14; Berkhouse, "Operation DOMINIC I - 1962," 244. 
85 The CALAMITY test and its effect on the White House appear in the 2000 film 
Thirteen Days. CALAMITY also features in Michael Dobbs’s account of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and 
Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War  (London: Hutchinson, 2008), 251-53. 
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unclear, largely due to the policy of the AEC during the Kennedy Administration to 
report the yields of some tests as a range rather than a specific figure. Seaborg states 
in his memoirs that the total yield of DOMINC was “held to approximately 20 
megatons.”86 Simon and Robison have suggested that the total yield of DOMINIC 
was approximately 35.4 megatons, and, although they do not state it explicitly, it 
seems these authors totalled only those shots with specific yields, and ignored those 
reported as brackets.87 The total yield of DOMINIC was in fact higher than both 
Simon and Robison’s estimate and Seaborg’s statement. 
DOMINIC was clearly the valediction of U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing, 
which began seventeen years earlier with TRINITY. Ironically, this comprehensive 
test series coincided with the worst moments of the Cold War. On the day the United 
States came closest to nuclear war with the Soviet Union – 27 October 1962 – it 
dropped a submegaton-yield nuclear bomb from a B-52 bomber over Christmas 
Island. Yet, DOMINIC was an important test series and not because it was the last 
atmospheric series. Seaborg informed Kennedy that, through DOMINIC, the United 
States “verified the performance of several warheads which are now or soon will 
                                                
86 Interesting is Seaborg’s hint of a desire to widen the yield and scope of DOMINIC 
through his use of the words “held to.” Interesting also is his statement, immediately 
after that quoted above, that the Soviet test series of 1961 had a total yield “almost ten 
times as much” as DOMINIC. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: 151. 
87 Simon, S.L. and Robison Simon, W.L., "A Compilation of Nuclear Weapons Test 
Detonation Data for U.S. Pacific Ocean Tests," Health Physics 73, no. 1 (1997): 263. 
These authors provide a yield total of 43 megatons for all tests held in the Pacific 
outside the Marshall Islands; subtracting the three shots of HARDTACK I, the 
remainder represents the DOMINIC shots and is 35.4 megatons. This figure is the 
same as the total of each DOMINIC shot reported with a specific yield. Using the 
upper limit of the range for those shots reported as such, the total yield of the series 
climbs to 38.5 megatons. 
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constitute a critical portion of our strategic weapons stockpile.”88 Moreover, with the 
completion of DOMINIC, the Department of Defense concluded that “the United 
States will have more high yield high-altitude effects data than the Soviet Union” – 
data that was particularly important for “penetration, weapon hardening, 
communications and radar blackout, and AICBM [anti-intercontinental ballistic 
missile] capability.”89 Furthermore, the DOMINIC tests had a dual effect on U.S. 
weapons laboratories: they vindicated “the elaborate computational and certification 
procedures” used by these laboratories during the moratorium, when testing of 
warheads was not possible; while at the same time “revitalized to a major degree” 
those laboratories, which had suffered personnel losses during the moratorium.90 
 
Conclusion 
The test series conducted under Kennedy were broad in scope, high in 
number, and concentrated in time, but were neither innovative nor far-reaching in 
effect. Nowhere to be seen were the significant technical developments on the 
Truman and Eisenhower years, where fission devices gave way to boosted fission and 
eventually fusion bombs, all of which were miniaturised and weaponised. Even the 
FISHBOWL tests, remarkable though they were, did not depart fundamentally from 
the high altitude HARDTACK I and ARGUS shots of 1958. Rather, the NOUGAT, 
                                                
88 Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn Seaborg, 10 August 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 301; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
89 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Gerald W. Johnson, 25 July 1962; 
Subjects, Reference Copy, Box 300; National Security Files; Papers of President 
Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library. 
90 Letter to President Kennedy from Glenn Seaborg, 10 August 1962; Subjects, 
Reference Copy, Box 301; National Security Files; Papers of President Kennedy, 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
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STORAX and DOMINC series contributed refinements to concepts and observations 
made in previous test series. 
Although it is difficult to argue, it can be suggested that the brevity of testing 
under Kennedy was at least in part responsible for this developmental weaknesses. In 
preceding periods, test series built upon the results of their predecessors, ultimately 
driving both theoretical and practical knowledge toward dramatic and observable 
innovations. The constrained nature of the tests held between 1961 and 1962, 
however – combined with the inherently political nature of their recommencement – 
precluded this linear development. The effect was that what progress was made, 
particularly by FISHBOWL in the field of anti-ballistic missile effects and precursor 
blackout bursts, was not exploited to the noticeable extent that characterised the 
testing of the 1950s. 
Nonetheless, there were strengths to the NOUGAT, STORAX and DOMINIC 
tests, and these were twofold. The first was the importance of complete tests of 
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, including their delivery system. This kind of 
test was borne out in SUNBEAM LITTLE FELLER I, which tested the Davy 
Crockett nuclear rocket; in DOMINIC FRIGATE BIRD, which tested the Polaris 
submarine-launched ballistic missile; and in DOMINIC SWORDFISH, which tested 
the Asroc anti-submarine nuclear rocket. While elements of this system could be and 
were tested separately, only through atmospheric testing could the entire system be 
verified – and the period between 1961 and 1963 offered a brief window to do so. The 
second was the confirmation and refinement of those “computational and certification 
procedures” that Seaborg mentioned in August 1962: all the various mechanisms and 
techniques for estimating the effectiveness of weapons short of nuclear testing. Here 
again the period between 1961 and 1963 offered a chance to verify theory and 
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practicality which in turn gave confidence that similar techniques would be effective 
under the Test Ban. 
Finally, the tests conducted under Kennedy fundamentally proved the efficacy 
of the United States’ nuclear arsenal. This point is an important one: through tests 
such as FRIGATE BIRD Washington gained confidence in its nuclear stockpile 
before it committed to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. It acquired experience with 
tactical nuclear weapons and with the firing of nuclear rockets. Moreover, the United 
States experimented with simultaneous underground detonations, a technique it feared 
the Soviet Union might use to obfuscate seismic monitoring of a test ban. In short, 
NOUGAT, STORAX and DOMINIC demonstrated that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was 
effective and that the Pentagon and the White House could have confidence in that 
stockpile going into the Test Ban – thus, these series achieved all Washington could 
realistically have hoped of them. 
That being said, nuclear testing under Kennedy was largely undertaken for 
political reasons. Washington calculated that, once the Soviet Union abrogated the 
test moratorium, it could not be allowed to test unilaterally. There was an undeniable 
technical dimension to this perception – for example, a concern that Moscow might 
develop an effective anti-ballistic missile weapons as a result of high altitude tests – 
but there was also a political and propaganda dimension to matching the Soviet test 
series. An exploration of these two interrelated dimensions, as evidenced by White 
House discussions regarding the recommencement of nuclear testing, will be explored 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
The Limitation of Nuclear Testing 
 
 
“The question of test resumption is one which must be considered almost totally in a 
political and psychological context rather than in terms of strategic technological 
considerations.”  
Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from Marc Raskin, 25 July 1961. 
 
 
“…nothing fundamental is likely to be changed by any amount of future nuclear 
testing.”  
Hans Bethe, lecture at Cornell University, 5 January 1962. 
 
 
When John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as president in January 1961, the 
negotiations at Geneva toward a test ban – revitalised by the test moratorium, but 
stymied by profound disagreements over the inspection of potential underground tests 
– were in their twenty-seventh month. It had been almost sixteen years since the 
United States’ first atomic test, but more than two years since the end of Operation 
HARDTACK Phase II. Concern regarding the health effects of global fallout had 
receded as the tests themselves stopped, but without progress at Geneva or a binding 
agreement to preserve the moratorium, the incentive to test nuclear weapons never 
really went away. Both Washington and Moscow considered the resumption of 
nuclear tests and, accordingly, less than nine months after Kennedy’s inauguration, 
both the Soviet Union and United States had returned to nuclear testing, and their test 
series spanned the next two years and both the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises.  
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The nuclear tests conducted by the United States between 1961 and 1963 were 
a spasmic epilogue to the longer experience of testing ended by the moratorium. But 
these tests were nonetheless crucial: they demonstrated the effectiveness of the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal and its delivery through proof shots of stockpiled weapons, and they 
showed that entire test series could be conducted underground. Moreover, the 
circumstances surrounding the U.S. resumption of testing offer an example of the 
political motivations for nuclear testing, while the weapons effects studies of 
Operation DOMINIC acted to diminish institutional interest in anti-ICBM technology 
and, therefore, opposition from those same institutions to the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
(LTBT). 
Literature dedicated to Kennedy and nuclear thought is generally focused on 
the doctrinal shift to flexible response, or the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.1 
To a lesser extent, historians focus also on various aspects of the Limited Test Ban 
                                                
1 Of the doctrinal shift, see particularly Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower 
and Thermonuclear War: 121-62; Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy: 215-
40; David G. Coleman, and Joseph M. Siracusa, Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The 
Making of Nuclear Strategy  (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 121-62. 
Excellent accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis include Dobbs, One Minute to 
Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War; G. Allison, 
and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Longman, 1999). For the perspective of the American people during the 
crisis, see Marcus D. Pohlmann, "Constraining Presidents at the Brink: The Cuban 
Missile Crisis " Presidential Studies Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1989). For interesting and 
personal perspectives of the crisis, see Blema S. Steinberg, "Shame and Humiliation 
in the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Psychoanalytic Pespective," Political Psychology 12, 
no. 4 (December 1991); B. Gregory Marfleet, "The Operational Code of John F. 
Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Comparison of Public and Private 
Rhetoric," Political Psychology 21, no. 3 (September 2000). A good source for the 
relationship between nuclear weapons and the crisis is Marc Trachtenberg, "The 
Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security 
10, no. 1 (1985). 
The Limitation of Nuclear Testing 
  231 
Treaty, particularly the leadership of President John F. Kennedy.2 While these are 
important themes, missing entirely from the historiography is an appraisal of the U.S. 
and Soviet test series and how these influenced the LTBT and, also, each other. The 
memoirs of Glenn T. Seaborg, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) under Kennedy, are particularly useful, as he provides a balanced and detailed 
account of the negotiations of the LTBT and discusses the interaction of testing and 
politics. 3  This chapter shall further explore that interaction by examining the 
relationship between the political and technical reasons for recommencing testing in 
1961, and investigate how the results of the test series carried out under Kennedy 
affected thought on nuclear weapons and the test ban.  
As with Chapters Two and Four, this chapter shall adapt to the field of nuclear 
testing one of the models presented by Scott D. Sagan to explain why nations pursue 
nuclear weapons. The third of Sagan’s models is the “security model,” whereby a 
nation develops nuclear weapons due to a perceived threat, almost always nuclear, to 
its security. This is perhaps the most basic and intuitive of his models but, as Sagan 
notes, also difficult to verify.4 As the first nuclear power, the United States had 
always been technologically and theoretically ahead of other nuclear powers, but this 
situation was threatened in 1961. I argue that the security model is applicable to U.S. 
                                                
2 Examples include Andreas Wenger, and Marcel Gerber, "John F. Kennedy and the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty: A Case Study of Presidential Leadership," Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1999); Theodore C. Sorenson, "JFK's Strategy of Peace," 
World Policy Journal 20, no. 3 (Fall 2003); McGeorge Bundy, "The Presidency and 
the Peace," Foreign Affairs 42, no. 3 (April 1964); Vojtech Mastny, "The 1963 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Missed Opportunity for Détente?" Journal of Cold War 
Studies 10, no. 1 (2008). 
3 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban. The epilogue to Greene’s work 
also discusses many of these issues. Greene, Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the 
Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1945-1963. 
4 Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb," 57-63. 
 The Limitation of Nuclear Testing 
 
 232 
nuclear testing under Kennedy because, for the first time in its history, the American 
lead in nuclear technology was jeopardised by the circumstances in which the Soviet 
Union resumed nuclear tests. Actors within the Kennedy Administration – scientist 
and politician alike – perceived that the rapid resumption of a carefully and 
extensively prepared test series by the Soviet Union, contrasted with the ineffective 
response mustered by the United States with Operation NOUGAT, had substantially 
narrowed the advantage the United States enjoyed in nuclear weapons technology 
when it entered the moratorium. Perhaps at no other time since the early days of the 
Manhattan Project had the United States perceived such a threat to its nuclear 
security, and this perception lends significance to Sagan’s security model when 
applied to testing under Kennedy. 
In Chapter Five, I examined the three major test series and two sub-series 
carried out by the United States under Kennedy’s brief presidency. This chapter shall 
survey the consequences of those series, including the political nature of the U.S. 
resumption of testing; the manner in which the results of U.S. and Soviet tests 
affected both perceptions of their relative power balance and attitudes toward a test 
ban; the effect these series had on the anti-ICBM (AICBM); and the final state of 
nuclear testing at the time of the LTBT. In so doing, it seeks not only to better 
contextualise the swansong to U.S. atmospheric testing that was seen between 1961 
and 1963, but also to demonstrate that, more so than under Truman and Eisenhower, 
U.S. testing under Kennedy was motivated by a perceived threat to its security. How 
this threat was managed was crucial to the LTBT. 
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The United States Considers Resumption 
In the absence of a diplomatic agreement with the Soviet Union banning tests 
or progress in negotiations to that effect, calls for the resumption of U.S. nuclear 
testing grew steadily more insistent in the first nine months of Kennedy’s presidency. 
The sources of these arguments were not different from those that had opposed the 
test moratorium under Eisenhower: the Department of Defense, embodied by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and to a lesser degree the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
but added now was the National Security Council (NSC). The United States made 
modest moves toward resumption even before the Soviet Union recommenced testing, 
and Moscow’s announcement on 30 August of its intention to resume testing bore out 
many of the warnings of test advocates, ensuring a response from Washington that 
had long been contemplated anyway. As the U.S. considered resumption in the first 
half of 1961, no conclusive technical arguments could be arrayed in favour of it; yet, 
the rapid progress achieved by a unilateral Soviet test series changed that, because 
U.S. nuclear superiority was for the first time imperilled. 
Despite Kennedy’s personal assurances to Eisenhower of his commitment to 
test cessation – before even receiving the Democratic nomination, for example, 
Kennedy wrote to Eisenhower to declare that, if elected president, he would “carry 
out in good faith” any suspension or cessation agreement negotiated under 
Eisenhower’s tenure – the outgoing president was so disillusioned with the apparent 
failure of the Geneva negotiations that he advised Kennedy to recommence nuclear 
testing without delay.5 Eisenhower apparently intended to order test resumption as 
                                                
5 Letter to President Eisenhower from Senator John F. Kennedy, 30 March, 1960; 
OF108-A Atomic Weapons, Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (7), Box 451; Official 
File, 1953-1961; White House Central Files; Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential 
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one of his final acts as president, had Richard Nixon won the 1960 election.6 Kennedy 
resisted this advice and remained committed to the suspension of nuclear tests despite 
the end of the moratorium before he took office and the lack of commitment from the 
Soviet Union. But Eisenhower’s was not the only voice advising resumption. 
Within the context of Soviet intransigence at Geneva, the incoming 
administration discussed the resumption of nuclear testing and identified problems 
inherited from the Eisenhower Administration. At the end of April, an informal 
meeting on Contingency Planning for the Resumption of Nuclear Testing – attended 
by members of the NSC, the United States Information Agency (USIA), the CIA, 
Department of Defense, the Disarmament Commission, the chairman of the AEC, 
Glenn Seaborg, and the president’s science advisor, Jerome Wiesner – discussed the 
stalled Geneva negotiations. Two core problems were identified: “which alternative to 
take to get off the hook,” that is, to abrogate the suspension of testing, and “how 
soon.”7 Further enunciated, the problem was “no longer how to get a test ban treaty” 
because, after two and a half years of effort, the stalled negotiations suggested that the 
United States could not reach a satisfactory treaty, but rather how “to get off the hook 
of a self-imposed test ban on which the Soviets hope to keep [the United States] 
                                                                                                                                      
Library; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961  (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 481. 
6 This anecdote comes from Glenn Seaborg, who quotes Harold K. Jacobsen and Eric 
Stein. To this author, it profoundly affects Eisenhower’s legacy but does show the 
depth of his disappointment in the final months of his presidency. Harold Karan and 
Eric Stein Jacobson, Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the 
Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 
263; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: 25. 
7 Memorandum for the Record, Informal Meeting on Contingency Planning for the 
Resumption of Nuclear Testing, 27 April 1961; Reference Copy, Box 439; Robert W. 
Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John F. Kennedy 
Library. 
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impaled.”8 The most compelling reasons for resumption were not military but instead 
diplomatic. It was remarked by Robert Komer, who served on the NSC under 
McGeorge Bundy, that the resumption of testing was “not absolutely critical to our 
security”; he lamented that it were not, because, if it were, the “decision would be 
easy.”9 Instead, the recent Soviet propaganda victory of Yuri Gagarin’s orbital flight 
(12 April) and the American defeat at the Bay of Pigs (19 April) had left the United 
States embarrassed, and the attendees of this meeting sought to convey to Khrushchev 
the risks of pushing the United States “too far” and Komer argued that the resumption 
of nuclear testing would serve this purpose.10 Moreover, the resumption of testing was 
perceived to counteract the Soviet Union’s misconceptions about the Kennedy 
Administration’s shift away from too exclusive a nuclear doctrine toward flexible 
response.11 Three options were considered in this meeting. First, to continue the 
voluntary suspension but to clearly announce a fixed deadline, after which testing 
would resume; second, to resume underground testing; and third, to begin with 
seismic research tests such as those proposed under Eisenhower to explore 
                                                
8 Subject: The Case for Resumption of Nuclear Tests, 28 April 1961; Reference Copy, 
Box 439; Robert W. Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; 
John F. Kennedy Library. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. This was a perception shared by the American press. Komer wrote to 
McGeorge Bundy only days later and noted that The Washington Post “decided we 
can’t resume testing because it would give us too big a black eye, coming after Cuba.” 
Memorandum for McGB from RWK, 1 May 1961; Reference Copy, Box 439; Robert 
W. Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John F. Kennedy 
Library. At about this time, Robert Wilson, a commissioner of the AEC, made a 
public appeal for the resumption of underground weapons tests. See Robert E. 
Wilson, "The Need for the Early Resumption of Underground Nuclear Weapons 
Tests," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 105, no. 2 (April 1961). 
11 For an excellent account of this shift from New Look and massive retaliation to 
flexible response, see Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear 
War. 
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decoupling.12 The attendees concluded that “whatever we did we should not be the 
ones to break off Geneva talks” and that the onus for just that should be left to the 
Soviet Union.13 
In May, the AEC recommended the second and third of these options. Seaborg 
wrote to John McCloy, Kennedy’s advisor on disarmament, and recommended that 
“immediately after the termination of negotiations” at Geneva, or even “before that 
time,” the United States begin underground tests for both weapons testing and seismic 
research purposes. 14  Seaborg included a surprisingly detailed test schedule that 
encompassed a 5-kiloton underground shot for seismic research (not dissimilar to 
those tests proposed by his predecessor, John McCone, in the first year of the 
moratorium); proof tests of both the Polaris missile and the Davy Crockett rocket; and 
a developmental test of a nuclear shell for 155mm artillery.15 The first of these tests, 
Seaborg stressed, could not be detonated earlier than ten weeks from the date of 
authorization, a point that Komer had also made in the meeting of April.16 This is a 
particularly important point when one considers the far more rapid resumption of 
testing achieved by the United States barely four months later. 
                                                
12 Subject: The Case for Resumption of Nuclear Tests, 28 April 1961; Reference 
Copy, Box 439; Robert W. Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security 
Files; John F. Kennedy Library. For the proposed series of seismic research shots 
under Eisenhower, see Chapter Four of this thesis. 
13 Memorandum for the Record, Informal Meeting on Contingency Planning for the 
Resumption of Nuclear Testing, 27 April 1961; Reference Copy, Box 439; Robert W. 
Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John F. Kennedy 
Library. 
14 Letter to John McCloy from Glenn Seaborg, 5 May 1961; Reference Copy, Box 
299; Subjects; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John F. Kennedy 
Library. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid and Subject: The Case for Resumption of Nuclear Tests, 28 April 1961; 
Reference Copy, Box 439; Robert W. Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National 
Security Files; John F. Kennedy Library. 
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Advocates of a resumption of testing could not, however, agree on the 
timeframe for that recommencement. Spurgeon Keeny, a member of the NSC whose 
counsel seemed to straddle both national security and science and technology, advised 
that the test ban negotiations be placed high on the agenda for the Vienna conference, 
but, if the Soviet response was unsatisfactory, the decision should be made to resume 
nuclear testing in December 1961.17 This was obviously a longer period of time than 
the ten weeks expressed by Seaborg and Komer. Keeny wrote that  
Choice of this date would permit the design of a militarily useful test series of 
relatively short duration and would begin after the adjournment of the U.N. 
General Assembly. Preparation for the test series should begin after the 
decision on an orderly and not on a crash basis.18 
 
Keeny was outlining two important points. The first of these was that there 
was a temptation to leap into a crash test program that would not achieve militarily 
useful ends. Despite his counsel, the United States would submit to that temptation 
and begin a crash test program once the Soviet Union recommenced testing in 
September. The second was that nuclear testing – specifically, its recommencement 
after a period of suspension – had assumed such a diplomatic and political character 
that Washington would be remiss to conduct such tests at the same time as the 
convening of the General Assembly of the United Nations. To do so would provide a 
forum for either the Soviet Union or the non-aligned countries to loudly voice their 
opposition to U.S. tests. Related to this last point was the realisation that the norm 
established under Truman, and eroded under Eisenhower, that nuclear testing was a 
                                                
17 Recommendation on Test Ban, 25 May 1961; Reference Copy, Box 439; Robert W. 
Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John F. Kennedy 
Library. These recommendations are appended to a letter from Keeny to “Bob,” 
presumably Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense. 
18 Ibid. Emphasis from the original. In the foreword to the addressee, Keeny states 
that “although I originally preferred an early July date, we have now delayed decision 
too long to hold a useful test series of short duration beginning reasonably in advance 
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rational and acceptable state action had been so entirely undermined by the 
moratorium that Washington now feared conducting such tests at the same time as the 
meeting of the United Nations. Many weeks later, Komer returned to the issue of the 
United Nations and, anticipating Kennedy’s thoughts, imagined that the U.S. would 
resume testing “only after an all-out effort to validate our position, which means after 
the UNGA.”19 This was a different perception of the General Assembly than that 
expressed by Keeny, but a no less diplomatic one regarding the consequences of U.S. 
testing. 
The internal shift toward test resumption within the Kennedy Administration 
was predicated upon the test ban negotiations, progressing poorly but still active at 
Geneva. The summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna promised an 
opportunity to reignite the discussions. The two leaders met on 3 and 4 June, and 
Kennedy’s weak performance in this meeting is still discussed by historians.20 
Dialogue regarding the test ban was eclipsed by Khrushchev’s menacing comments 
on Berlin, and, in the absence of measurable progress, modest moves continued 
toward recommencing U.S. tests. 
Throughout June and July, the debate regarding resumption deepened and its 
consequences became starker. Two dimensions to the decision to recommence testing 
were identified less than a fortnight after Vienna. The first was entirely political: that 
the United States should resume testing to assert its freedom of action. The second 
recalled the national security arguments arrayed against the moratorium in 1958: that 
                                                
19 Letter to Arthur [M. Schlesinger Jr.] from Robert W. Komer, 28 July 1961; 
Reference Copy, Box 439; Robert W. Komer; Papers of President Kennedy, National 
Security Files; John F. Kennedy Library. 
20 See Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963  
(New York: Harper Collins, 1991). For the meeting as seen from Khrushchev’s 
perspective, see chapter seventeen of William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man, His 
Era  (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 480-506. 
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the “balance of military advantage” favoured resumption because of the expected 
gains and because the Soviet Union might already be testing clandestinely.21 This 
same memorandum, written to the under-secretary of state, expressed the “certainty” 
that the Soviet Union would resume testing once the United States did so. Just over 
three weeks after Vienna, the head of the USIA, Edward R. Murrow, described the 
test ban issue and the U.S. resumption of testing as “a key, conceivably the key, to our 
Cold War posture in the coming year.”22 On this he was largely correct, although 
Murrow could not have foreseen the course taken to U.S. resumption, nor the 
connection between test resumption and the intensifying Berlin crisis. Murrow also 
provided a very detailed public relations plan for the resumption of testing by the U.S. 
and the U.K., which placed an emphasis on “the irreducible minimum security 
requirements of the free world including the neutrals.”23 
It was within this context that, on 21 July, what was probably the single most 
important document for its bearing upon the test resumption debate was submitted to 
the NSC: the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing, referred to as the 
Panofsky Report after its chairman, the balding and bespectacled Stanford physicist, 
Professor Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky.24 The Panofsky Report considered the technical 
                                                
21 Subject: Program for Dealing with Adverse Public Reaction Abroad in Response to 
Renewed U.S. Nuclear Testing, 16 June 1961; Reference Copy, Box 299; Subjects; 
Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John F. Kennedy Library. 
22 Memorandum for Chester Bowles from Edward R. Murrow, 24 June 1961; 
Reference Copy, Box 299; Subjects; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security 
Files; John F. Kennedy Library. Emphasis from the original. Edward Murrow was the 
broadcast journalist who used his television program to confront Senator Joseph 
McCarthy at the height of McCarthyism. 
23 Ibid. 
24 The panel was composed of the luminaries of the U.S. scientific policy sphere, 
including Hans Bethe, Norris Bradbury (the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory), 
John S. Foster Jr. (director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory), George Kistiakowsky 
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questions related to U.S. resumption – but made no comment on “very important non-
technical or military issues” that the report acknowledged were equally significant.25 
It was a very cogent and articulate document, which concluded that no urgency 
existed to recommence nuclear testing and that the decision to resume was governed 
solely by non-technical considerations.26 The Panofsky Report stated that there was 
no evidence for any Soviet clandestine testing since November 1958, and that any 
suspicious activity identified by intelligence was “equally compatible” with many 
activities unrelated to testing. 27  The panel considered the consequences of the 
resumption of underground testing and made a number of important points. First, 
weapons development tests would not be seriously impaired by restriction to 
underground testing, although that restriction would make some tests more difficult 
and expensive. Second, some weapons effects tests could not be carried out if testing 
was confined underground because of the importance of high-altitude and airburst 
shots to effects studies. The report noted that such high altitude tests were of interest 
to, but not critical to, the “AICBM problem.” Third, in a circumstance where the 
United States conducted no nuclear tests but the Soviet Union undertook “very 
extensive clandestine testing,” the Soviet Union’s nuclear warhead capabilities could 
surpass those of the United States “in as little as three or four years.”28 This last point 
                                                                                                                                      
(Eisenhower’s science advisor after James Killian), Spurgeon Keeny (quoted above), 
and many other physicists. 
25 Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing July 21, 1961, page 1; Reference 
Copy, Box 301; Subjects; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John 
F. Kennedy Library. 
26 Ibid, page 7. 
27 Ibid, page 2. This section of the report confirmed the argument made during the 
Eisenhower Administration that greater levels of clandestine activity – for example, 
decoupling – would correspondingly have a greater possibility of detection through 
“conventional intelligence.” 
28 Ibid, pages 5, 10-11. 
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was undoubtedly alarming to its readers, but posed no immediate threat to U.S. 
nuclear superiority. 
Also remarkable about the Panofsky Report was the explicit connection it 
drew between the type and objectives of nuclear tests, and the doctrine for the use of 
nuclear weapons. This was a connection that had been poorly made until the Panofsky 
Report. For example, improvements in yield-to-weight ratios achieved through 
weapons development tests affected, above all, mobile, high-yield weapons that were 
perfectly suited for a deterrent strategy. These weapons could survive a pre-emptive 
attack (through their mobility) and then destroy large, soft targets like cities (through 
their high yield). Test series that aimed at improvements in yield-to-weight ratio thus 
complemented a deterrent strategy. However, the Panofsky Report grimly if 
understatedly noted that development along these lines had reached something of a 
horizon because 
warheads of present yields delivered with the [precision] of existing systems 
would so completely over-kill the population and over-destroy the floor space 
of urban area targets by blast and fire, that further increases in yields would 
produce little additional damage.29 
 
This was to say that the improvements in yield and weight of nuclear weapons, 
achieved through testing, had exceeded the requirements to destroy any individual 
target, and so there could be little practical progress to be further made in this field. 
The Soviet Union, however, certainly could not develop an advanced, mobile ballistic 
missile system such as that described above without additional tests.30 Similarly, 
unlimited underground testing would probably reduce the capabilities of both the 
United States and Soviet Union to pursue a counterforce strategy, because increases in 
yield would be offset by increased mobility (which made a nuclear force that much 
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more difficult to destroy in a counterforce attack). Just as weapons tests led to 
improved yield-to-weight ratios and the diversification of the nuclear arsenal, 
continued improvements in weapons design would only increase the mobility and 
survivability of a second-strike force, which made its destruction in a counterforce 
attack all the more difficult.31 In connecting the results of nuclear tests to the two 
strategies of deterrence and counterforce, the Panofsky Report was saying that the 
resumption of testing would contribute nothing new to the first and probably 
jeopardise American capabilities in the second. 
Probably the most important contribution of the Panofsky Report to the 
resumption debate was that, by carefully rejecting the technical arguments for a 
resumption of testing, the report highlighted the fundamentally political character of 
the decision to resume testing. Summarising the “clear impressions” left by the report, 
Marc Raskin wrote to McGeorge Bundy days later and said that because there was 
“nothing critical” in the short-term that impaired the U.S. military posture by not 
testing, “the question of test resumption is one which must be considered almost 
totally in a political and psychological context rather than in terms of strategic 
technological considerations.”32 This is an important point, but one that could only be 
made before 30 August 1961. While the moratorium remained intact, so too did U.S. 
nuclear superiority, but the achievements of the Soviet test series in 1961 jeopardised 
this, and attention was again given to the “strategic technological considerations.” 
While elements of the NSC framed the question to resume testing in terms of a 
political rather than military decision, the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of 
                                                
31 Ibid, pages 17-20. 
32 Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Marc Raskin, 25 July 1961; Reference 
Copy, Box 299; Subjects; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John 
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Staff refused to abandon those strategic technological considerations. A note for 
General Maxwell Taylor signed by Kennedy questioned why the Joint Chiefs “took a 
very strong position against the [Panofsky] Report on testing…in view of the fact that 
the Chairman of the AEC [Seaborg] seems to find himself in general agreement in the 
findings and conclusions of the report.”33 In a meeting of the NSC the next day, 
Kennedy asked Panofsky himself to comment on the criticisms of his report from the 
JCS; Panofsky replied that he could not “make any intelligent comment because the 
criticisms of the Joint Chiefs were not spelled out.”34 By way of Taylor, who at this 
time occupied an awkward position interposed between the president and the Joint 
Chiefs, the JCS replied to the president’s question and spelled out their criticisms one 
month after this meeting of the NSC. Their disagreement with the Panofsky Report 
was based entirely on the intelligence aspects of the report. The JCS believed there 
were “negligible risks involved” in clandestine testing and that, combined with the 
technical needs of the Soviet weapons program, there was a “strong possibility” that 
Moscow had clandestinely tested during the moratorium.35 The CIA, by contrast, 
believed the political risks of exposure were a great deterrent to clandestine testing, 
and agreed with the Panofsky Report that there was no evidence either way that 
                                                
33 Memorandum for General Taylor from J.F.K., 7 August 1961; Reference Copy, 
Box 302A; Subjects; Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files; John F. 
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President’s Weekend Reading, Box 2; Weekend Papers; John F. Kennedy Library. 
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Moscow had cheated during the moratorium.36 Nonetheless, despite the divergence 
between the JCS and CIA on the available intelligence, both parties “agreed to the 
need for the United States to resume nuclear testing within a reasonable time.”37 
The most persuasive counter to the Panofsky Report came from General 
Taylor himself. Appearing to write to the president on his own behalf rather than that 
of the Joint Chiefs, Taylor took the greatest strength of the Panofsky Report – the 
connections it made between testing and strategy – and adapted it to his own 
argument. Taylor stressed the shortcomings of the Panofsky Report, which self-
admittedly did not broach military issues. Taylor argued that, if the United States 
were to renounce a first strike and thus absorb a pre-emptive attack, it required a 
“secure retaliatory force, which is mobile and uses lightweight warheads”; further 
weapons development testing was required to develop this force.38 Such a need would 
be made acute if it was concluded that the Soviet Union was going to beat or had 
beaten the United States to an anti-missile missile, because lighter warheads would 
permit decoys and multiple warheads to saturate and defeat a Soviet AICBM system. 
Moreover, sounding of the arguments from his book The Uncertain Trumpet, Taylor 
suggested that current U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were “generally too large and 
their aggregate effect too destructive” for use in friendly territory, and that it was of 
                                                
36 John McCone became director of the CIA in November; given his strong belief that 
the Soviet Union would cheat during a moratorium expressed while he was chairman 
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37 Ibid. 
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greater importance for the U.S. than the Soviet Union to develop smaller atomic 
weapons for tactical warfare.39 Taylor concluded that 
a failure to resume testing seriously retards progress in developing both light 
strategic warheads and very small atomic weapons. Because of our military 
strategy, progress in both fields is worth more to us than to the USSR. This 
fact argues for a resumption of testing at once unless the most compelling of 
political arguments can be adduced against it.40 
 
Here again, as with the Panofsky Report itself, Taylor was drawing attention 
to the political dimensions of the decision to resume testing, although from an entirely 
different perspective. 
As this debate was carried out in July and August, far more practical 
preparations were being made for the recommencement of U.S. testing. In July, the 
AEC submitted details of desired tests and a rough test schedule that Robert Komer 
described as a “laundry list.”41 These tests were to be held in existing tunnels and 
holes – presumably at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) – and could begin barely a month 
after authorisation.42 Only a week after the submission of the Panofsky Report, Robert 
McNamara, the secretary of defense, sent a long memorandum to John McCloy 
calling for preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing.43 His letter requested 
weapons development tests to improve yield-to-weight ratios; weapons effects studies 
to explore results related to the AICBM; proof tests of Polaris, Minuteman and Davy 
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Crockett weapons; and seismic research tests to explore decoupling. Meanwhile, 
correspondence between McGeorge Bundy and Glenn Seaborg in early August gives 
an indication of the preparations at the NTS. The readiness of the Nevada site was 
based largely on construction undertaken during Operations PLUMBBOB and 
HARDTACK Phase II in 1957 and 1958 and the abandoned preparations for an 
underground series in 1959-60.44 Since that time, two tunnel complexes had been 
routinely cleaned, widened and lengthened. Seaborg recommended a number of 
possible actions to increase the readiness of the NTS to recommence testing that were 
ordered according to the risk of public disclosure that each action might court: for 
example, procurement of cables would involve a slight risk of public disclosure while 
tunnelling and placing of diagnostic, scientific instruments would pose an increased 
risk. Perhaps most importantly, at this point in August, the AEC could only conduct a 
few – “perhaps four” – test shots with “reasonable assurance that significant 
diagnostic information would be obtained.”45 This comment from Seaborg harks back 
to the warnings of Spurgeon Keeny in May that any resumption of testing should be 
ordered and militarily useful – because the AEC was unprepared for anything more 
than a few scientifically measured, useful test shots. Indeed, as late as 30 August, the 
day on which the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume testing and the 
White House recalled ambassador Arthur Dean from Geneva, Seaborg wrote to 
Bundy that the only purpose of rapid testing was political rather than technical 
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because “adequate diagnostic instrumentation could not be implaced [sic] and made 
operative in time.”46 
On 30 August 1961, the Soviet Union announced that it was resuming nuclear 
weapons tests, terminating the suspension that had existed for almost three years. 
According to Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy’s speechwriter and close aide, the 
president’s first reaction to the Soviet announcement was “unprintable”; according to 
McGeorge Bundy, of all the perceived Soviet provocations of 1961 and 1962, 
resumption of nuclear testing disappointed Kennedy the most.47 The debate within the 
Kennedy Administration during 1961 regarding resumption was largely rendered 
irrelevant by the Soviet decision, which freed the United States from many of its 
concerns about how to resume its own testing. The response from the White House to 
the Soviet announcement was naturally critical, but it made the point that the purpose 
of Soviet intransigence in Geneva and over Berlin was to “abandon serious 
negotiations in order to free its hand to resume nuclear weapons testing.”48 Seaborg 
agrees, arguing that the Soviets were trying to “goad” the United States into breaking 
off the Geneva negotiations.49 This argument is not a little disingenuous given that 
elements of the Kennedy Administration had contemplated and argued for U.S. test 
resumption long before the Soviet announcement was received. 
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Given the debate, muted as it was, that preceded the Soviet announcement of 
30 August, the question arises whether Moscow had beaten Washington to the punch, 
and whether the United States would have resumed testing independent of the Soviet 
decision. This section of the thesis has attempted to show that internal discussion 
regarding test resumption was not a vacuum while the suspension was in effect, and 
that the United States could not have been totally surprised by Moscow’s decision 
because it too had contemplated a similar path. But so long as Kennedy remained 
personally committed to test suspension – to British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, Kennedy described himself as a “great anti-tester”50 – and so long as the 
decision was freed from military and technical considerations and rendered a solely 
political one, it seems unlikely that the United States would have resumed testing had 
the Soviet Union not done so first. When the Soviet Union did recommence testing – 
rapidly and spectacularly – it produced a political response from the United States, 
and that response was a series of rushed nuclear tests of dubious technical value.  
 
Underground Testing Resumes, Atmospheric Testing Considered 
 The Soviet Union followed its announcement of 30 August with its first 
nuclear test only two days later, which yielded approximately 150 kilotons of TNT 
equivalent.51 The United States could contemplate a number of responses in the two 
days during which the Soviet announcement was one of intent, but the accomplished 
fact of the 1 September test limited those responses for both technical and political 
reasons. Technically, the United States feared that the Soviet Union might make 
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advances in weapons technology, such as the AICBM; politically, the Soviet Union 
could not be allowed to test unilaterally and without challenge. The balance between 
these two aspects of the United States’ response were skewed toward the political 
while Washington was caught by surprise, but, as U.S. testing resumed in the 
atmosphere and the Soviet Union tested its largest thermonuclear weapon, technical 
considerations came back into focus. 
 The Soviet resumption of nuclear testing was, by itself, a very important 
dimension of the Cold War and one not given deserved attention in the literature.52 
The decision to resume testing was closely connected in time and probably in 
motivation to the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson certainly 
thought so during a meeting in that brief period between Moscow’s announcement 
and its first test, and Khrushchev emphasised this reason on the same day during a 
meeting with members of the British parliament.53 The idea that nuclear tests – 
specifically, their controversial resumption – could influence diplomatic proceedings 
lends them political significance; more to the point, nuclear testing offered an equally 
spectacular although marginally less bellicose method to affect decisions regarding 
Berlin than the blockade that Stalin had used in 1948. Of particular note was the 
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scope and rapidity of the Soviet resumption. Moscow conducted at least three tests 
within a week of its announcement, all of a yield of tens of kilotons; by the first week 
of October, the U.S. had detected at least twenty-three airburst shots.54 Edward Teller 
cautiously wrote that “the scale and success of this test series are impressive.”55 That 
scale and success made it obvious that extensive preparation for this series had been 
undertaken by the Soviet Union during the moratorium – Roswell Gilpatric, the 
deputy secretary of defense, estimated that these preparations had begun “about two 
years prior to resumption of testing” while Chester Holifield (D-CA), the chairman of 
the JCAE, estimated that “extensive clandestine preparations had been under way for 
many months.”56 Irrespective of their length, Soviet preparations clearly surpassed the 
maintenance and widening of the Nevada underground tunnels undertaken by the 
AEC, and realised the fears of test ban opponents in both Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations. 
The U.S. response to Soviet resumption was prompt, but rushed and 
impetuous. On 2 September, the day after the first Soviet test, Kennedy sent a private 
message to General Eisenhower advising him that “the U.S. is preparing to resume 
underground testing within two or three weeks. We are delaying public announcement 
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as long as possible in order to put the responsibility squarely on the [Soviet Union].”57 
That announcement came two weeks later on 15 September, which announced the 
first U.S. underground shot conducted that afternoon at Nevada. This statement from 
the White House proclaimed that the underground test – NOUGAT ANTLER – had 
“produced no fallout,” although this was untrue and radioactivity was detected 
offsite.58 By this time, the United States had detected ten Soviet tests, three of which 
were in the megaton range.59 By contrast, ANTLER yielded either 2 or 6 kilotons.60 
The rush to oppose the Soviet Union’s testing through nuclear tests of its own, 
combined with the vast discrepancy in the yields of their respective tests, led the 
United States toward a far more haphazard test series than either Glenn Seaborg or 
Spurgeon Keeny had counselled in months prior. As early as 30 August, Seaborg 
wrote to McGeorge Bundy that 
You also inquired how soon we would be able to commence [testing], and 
from the way you phrased your question, I had the impression that you were 
more or less hoping that that answer would be that we could commence rather 
soon – primarily for strategic and not necessarily for technical reasons.61 
 
Seaborg explored this notion further many years later in his memoirs on the 
topic. He described a “sort of frenzy” that existed within the Kennedy Administration 
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in September through which each test was seen as a political demonstration “for one 
ideology or its rival.”62 Thus, there was an impulse to “emulate” the Soviet Union and 
to emphasise “the political effects rather than the military preparedness aspects of 
testing.”63 This impulse was expressed on 5 September during a meeting between 
Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Seaborg, Gilpatric, General Taylor and others in which 
the discrepancy in yield of the first Soviet and U.S. tests was discussed. The first 
Soviet test yielded 150 kilotons, while the first U.S. test was expected to yield just 20 
tons; Kennedy believed that this disparity would “invite much adverse comment” and 
requested a larger test, of 20 or more kilotons (although he settled for a test of a 
guided missile warhead that would yield around 2 kilotons).64  The urgency to 
challenge the Soviet Union with more and larger tests made the problem of 
instrumentation at Nevada particularly acute, and diminished the technical and 
military data garnered from the NOUGAT series. For these reasons, Operation 
NOUGAT was a test series of profoundly political character that only tangentially 
responded to technical requirements, mostly in the form of proof tests. 
While it was the rapidity and scale of the Soviet test series that drove the 
political response from the United States, those same characteristics, after reflection, 
focussed attention toward a comprehensive and measured test series. At the end of a 
long memorandum dated from the end of November, Seaborg articulated the 
fundamentally different approaches that the United States and Soviet Union had taken 
to the moratorium and what those meant for U.S. testing. He asserted that because the 
United States “was negotiating in good faith” at Geneva, its weapons design efforts 
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during the period of suspension was concentrated on “devices that could be stockpiled 
with adequate assurance without tests” – meaning weapons that did not depart 
radically from already proven concepts and designs.65 By contrast, the “available 
evidence” – presumably, the high number and yield of Soviet atmospheric shots since 
1 September – suggested that Moscow had anticipated future atmospheric testing and 
“orientated [its] efforts toward significant advances requiring such testing.”66 This 
line of thought, laced with suspicion as it was, articulated the fear that the Soviet 
Union would make important technological or theoretical progress in the field of 
nuclear weaponry that threatened the security of the United States, which it needed to 
match; specifically, through atmospheric testing. 
The balance between the Kennedy Administration’s technical and political 
perceptions of testing was conveyed in early November in a statement through which 
the president turned the nation’s attention to atmospheric testing. The Soviet Union 
conducted its largest test (and what remains the highest-yield nuclear test ever 
conducted) on 30 October, almost exactly three years after the beginning of the 
moratorium. Kennedy publicly announced this test on 2 November, which, he noted, 
“exceeded 50 megatons.”67 Kennedy explored both political and technical dimensions 
when he said that the 30 October test “does enter into the Soviet campaign of fear, but 
these tests are, no doubt, of importance to Soviet leaders and scientists in developing 
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and improving nuclear weapons.”68 The president turned specifically to atmospheric 
testing and argued that the Soviet Union had undertaken atmospheric testing “for so-
called psychological or political reasons,” and that the United States was making 
preparations for a return to atmospheric tests “in case it becomes necessary to conduct 
them.”69 
Indeed, it was the progression of the Soviet test series and the growing 
awareness of its significance that convincingly argued the necessity for atmospheric 
tests. The question of whether the United States should also test in the atmosphere in 
effect replaced the question of whether the United States should resume testing, 
debated earlier in the year and made moot by the Soviet resumption. At about the 
same time that the United States came to appreciate the extent of Soviet preparation 
during the moratorium, Gilpatric argued that such were the technical 
accomplishments of the Soviet test series that the continued, unilateral U.S. restriction 
of atmospheric testing would “permit the USSR to obtain a technological gain of 
several years and obtain information which will be denied us without atmospheric 
testing.”70  Gilpatric was referring to effects studies most easily and effectively 
derived from atmospheric shots, especially those related to the vulnerability of 
ICBMs. He recognised that although a limited amount of data could be secured from 
low yield, underground tests, such tests could not provide all the data necessary “to 
satisfy defense requirements” and what data was obtained was done so “at a relatively 
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slow pace.”71 Gilpatric argued for atmospheric tests to supplement the ongoing 
underground shots because 
Intensifying our test activities is mandatory if we are to get the maximum 
technical data as quickly as possible. This will enable the United States to 
minimize [sic] the advantages being gained by the USSR in weapon and 
effects technology during their current tests.72 
 
Seaborg wrote to the president at least three times in October to argue for 
atmospheric testing. He requested low yield atmospheric shots at Nevada and a “3-
months’ readiness posture” for high yield atmospheric shots at Eniwetok.73 He 
observed the advantages of using tethered balloons for atmospheric shots, which 
could accelerate the NOUGAT series by one or two months and the STORAX series 
by four of five months because shots could be fired much more rapidly “if not 
inhibited by the lengthy process of preparing underground sites.”74 Not only were 
they faster, but atmospheric tests were also cheaper to conduct than underground 
tests. But, perhaps most decisive of his arguments was that underground testing was 
not suitable for tests of some weapons systems, effects tests, or proof tests of some 
stockpile weapons.75 Although Seaborg did not explicitly say so, this argument, taken 
in conjunction with Gilpatric’s memorandum of the previous day, suggest that both 
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the AEC and Department of Defense had the AICBM in mind when they pushed for 
atmospheric testing. Seaborg, moreover, spoke on behalf of the laboratory directors in 
recommending the resumption of testing in the atmosphere.76 
Discursively, the problem of atmospheric testing had supplanted the wider 
question of test resumption, and it was not without its opponents. Carl Kaysen, the 
deputy special assistant for national security affairs, submitted two papers to Kennedy 
in January 1962 arguing eloquently against the recommencement of atmospheric 
testing. He quite accurately observed that “while nuclear tests are not the most critical 
element in our strategic posture, they are the most highly visible and emotionally 
charged aspect of the arms race.”77 Here Kaysen was touching on the symbolic and 
political function of nuclear testing since the moratorium. But he warned that 
atmospheric testing would provoke a Soviet response, and that a series of atmospheric 
tests would not satisfactorily answer the questions to which they were directed and 
“must be viewed not as a self-contained series of tests but as the first step in what will 
be a continuing and expanding program of testing in the atmosphere.”78 The spiralling 
momentum toward further and further testing, experienced and curbed by 
Eisenhower, loomed again, and Kaysen feared that “the next opportunity for a pause 
will not arise till we and the [Soviet Union] have each completed at least two test 
series, a period of three or four years.”79 In a technical sense, Kaysen seconded 
Jerome Weisner, the president’s science advisor, in saying that prospective 
technological losses from a continued suspension on atmospheric tests could be 
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compensated through “more extensive exploitation” of underground and outer space 
testing.80 Kaysen rejected the technical benefits of atmospheric testing by instead 
indicating, presciently it turned out, that anticipated weapons effects related to radar 
blackout (realised in the FISHBOWL tests) would only serve to show “how much less 
good” the AICBM was likely to be, because these effects could potentially limit the 
usefulness of ballistic missile interception.81 Marc Raskin also articulated arguments 
against atmospheric resumption, although he framed his opinion in terms of both soft 
and hard power. He submitted to McGeorge Bundy that the United States could 
“reclaim” its moral and political leadership by not resuming tests in the atmosphere 
and that this would contrast with the tarnished reputations of the Soviet Union, United 
Kingdom and France.82 More interestingly, Raskin argued that the U.S. return to 
atmospheric testing would indicate a precarious military balance between Washington 
and Moscow, because “one series of tests by the [Soviet Union] was enough to put the 
United States in jeopardy and in panic of its security.”83 This is a persuasive line of 
thought, and one that perfectly articulates Sagan’s security model, but one that does 
not seem to have been developed by other actors within the Kennedy Administration. 
Finally, as if to balance these hard and soft arguments, Raskin suggested that the 
successful development of either the AICBM or the penetration of a Soviet defense 
system (the goals of atmospheric testing) would only affect the escalation and 
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acceleration of the arms race.84 How Kennedy received these arguments is unknown, 
but Robert Komer wrote a direct reply to Kaysen’s memorandum that implied that 
any argument against atmospheric testing was overshadowed by the political 
arguments for atmospheric testing: 
At a time of crisis over Berlin and [south-east Asia]…it may be terribly 
important to utilize [sic] to the optimum the political deterrent value of any 
nuclear posture. Thus, even if further atmospheric testing will not produce 
major military gains, I see political arguments for test resumption.85 
 
Testing, in this case in the atmosphere, for the sake of applying diplomatic 
pressure to the Soviet Union was precisely the same motivation the United States 
credited to the resumption of Soviet testing in September, and it appeared, at least to 
Komer, to be an especially important reason for doing so. 
Kennedy himself was divided on atmospheric testing by his instinctive 
opposition to testing and by the counsel of his advisors. At the end of 1961, 
McGeorge Bundy surveyed the positions of the most senior advisors: vice-president 
Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, John McCone (now director of 
central intelligence), Glenn Seaborg, Harold Brown and himself. “I regret to say,” 
Bundy wrote to Kennedy, “that every one of these men, except yourself, favors 
atmospheric testing.”86 Seaborg’s memoirs describe an ambivalent president during 
December 1961 and January 1962: “while I did not in general find Kennedy to be an 
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indecisive man, he did vacillate on issues related to nuclear testing.”87 Kennedy had 
as company the American people, who, surveys showed, were deeply divided on the 
issue. At the end of November, a Gallup Poll revealed that 44% of respondents 
favoured the resumption of U.S. atmospheric testing, while 45% opposed it. 88 
Theodore Sorensen noted that these figures made a national consensus behind a 
presidential decision more difficult, although he did point out that Kennedy’s 
“reservoir of goodwill” was higher than that “which enabled Eisenhower to withstand 
similar pressures from the same people who wanted him to resume while the Geneva 
talks were in progress.”89 
There was, however, a practical obstruction to the resumption of atmospheric 
testing. High yield shots had always been conducted at the Pacific Proving Ground 
and plans submitted by the AEC and Department of Defense for an atmospheric test 
series called for the use of the Pacific islands. As Seaborg wrote to Kennedy, 
Johnston Island and Eniwetok Atoll were the “logical choices” because of Johnston 
Island’s missile launching facilities and Eniwetok’s existing test installations. 90 
However, Eniwetok Atoll was part of the Trust Territory administered by the United 
States “subject to the supervision” of the United Nations after it was captured from 
Japan in the Second World War, and the State Department objected to its use in 
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atmospheric tests because of inherent opposition from the United Nations.91 Dean 
Rusk feared that 
We are especially vulnerable to charges that by conducting tests in the Trust 
Territory we avoid exposing our own continental inhabitants to the dangers 
involved in proximity to atomic blasts by exposing our [Marshallese] wards in 
the Trust Territory to those same dangers. Such an argument is strengthened 
by the fact that the people of Rongelap have already suffered some injury as a 
result of their proximity to an atomic blast in the past [CASTLE BRAVO].92 
 
The solution to this problem was to use the British possession of Christmas 
Island in conjunction with Johnston Island. The AEC identified the advantages of 
Christmas Island over other potential locations: foremost, it was not part of a U.N. 
trusteeship; it was located far from inhabited areas; basic facilities including an 
airstrip already existed; the island was relatively large; and it possessed a good 
harbour.93 The use of Christmas Island was secured through a series of diplomatic 
exchanges from November 1961 through January 1962, which reached a crescendo 
with the Bermuda Summit of 21 and 22 December 1961 – the same meeting in which 
Kennedy described himself as a “great anti-tester.”94 Christmas Island was eventually 
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used for all the shots of the Operation DOMINIC series with the exception of the 
high-altitude shots of FISHBOWL, which were fired above Johnston Island. 
After an unassertive, internal debate about recommencing nuclear testing by 
itself, the United States resumed underground tests on 15 September 1961. This 
underground series, Operation NOUGAT, was almost entirely a political response to 
Soviet resumption and achieved little in a technical sense beyond proof tests of 
stockpiled warheads. This was because the NTS was unprepared for a measured test 
series and lacked the diagnostic equipment to record militarily and scientifically 
important information, and the urgency to resume precluded the installation of that 
equipment. NOUGAT was rushed and haphazard as a result of a political decision to 
oppose Soviet testing. The political dimension to test resumption came to be 
appreciated by members of the NSC, particularly Robert Komer, as a means to apply 
diplomatic pressure to the Soviet Union over issues such as Berlin, and this 
appreciation encouraged the extension of U.S. testing into the atmosphere. At the 
same time, the United States became aware, or perhaps fearful, that the extensive 
Soviet test series presaged important technological or theoretical developments, 
particularly in the field of the AICBM, and this awareness in turn compelled U.S. 
atmospheric testing to match. The political character of U.S. resumption speaks to the 
underlying threat that the Soviet 1961 series posed to the American nuclear lead, 
because almost without debate it was concluded that the Soviet series must be 
matched. As the most visible example of this conclusion, NOUGAT proved the old 
adage that half of something is better than all of nothing. But the return to nuclear 
testing after almost three years of suspension brought with it all the momentum for 
more and more tests that was seen under Eisenhower, a momentum that Kennedy 
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weighed in late 1961 and early 1962. After overcoming the obstacle posed by 
Eniwetok Atoll and Christmas Island, the United States detonated its first atmospheric 
test on 25 April 1962. Thus began Operation DOMINIC, and I turn next to the 
balance between U.S. and Soviet nuclear testing achieved through their test series of 
1961-1963. 
 
The Balance Between U.S. and Soviet Testing 
The very different approaches taken by Washington and Moscow to the test 
moratorium and to test resumption – for example, the extensive preparations made by 
the Soviet Union to test and the ambivalent U.S. return to atmospheric testing – led to 
dissimilar test series between 1961 and 1963. As these were the final atmospheric 
series conducted by each nation, a circumstance preserved by international agreement 
rather than voluntary moratorium, the respective positions of each testing program 
was of special significance. Unlike 1958, where the United States had enjoyed a 
relative advantage in nuclear technology, the comparative positions of the U.S. and 
Soviet test programs were less clear in 1963, and, as a result of their dissimilar test 
series, the United States and Soviet Union stood in asymmetric positions in three 
areas: yield, medium of testing, and effects data. 
The clearest divergence between U.S. and Soviet nuclear technology was in 
yield. This difference was apparent by the end of 1961 and remained the case by 
1963. Kennedy and Macmillan discussed just this at the Bermuda Summit, and agreed 
that “in light-weight bombs, one half to one megaton, the United States is clearly 
ahead. In the three [to] four megaton range, the two countries are about equal, and the 
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Soviet Union has the advantage in the range from 25-100 megatons.”95 The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff reached the same conclusion almost two years later, despite the 
intervening test series. The JCS indicated that the Soviet Union was ahead of the 
United States in high yield – “tens of megatons” – technology in addition to weapons 
effects related to very high yield devices, but “lags somewhat behind” the U.S. at low 
yields.96 This advantage was accrued through high yield atmospheric shots between 
1961 and 1963: the Soviet Union conducted thirty-two tests of devices above one 
megaton during this time, a figure three and a half times greater than similar U.S. tests 
during that time and three more devices than the U.S. had tested since 1952.97 As 
Kennedy had hinted at in his announcement of the Soviet test of 30 October 
(mentioned above), very high yield weapons served a military as well as a political-
psychological purpose, as they were able to inflict damage to a target before 
interception by “presently conceived anti-ICBM systems.”98 
The Soviet lead in the field of very high yield weapons, a field not explored by 
the United States except accidentally, was demonstrated to the world through the 30 
October 1961 test. The exact yield of this Soviet test remains unclear, although it was 
certainly so bewilderingly high a yield as to escape easy description. Many sources 
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within the Kennedy Administration – including the normally opposed Bethe and 
Teller – attribute a yield of 60 megatons to the test, while post-Cold War sources 
instead credit 50 megatons.99 Either figure greatly eclipsed the CASTLE BRAVO test 
of 1954, the highest yield test conducted by the United States, which yielded 15 
megatons. Hans Bethe discussed this Soviet device and the general state of nuclear 
weapons development in a public lecture at Cornell University in January 1962. He 
explained to his audience that the device tested on 30 October was designed to yield a 
staggering “100 megatons or slightly more.”100 As designed, the fusion fuel of the 
device was surrounded with a tamper of fissionable uranium, but this was instead 
replaced in the test by a jacket of neutron-reflecting lead that “gave only a few 
megatons of fission.”101 Bethe was reprimanded by the AEC for sharing this detailed 
information in a public lecture.102 
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Along with the different emphases each power placed on the yield of its tests, 
the United States and Soviet Union differed also in the medium in which those tests 
were conducted. The Soviet Union resumed atmospheric testing immediately, while 
the United States recommenced testing underground and only after many months 
moved to atmospheric shots. Although this was an awkward decision in a political 
sense – for example, see Kennedy’s concern with the unfavourable comparison of 
yield of U.S. and Soviet tests – there was a long-term technical advantage. The United 
States had more experience with underground testing than the Soviet Union, and was 
as a result “far ahead” in its “capacity to test underground.”103 It was, after all, the 
United States through Operations PLUMBBOB and HARDTACK II that had 
determined the difficulties of detection posed by underground tests, and, of the three 
test series conducted by the United States during the period of resumption, two were 
underground series. By contrast, the Soviet Union had little to no experience with 
underground testing. To develop the infrastructure and facilities for underground tests 
would be both “costly and time-consuming,” and such an effort might slow Moscow’s 
progress by “the equivalent of a year.”104 The United States, meanwhile, had between 
February and May 1963 developed the ability to conduct simultaneous underground 
detonations – an important technique for defeating or confusing the detection of 
underground tests. 105  Indeed, the Soviet inexperience with underground nuclear 
testing, particularly compared to the United States’ capability to obfuscate its own 
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underground shots, in essence deflated the fears of test ban opponents who had 
imagined the Soviet Union capable of extensive, clandestine, underground test series. 
A further although less distinct divergence between the U.S. and Soviet test 
series was in the area of weapons effects. The Twining Committee Report – an 
alarming document authored by a committee that included Edward Teller and was 
chaired by the former chairman of the JCS, General Nathan Twining – explored the 
consequences of U.S. and Soviet effects tests.106 Both nations had conducted high 
altitude effects tests related to the phenomena of radar blackout and radio absorption, 
and the U.S. had obtained “considerable information on this effect.”107 But the tests 
that had generated this information were all nighttime shots, and evidence from the 
HARDTACK TEAK shot of 1958 had suggested that the effects were more 
pronounced in daylight. This was because of the phenomenon of photodetachment, 
presumably caused by the interaction of the sun’s electromagnetism with the products 
of the bomb debris, and “the blackout from a daytime shot – both radar and 
communications – might thus be far greater than for a corresponding nighttime 
event.”108 Soviet tests in this field were all conducted during daytime, and, to the 
members of the Twining Committee, it seemed that the Soviet Union might have 
recorded more data and/or possessed a better understanding of the phenomena of 
blackout and communications disruption than the United States.109 But it was not 
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mentioned that the Soviet Union might instead be entirely unaware of the lesser effect 
of nighttime shots, as a direct result of its daytime tests. 
The balance between U.S. and Soviet tests between 1961 and 1963 was 
important for the acceptance of a test ban treaty. Of the three asymmetries identified 
above, Washington and Moscow each enjoyed one advantage while the third 
remained uncertain. The implication of the Soviet lead in very high yield weapons 
was that the U.S. could not realistically develop them if it committed to a test ban. 
Tests of such weapons were only possible through atmospheric testing, and their 
enormous yield made detection easy, meaning that it would be essentially impossible 
for a state to conduct clandestine tests related to very high yield weapons. The Soviet 
Union had already tested and developed weapons in this field while the United States 
had not. But the institution that, given the debate that preceded the moratorium, might 
have posed the greatest objection to this U.S. disadvantage – the JCS – was 
surprisingly sanguine about very high yield weapons. By mid-1963, the JCS had 
concluded that U.S. disadvantage in this field “should not be regarded as a major 
problem” since very high yield weapons “do not have major strategic significance.”110 
The JCS did not “regard as important” the attainment of weapons to rival the Soviet 
30 October test, and felt that “the types and numbers of megaton yield weapons 
available to us now or in the future could give [the United States] an adequate 
capability in the high-yield range.”111 Similarly, the United States held a clear 
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advantage in the only medium of testing permitted under the LTBT – underground – 
and its experience with the obfuscatory technique of simultaneous underground 
detonation gave Washington a good reason to commit to the treaty. 
Important, determinist questions emerge from the balance of Soviet and U.S. 
testing between 1961 and 1963. Until the moratorium, both powers’ nuclear test 
programs were largely linear, the Soviet following the American, with minor 
divergences such as the scientific choices between the Alarm Clock, Sloika and 
radiation implosion designs for the hydrogen bomb.112 As a result of the Soviet 
preparations during the moratorium, it conducted an extensive and effective test series 
in 1961 that the U.S. was unable to immediately match, and, by 1963, subtle but 
observable differences emerged in the emphases of their test series. These imbalances 
were mainly of yield and medium, and can be explained as political and scientific 
choices. But these differences were only of emphasis: by this stage of the Cold War, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union had progressed through fission bombs to 
boosted fission, then fusion, then toward weapons effects studies and AICBM 
defences. To what extent this linear evolution was a result of espionage, or imitation, 
or a determinist limitation imposed by nuclear science remains unclear. Lacking 
answers to this question, I shall discuss the final objective of that linear technological 
progression: the anti-ICBM. 
 
The AICBM 
Of all the technical arguments for atmospheric nuclear testing, the 
development of, and the vulnerability of intercontinental missiles to, an anti 
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intercontinental ballistic missile (AICBM) system were the most vocal and 
compelling. The AICBM cast a shadow over the debate about nuclear testing of 
shorter length but equal significance to that cast by the thermonuclear weapon during 
the hydrogen bomb debate within the Truman Administration in the winter of 1949-
1950. The attraction of the AICBM was not limited to the Kennedy Administration: 
as discussed in Chapter Four, the AICBM was held as the darling of those opposed to 
the test moratorium during the Eisenhower Administration, especially the JCS and the 
AEC. There was an understated value to the resumption of U.S. atmospheric nuclear 
testing in disproving the most optimistic assessments of the AICBM, which in the 
absence of such testing might forever have remained a promising potential on the 
technological horizon. But more generally, the AICBM holds significance because it 
represented the ultimate expression of the U.S. nuclear posture and technology at the 
time that atmospheric testing was abandoned, and was arguably the culmination of the 
eighteen tests series conducted by the United States between 1945 and 1963. 
Interest in the AICBM did not wane during the years of the moratorium, but 
supporters of that suspension had demonstrated that the fundamental problems of the 
AICBM were related to its delivery rather than its warhead. These problems included 
the engineering of, and electronic and guidance systems for, the rocket or missile that 
would deliver the warhead. It is unclear whether these problems were completely 
solved during the moratorium, but discussion regarding the AICBM and the lobbying 
of scientists such as Edward Teller suggests that they were overcome at least so far as 
to conduct relevant atmospheric effects tests in 1962. These tests were of paramount 
importance for the subsequent development of the AICBM. Teller wrote to Kennedy 
on 7 December 1961 – and this author wonders if Teller deliberately chose the 
twentieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor to underline his arguments for 
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military preparedness – and provided a clear description of the state of the AICBM at 
that time. Information pertinent to an AICBM defense and the penetration of a Soviet 
AICBM system, Teller argued, “can be obtained in most cases only by atmospheric 
testing” because weapons of megaton-yield and missile defense experiments could 
not be conducted underground.113 Teller was probably referring to the need to gather 
weapons effects data in the medium that the AICBM would be used – that is, at 
various altitudes of the atmosphere – and the excessive difficulty of containing 
megaton-yield detonations underground. 
But if the technical dilemmas had been overcome to the point of continued 
testing, the period of reflection offered by the moratorium had posed new problems to 
the AICBM. Hans Bethe best qualified this new problem in his controversial speech 
at the beginning of 1962. On the topic of the AICBM, Bethe began by implying that 
the problems of guidance and delivery had been largely solved since 1958 because it 
was “not very difficult to design a defensive missile which will come close enough to 
an ICBM to destroy it by means of an atomic explosion.”114 But he identified a 
wholly new problem: an attacker could send decoys along with its missiles, or it could 
saturate a defender’s radar with many missiles simultaneously, all of which would act 
to limit the effectiveness of an AICBM.115 Bethe made no mention in this public 
lecture of the effect of radar blackout achieved by high-altitude nuclear explosions – 
observed in the HARDTACK and ARGUS tests of 1958 – which an attacker could 
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use as a precursor to a saturation of missiles and decoys in order to penetrate an 
AICBM system. Teller discussed this problem in more detail. Decoys could be 
discerned from an incoming warhead only at relatively low altitudes, where the 
thicker atmosphere would slow down “the numerous light decoys that can be cheaply 
delivered together with the nuclear explosive,” but warheads and decoys could not be 
discriminated above an altitude of thirty or forty kilometres.116 From this point, the 
practical threat of very high yield Soviet tests (such as that of 30 October 1961) 
emerged: these weapons could cause “very extensive damage” even when detonated 
above the effective ceiling of an AICBM system.117 
Operation DOMINIC responded to the need for effects data and “greatly 
advanced” U.S. understanding of weapons effects related to the AICBM. Experiments 
were conducted to reduce “uncertainties and vulnerabilities,” reveal new physical 
phenomena, refine information regarding blackouts and penetration aids, and optimise 
warheads for the anti-ballistic missile role.118 Of particular interest were blackout 
effects, as explored in the FISHBOWL tests. It was concluded that multiple radars 
with many lines-of-sight were required to effectively defend a target because of radar 
blackout, an exceptionally expensive proposal that was made more difficult by self-
blackout, where a defensive AICBM detonation would disrupt the defender’s own 
radar. As explored in Chapter Four, radar blackout was caused by both the delayed 
fission products of the warhead as well as the ionization of the surrounding air by the 
nuclear fireball. Self-blackout could be reduced through development of a clean 
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warhead, an all-fusion device that would do away with the fissionable material that 
contributed to radar disruption. A related problem was the vulnerability of AICBM 
warheads to the nearby detonation of other interceptor warheads – because it was 
“necessary to fire more than one defensive missile at each incoming dangerous object 
in order to insure a high enough probability of kill.”119 Multiple detonations of 
AICBM warheads made the challenge of radar blackout acute. Meanwhile, 
experiments in optimised warhead design generated interest in enhanced radiation 
weapons (ERWs): the so-called neutron bomb. ERWs generated much greater high-
energy neutrons and prompt radiation than conventional nuclear weapons, and could 
be used tactically as an airburst to kill or incapacitate personnel. But for the purpose 
of an AICBM, ERWs had an increased probability to kill an incoming missile because 
the neutrons acted to induce fission within the fissionable material of an ICBM and so 
detonate the missile prematurely.120 Tests in the DOMINIC series not only explored 
the capabilities of a U.S. AICBM, but also the vulnerability of U.S. missiles to a 
Soviet AICBM; while the Soviet Union conducted as part of its final test series in 
1963 “several sophisticated high altitude experiments” that were probably 
experiments with radar blackout effects.121 
Despite the data garnered from DOMINIC and FISHBOWL, the limitations 
imposed on the AICBM were ultimately as insurmountable in 1963 and they had been 
in 1958, although for very different reasons. There were two related dimensions to the 
failure of the AICBM. Firstly, interception was a problem “dominated” by the 
concerns of the reaction time of the system, its “traffic handling capacity,” and its 
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ability to discriminate decoys from warheads.122 These problems were exacerbated by 
weapons effects like electromagnetic pulse, radar blackout and radio disruption. The 
Twining Committee Report recognised this problem but understated its consequence, 
saying only that “if the [AICBM] system is faced with multiple warheads which must 
be attacked simultaneously, it may find it difficult to operate in an environment of 
multiple fireballs even though several radars are employed.” 123  Secondly, the 
economic exchange between ICBM and AICBM did not favour the latter. It was far 
cheaper for an adversary to saturate an AICBM than it was to field a defensive system 
of sufficient complexity and ruggedness to defeat that attack. This problem was in 
turn exacerbated by the use of decoys and penetration aids, which, it seemed, would 
always remain technologically ahead of the defense.124 Probably for these reasons, 
even the Joint Chiefs of Staff – the indomitable defenders of the AICBM in 1958 – 
had concluded by mid-1963 that “in the antiballistic missile field, development of the 
US system does not depend on atmospheric testing and hence this treaty [the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty] will not significantly influence any imbalance that may exist.”125 
Moreover, it was probably the failure of the AICBM that diminished the Joint Chiefs’ 
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interest in very high yield weapons, because the chief advantage of those weapons 
was in their ability to defeat an AICBM defense. 
The AICBM was a telling example of the influence of nuclear testing on 
weapons technology and nuclear thought, and so it was appropriate that it was testing 
that ultimately proved its inefficacy. The United States entered the moratorium 
knowing that the AICBM could not be further developed through tests, but once 
technical problems with its delivery system were overcome, tests conducted as part of 
Operation DOMINIC showed that the AICBM was very vulnerable to particular 
weapons effects, and no further amount of atmospheric testing was likely to change 
that. But the AICBM also spoke to a deeper desire – more dramatically expressed 
through the Strategic Defense Initiative of the Reagan era – that nuclear weapons 
might serve defensive purposes, or that there were technological defences against the 
spectre of nuclear catastrophe. Noble though this notion was, it was a deeply flawed 
one. Speculation about the AICBM in 1962 and 1963 paints a picture of an intense, 
dramatic and confused battle fought in the airspace of a nation between incoming 
nuclear missiles and defensive, anti-missile interceptors: a battle fought by multiple 
nuclear detonations at many altitudes, filling the sky with fireballs, mushroom clouds, 
radar blackouts, radio disruption, electromagnetic pulse effects – and fallout. In the 
case of the AICBM as it was in 1963, the remedy was only marginally less deadly 
than the poison. 
 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty 
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, negotiations 
toward a test ban were reinvigorated and, following difficult talks in early 1963, the 
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path emerged to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.126 The LTBT realised at least in part the 
hopes of test ban advocates like Vannevar Bush, Thomas E. Murray, Adlai Stevenson, 
James Killian and George Kistiakowsky, and even presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy. It promised an international treaty to end atmospheric nuclear testing of far 
more durability than the moratorium that had lasted between October 1958 and 
October 1961, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union have conducted a 
nuclear test in the atmosphere, underwater or outer space since 1963. This final 
section of the chapter shall briefly explore how the LTBT came to be accepted by the 
Kennedy Administration and what its restrictions meant for U.S. nuclear testing. 
The LTBT was not a comprehensive agreement to ban all nuclear tests, 
although it was more effective than the voluntary moratorium achieved by 
Eisenhower. Testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater were 
prohibited by the treaty, which left underground tests exempt from its auspices. The 
problem of detection remained, and, despite many years of negotiation at Geneva, the 
United States and the Soviet Union could find no accord in how to solve it.127 A 
limited treaty that exempted underground testing would be far less problematic to 
monitor because of the relative ease of detecting tests conducted in the atmosphere, 
outer space, and underground. Moreover, a limited treaty was more acceptable to the 
Soviet Union and to many of the internal actors in the U.S. government (not least of 
which were the JCS and especially the Senate, whose approval of any treaty was 
essential) because underground testing still offered the potential to continue nuclear 
weapons development, albeit in a constrained fashion. Twice the United States had 
                                                
126 For the best account of the negotiations for the LTBT, see parts four and five of 
the memoirs of the chairman of the AEC, Glenn Seaborg. Seaborg, Kennedy, 
Khrushchev, and the Test Ban: 159-282. 
127 See Chapter Four. 
 The Limitation of Nuclear Testing 
 
 276 
proposed what was essentially a limited test ban – firstly, in 1959, one of 
Eisenhower’s final efforts to end nuclear testing; and, secondly, in 1961, following 
the Bermuda summit and the Soviet Union’s sudden resumption of testing – but the 
concept only became acceptable to Moscow in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. William Taubman describes a Khrushchev who only days after standing at the 
brink of nuclear war was “at last ready for the relationship Kennedy had offered at the 
Vienna summit.”128 But a test ban did not emerge immediately as the two countries 
pulled back from Cuba; in the words of Seaborg, “the high hopes that both President 
Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev seemed to have entertained that the world’s brush 
with catastrophe might hasten a test ban agreement were, for the moment, not 
realized.”129 Those high hopes took almost a year to be fulfilled. 
There were obvious consequences to the development of nuclear weapons 
from a ban on tests in the atmosphere and outer space. Most apparent was that an 
atmospheric test ban “would, for all practical purposes, eliminate for both sides the 
possibility of acquiring further effects data basic to penetration and [the AICBM].”130 
Although the AICBM had proved impractical and further refinement of the concept 
unlikely, it could not be ruled out, and it was almost certainly of comfort that neither 
power could develop a potentially destabilising technology. On the other hand, 
success of the AICBM was beholden to the “important details of design and cost,” 
and, as in 1958, these details could be solved without atmospheric testing.131 It is 
unclear which of these perspectives on the relationship between a test ban and the 
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development of the AICBM took precedence, but both acted to remove the AICBM as 
a reason for continued testing. Relatedly, the possible future of indefinite, unlimited 
nuclear testing promised “the most likely ultimate result” of technical parity between 
the United States and Soviet Union.132 A test ban in 1963 preserved however 
temporarily the U.S. advantages in low yield devices and underground testing, leaving 
only the Soviet advantage of very high yield devices which was of no interest to the 
U.S. military. Indeed, the limitation imposed by the test ban promised only modest 
technological developments, which meant that parity between the two powers could 
be realised through total stockpiled warheads and their delivery systems. A particular 
strength of the LTBT was that, by restricting potential future technological 
developments, it in turn diminished the kind of threats to a nation’s security that had 
driven the U.S. resumption of nuclear testing in 1961. 
Opposition within the Kennedy Administration to the test ban was far less 
apparent than that mounted by the AEC, JCS and Department of Defense against the 
voluntary moratorium in 1958. For reasons previously explored, including the 
inefficiency of the AICBM and the subsequent disinterest in very high yield weapons, 
the principal arguments of the JCS against a test ban were removed. Although the 
Joint Chiefs considered the advantages of any limited test ban “in reality more 
political than military,” these seemed to outweigh any military-technical 
requirements.133 The JCS described these advantages as: a potential increase of “trust 
and confidence” if the Soviet Union abided by the treaty; the easing of global 
tensions; constraint upon the “further diffusion” of nuclear weapons technology; 
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increased tensions between the nuclear Soviet Union and non-nuclear People’s 
Republic of China; reduced global fallout levels; reduction in defense costs; and a 
possible slowing of the arms race.134 Nonetheless, the JCS affirmed the importance of 
continued underground testing “at a rate to insure continued progress in nuclear 
technology” – and it is difficult to imagine that the JCS would have supported a 
comprehensive test ban.135 That Kennedy did not face the kind of domestic opposition 
to the LTBT that Eisenhower faced toward the moratorium was likely the confluence 
of several factors. Unlike the moratorium, the LTBT permitted that for which John 
McCone, fighting the rearguard as chairman of the AEC, had argued in the days 
leading up to the moratorium in October 1958: underground testing. Secondly, and 
less tangibly, the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis (and, specifically, the effect of the 
DOMINIC CALAMITY shot on 27 October 1962) probably sobered opinions in both 
Washington and Moscow regarding nuclear testing. U.S. testing had begun politically, 
and the CALAMITY test had political effects upon an international crisis. Thirdly, 
Kennedy enjoyed far greater support from the AEC under Seaborg than Eisenhower 
had under Strauss and McCone. This agential reason should not be lost among the 
more structural factors that underpinned the LTBT.136 Finally, the technological 
horizon was – for the first time in the history of U.S. nuclear testing – clear of 
potential developments. No hydrogen bomb loomed as it did in 1952, and the AICBM 
that had loomed in 1958 had been disproved by the set of tests conducted between 
1961 and 1963. In the fields of science for which atmospheric testing were relevant, 
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that horizon had been reached, and only technical improvements to delivery systems 
possible without atmospheric tests remained, such as the multiple independent re-
entry vehicle and mobile, land-based ICBMs. 
Among the contentious technical statements that Hans Bethe submitted in his 
public lecture at Cornell University in January 1962 was his opinion that “nothing 
fundamental is likely to be changed by any amount of future nuclear testing.”137 Bethe 
was certainly not an entirely objective scientist, and he was publicly committed to the 
pursuit of a test ban. But in this he was probably, for the most part, correct. It is of 
course very difficult to prove the absence of something, as Bethe argued, but it is 
possible to say that the United States’ nuclear arsenal was most secure in 1963 and 
that this alone was an excellent reason to commit to the LTBT. This security came 
through eighteen years of weapons development, weapons effects studies, safety tests, 
and proof shots that gave Washington confidence in its arsenal. In 1962 as in no other 
year before then was it possible for Bethe to say that nuclear testing promised nothing 
fundamentally new; this remained the case in 1963. 
In a nationwide radio and television address at the end of July 1963, the 
president delivered an eloquent and intelligent summary of the LTBT. Kennedy 
described the successful conclusion of negotiations for the treaty as “a shaft of light 
cut into the darkness.”138 His defense of the treaty mirrored points made later by the 
JCS: it was a step toward reduced tensions and “broader areas of agreement”; it freed 
the world from the fear of radiation and fallout; it arrested the spread of nuclear 
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weapons; and the treaty strengthened U.S. security by limiting the arms race.139 But 
these were all first steps rather than final accomplishments, and Kennedy concluded 
expressively: 
My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, get back 
from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is 
one of a thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, 
at this time, took the first step.140 
 
Indeed, the same limitations that meant the LTBT could be widely accepted 
also made that first step appear a modest thing. As Kennedy himself noted, the LTBT 
did not reduce the stockpiles of the nuclear powers, it did not halt the production of 
nuclear weapons, and it would not prevent their use in conflict.141 Seaborg agreed. In 
his memoirs on the test ban and its negotiation, he wrote that “I regard the failure to 
achieve a comprehensive test ban as a world tragedy of the first magnitude.”142 
Although a comprehensive test ban would not be signed until the Berlin Wall and the 
Iron Curtain had fallen, the first step achieved in 1963 was a not insignificant thing.  
On the morning of 24 September 1963, the United States Senate consented to 
the LTBT and, at 10:45am, President Kennedy was handed a card that read “Test ban 
vote 80-19.”143 One can imagine the president’s reaction: thus ended eighteen years of 
U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing 
 
Conclusion 
During the thousand days of the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the United 
States moved from the test moratorium in 1961, to a period of extensive testing that 
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spanned probably the most challenging crisis of the Cold War in 1962, to the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty by the end of 1963. Although nuclear testing under Kennedy 
appeared – when considered within context of the test moratorium and the erosion of 
the norm of nuclear testing the moratorium achieved – an awkward, irrational 
epilogue, these test series were of profound importance to the achievement of the 
LTBT. Only through these tests, the way in which they clearly defined the end of the 
usefulness of atmospheric testing, disproved promising technologies, and rendered 
obsolete an ineffective and voluntary agreement, could the hopes of both Eisenhower 
and Kennedy be realised, however imperfectly.  
The return to nuclear testing, which had been contemplated by Washington 
long before the Soviet Union abrogated the moratorium, was borne out of a perceived 
threat to U.S. security that was felt more acutely in 1961 than at any time under 
Truman or Eisenhower.  Although the United States had considered recommencing 
testing independently, it was unlikely to have done so while scientists advised that 
there was little technical reason to do so and the president remained personally 
committed to not testing. But the preparations the Soviet Union had made to test 
during the moratorium allowed it to conduct an impressive test series in 1961 that the 
United States could not easily match, and this, it was feared, had narrowed the 
technological gap between the two powers. The political nature of the U.S. response – 
that the Soviet Union could not be allowed to test unilaterally, no matter how 
technically ineffective the rejoinder – carries the implication of this threat to security. 
Marc Raskin observed just this when he wrote at the end of 1961 that “one series of 
tests by the [Soviet Union] was enough to put the United States in jeopardy and in 
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panic of its security.”144 But as Scott D. Sagan noted in defining the security model 
used in this chapter, it is difficult to explicitly connect this threat to individual 
decisions within the Kennedy Administration. 
The United States’ security was improved by the series of 1961 to 1963. This 
was achieved foremost in the proof tests of important weapons systems, especially the 
Polaris submarine-launched missile exploded as shot FRIGATE BIRD of Operation 
DOMINIC. Similarly, the FISHBOWL tests of DOMINIC, despite their many 
embarrassing failures, had given the United States experience in the launching of 
rockets and missiles with nuclear warheads, and effects studies from these shots had 
proven the impracticality of the AICBM. Although the United States appeared unable 
to defend itself from a Soviet attack though an AICBM system, it no longer had to 
fear the Soviet development of a similar, destabilising defense. Finally, Operations 
NOUGAT and STORAX, together with HARDTACK II, had honed Washington’s 
ability to conduct nuclear testing underground, which gave it as great an advantage as 
it entered into the LTBT in 1963 as it had enjoyed in nuclear technology going into 
the test moratorium in 1958. 
An important question was raised by the balance between U.S. security and 
the norm of nuclear testing after it was undermined by the moratorium. Glenn 
Seaborg best expressed this in his memoirs. He asked  
How could the nation’s safety and institutions be protected in the short run 
without losing sight of the larger, more distant goal of a world in which the 
enormous energies and resources now squandered on armaments could be 
redirected to bettering the human condition?145 
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The achievement of the Kennedy Administration was less the signing of the 
LTBT as it was successfully balancing these competing dimensions. Although 
armaments expenditures were not stemmed by the test ban, the universal health threat 
posed by global fallout was, and the United States increased its sense of security at 
the same time. In order to agree to the LTBT, the Soviet Union presumably also felt 
that its series had bettered its position relative to the moratorium. Indeed, the 
relationship between the LTBT and both Washington and Moscow’s sense of security 
is an intangible but important one. It is difficult to imagine one without the other; 
such a circumstance would have been not much different from the moratorium. This 
author calls for further, English-language research into the progress accomplished by 
the Soviet Union in its 1961 test series, and whether this progress went some way to 
its agreement to the LTBT. 
In his remarks at the signing of the LTBT on 7 October, Kennedy described 
two decades filled with nuclear tests but “never empty of hope”; and, as he signed the 
instruments of ratification, the president remarked that “what the future will bring, no 
one of us can know.”146 No one could know that expanded production of nuclear 
weapons would lead to superpower parity in the 1970s; no one could know that 
through multiple independent re-entry vehicles, mobile ICBMs, stand-off cruise 
missiles, and long-range submarine-launched missiles, the destructive potential of the 
superpower arsenals would only multiply; nor, on a personal level, could anyone 
know that Kennedy himself would be assassinated less than seven weeks later. 
Despite the hopes ascribed to the LTBT, the future did not bring an effective end to 
nuclear tests until the end of the Cold War itself, and, fifty years after the signing of 
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the LTBT and twenty years after the negotiation of a comprehensive ban, the 
comprehensive test ban is still yet to be ratified by the United States. The LTBT – 
“great as it is with promise”147 – drove testing underground and freed the world from 
fallout, but did not arrest the arms race. 
Rather, the end of atmospheric testing acted to considerably expand 
underground tests. Between January and September 1963, the budget for the 1964 test 
series increased to the point where the total cost ended up higher than the “assumed 
preparations and actual conduct of an atmospheric test series” in 1964.148 Along with 
the cost, the number of shots increased, and by the end of the decade almost as many 
tests were held underground as the totality of the eighteen years of testing that 
preceded the test ban. Of the 1,030 U.S. nuclear tests carried out between 1945 and 
1992, 685 were conducted after the ratification of the LTBT.149 Pandora’s box had 
been closed – although the lid remained ajar. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The history of United States’ nuclear testing between 1945 and 1963 is a vivid 
and exciting one, but one that is also of profound historical importance. It is a story of 
trailblazing scientific progress; of the improvement of weapons that came to imperil 
the species; of the rivalry between superpowers; of accidents and affected populations 
and radiological contamination; and of politics and posturing and diplomacy. The 
testing of the weapons that defined the consequences of the Cold War was, itself, a 
crucial dimension to the narrative of that conflict. The story of U.S. nuclear weapons 
testing is one in which a central question – why conduct nuclear tests? – was debated 
and held in tension between politicians, generals and scientists. It is this question that 
this thesis has explored. 
I have argued three major points. Firstly, that nuclear weapons testing was for 
the most part a rational state act in which essential information was learned that was 
relevant to nuclear weapons and their use. This information in turn illuminated other 
important issues, such as the details of a test cessation agreement. Secondly, that 
crucial to the history of nuclear testing as a rational state act was the idea of its 
normalisation. This was a process that began under Truman and was in some cases a 
deliberate act, but was for the most part organic. The norm of testing as an acceptable 
state action was forever undermined by Eisenhower’s moratorium of 1958-1961, 
which posed a political dilemma to the tests under Kennedy that was resolved only 
through the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Finally, this thesis argued that part of the reason 
Washington accepted the LTBT in 1963 was because it had accomplished all it could 
realistically expect from atmospheric weapons testing. I have also sought to enhance 
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contemporary understanding of nuclear weapons development programs through a 
history of the experiences of the world’s first and pre-eminent nuclear power, and, by 
doing so, contribute to a polemicised perception of nuclear weapons tests. 
Testing of nuclear weapons was not a process that inevitably occurred in the 
aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of the Second 
World War. Rather, there was a very real discourse within the American political and 
public sphere regarding nuclear testing, and it was the victory of those who argued for 
national security over those who perceived the diplomatic and environmental costs of 
testing that normalised nuclear weapons tests. This discourse was best observed in the 
lead-up to the Operation CROSSROADS tests of 1946 – the first peacetime test series 
held by the United States, and the first series of almost two decades of atmospheric 
testing. With CROSSROADS, public appeals against nuclear tests as well as calls 
from scientists like Oppenheimer were marginalised, and the precedent for testing of 
nuclear weapons during peacetime and for reasons other that proof-testing was 
established. Although that discourse never really went away, CROSSROADS, and 
subsequent test series, presented both precedent and fait accompli, and opponents of 
nuclear testing struggled to overcome these until 1958. 
During the presidency of Harry S. Truman, the United States conducted 
nuclear tests primarily for weapons design purposes, and it made rapid and impressive 
progress. Through important series like Operations SANDSTONE and 
GREENHOUSE, the U.S. increased the yield of its atomic weapons while 
simultaneously reducing the requirements for fissionable material like plutonium and 
uranium, and made crucial steps toward the hydrogen bomb. The first Soviet atomic 
test in August 1949 ended the American atomic monopoly and impelled the U.S. 
toward the hydrogen bomb, a path confirmed by Truman in his directive of 31 
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January 1950. By the time Truman left office, the United States had tested its first 
hydrogen bomb, and this achievement was the pinnacle of what was a remarkable 
process of weapons development. Within two test series, the United States 
accomplished a twofold increase in the yield of its atomic weapons; within four 
series, a tenfold increase; and, in only seven test series and seven years, the United 
States had created weapons almost five hundred times more powerful than the bomb 
that had destroyed Nagasaki and almost seven hundred times more powerful than the 
bomb that had destroyed Hiroshima. 
With the normalisation of nuclear weapons testing and the development of the 
hydrogen bomb under Truman, nuclear testing considerably expanded during the 
presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Test series under Truman, although trending 
generally upward in number and yield, nonetheless included three years in which no 
tests took place. Gone were these pauses under Eisenhower: every year of his 
presidency until the moratorium featured at least one test series, and, in the final ten 
months before the moratorium, three test series were conducted. These series included 
more and more test shots, and the total yield of Operations CASTLE, REDWING and 
HARDTACK Phase I was more than double the total yield of every other U.S. 
nuclear test carried out between 1945 and 1963 combined. Because of this 
extraordinary expansion, U.S. nuclear testing was at its zenith under Eisenhower. Test 
series during Eisenhower’s tenure made many technical accomplishments, including 
the miniaturisation and diversification of the U.S. nuclear arsenal that permitted 
warheads to be delivered by bomber, missile, rocket and artillery, but also became 
increasingly interested in weapons effects. The pursuit of weapons effects was best 
seen in the high-altitude tests of Operation HARDTACK I and Project ARGUS. 
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Testing under Eisenhower was suspended in October 1958 with the beginning of the 
test moratorium. 
Flawed as the test moratorium was, its prime accomplishment was to arrest the 
expansion of nuclear testing that had preceded it. Although this was only a temporary 
success – the moratorium lasted just short of three years, after which both the Soviet 
Union and United States resumed extensive testing – that period of non-testing 
undermined the norm of nuclear weapons testing as an acceptable state action. 
Nuclear tests carried out after the moratorium existed as clear contrast to a period 
devoid of testing; indeed, the resumption of testing was a controversial violation of a 
political, suspension agreement. The test series carried out during the presidency of 
John F. Kennedy, then, assumed an overwhelming political and diplomatic 
significance because of their controversy; because they diverged from the 
moratorium; and because the moratorium had eroded the idea that testing was an 
acceptable, rational state action. But it was possible, after the signing and ratification 
of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, to say that the set of tests conducted between 1961 
and 1963 were crucial to the realisation of an effective ban on atmospheric testing. 
The act of test resumption had discarded an ineffective suspension agreement and, in 
the interaction between these tests and the Cuban Missile Crisis, urged acceptance of 
a more durable cessation agreement in its place. 
This thesis has sought above all else to show how contemporary actors 
rationalised nuclear testing. Part of this rationalisation has been to survey the ideas 
that derived from testing and to demonstrate the connection between test series and 
nuclear thinking. But crucial to the argument that nuclear testing was a rational state 
action is the question: what was learned from nuclear weapons tests? Foremost, 
nuclear weapons tests provided the kind of evidence-based interpretation of nuclear 
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weapons and doctrine for their use that Michael Quinlan argued was lacking from the 
discourse on the topic. The tests conducted in the period covered by this thesis 
spectacularly demonstrated the awesome power of nuclear weapons, that same 
“uniquely appalling” destructiveness that Quinlan readily observed.1 I suggest that 
only through a test like IVY MIKE could a true sense of the scope of thermonuclear 
weapons be grasped, just as CASTLE BRAVO dramatically demonstrated the threat 
of fallout as it has come to be understood. Similarly, the refinement of weapons and 
measurement of their effect aided the creation of war plans for their use; here I am 
thinking of Operations SANDSTONE, BUSTER-JANGLE and TUMBLER-
SNAPPER, which together determined the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the 
number of weapons to be allocated to the destruction of individual targets in the event 
of war. Weapons effects tests, particularly high-altitude series like HARDTACK I and 
DOMINIC, were vital to the development of defences against missile attacks and 
methods for penetrating such defences; while underground test series like 
PLUMBBOB and HARDTACK II generated information essential to the monitoring 
of a test cessation agreement, and thus had diplomatic significance. Likewise, the 
resumption of testing in 1961 served a political function – Operation NOUGAT, for 
example, acted in part as a diplomatic response from Washington produced by 
Moscow. And while all of these examples remain closely aligned to the spectre of 
nuclear conflict, there were very real scientific benefits to nuclear testing, such as in 
the pursuit of nuclear energy, the use of nuclear weapons as tools of excavation for 
great projects, and especially in the case of Project ARGUS, which provided much 
data on the Van Allen radiation belts that surround the Earth at a time when humanity 
was beginning to explore space. That nuclear weapons technology has evolved from 
                                                
1 Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, 
Prospects  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13-14. 
 Conclusion 
 
 290 
plutonium, implosion-type fission bombs, and that nuclear doctrine has evolved from 
a single bomber dropping such a weapon on a target city, is due foremost to nuclear 
weapons testing. 
However, as Scott Sagan and Nina Tannenwald have each in their own way 
noted, the norm that governed nuclear testing changed during the period covered by 
this thesis. Sagan, for example, questioned why “was nuclear testing deemed 
prestigious and legitimate in the 1960s, but is today considered illegitimate and 
irresponsible?”2 Certainly there are larger issues related to proliferation embedded 
within this question, but related also was the delegitimisation of nuclear testing 
accomplished by the test moratorium, and of atmospheric testing specifically by the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty. I have argued that the normalisation of testing under 
Truman was followed by the expansion of testing under Eisenhower, and finally by 
the denormalisation of testing under Kennedy. There were diplomatic considerations 
in this process – such as the politically-threatening character assumed by atmospheric 
testing – as well as considerations of national security – such as the preservation of 
the U.S. lead in nuclear technology or in underground testing – but, rooted among 
these considerations, the process of denormalisation was connected to widespread 
concerns about fallout.3 
Ultimately, by the time that denormalisation had reached its apex with the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, the United States had probably accomplished all it could 
hope for from atmospheric testing. By 1963, the U.S. had developed a varied arsenal 
                                                
2 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search 
of a Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-1997): 76. 
3 As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, the relationship between nuclear testing 
and fallout, and between fallout and displaced and affected populations, is better 
explored in other sources. But testing continued underground after the Limited Test 
Ban largely because it contained fallout, and so removed the global fear of radiation 
from consideration. 
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of fission, boosted fission and fusion weapons; it had proof tested many weapons 
systems, from strategic bombs and missiles to tactical rockets and shells; it had 
experimented underground, underwater, on the surface, in the atmosphere, and in 
orbit of the planet; and it had investigated the exotic effects of nuclear explosions at 
various altitudes, including radar blackout, radio disruption and electromagnetic pulse 
effects. Through these experiments, the United States had strengthened its security 
and possessed confidence in its arsenal. With the tests conducted between 1961 and 
1963, the most optimistic hopes invested in the anti-intercontinental ballistic missile 
had been invalidated, and there were no promising, potential improvements in nuclear 
weapons discernable that required atmospheric testing. Although this author cannot 
conclude with the same confidence, it seems likely that the Soviet Union reached 
similar conclusions, and both powers agreed to the test ban treaty in the final months 
of 1963. 
In addition to the arguments summarised above, this thesis has strived to 
demonstrate that nuclear testing was a central component of the wider history of the 
Cold War, in part because of its importance to the development of the weapons that 
defined that conflict, but also because nuclear weapons tests were tied to the shifting 
balance between the superpowers. That conflict and that balance were intense 
moments in the human story. But this author, in conclusion, wishes to stress the 
bigger historical picture. After millions of years of evolution, hundreds of thousands 
of years of prehistory, and millennia of human history, the human species had 
developed weapons whose destructiveness came not through the kinetic or the 
chemical but the nuclear, through a manipulation of the underlying structures of the 
universe. That species then exploded these weapons as experiments – tremendously 
violent and energetic reactions that awed and stunned – and, through the act, refined 
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such weapons into a terrifying capability to destroy itself. It is unclear if Lewis 
Strauss was thinking in such terms, but having only recently witnessed the largest 
thermonuclear explosion ever detonated by the United States, it seems likely that he 
would have contemplated the notion when he described nuclear weapons testing as 
“this awesome field.” 
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